处在全球抗议中的奥运会危机
在西藏问题和西方对中国'侮辱'的问题上持强硬的立场预示了更大的危机
中国劳工论坛
北京奥运会已陷入危机。奥运圣火全球接力传递中的抗议活动恢复了国际社会对在西藏的中国政权和'侵犯人权' (一个蓄意的含糊其词的术语,该术语意味着国家镇压)的政策的批评。中国的反应是由国家控制的媒体带头的'捍卫中国的奥运会的'民族主义浪潮,好象这奥运会主要不是一个提供给如阿迪达斯,三星,可口可乐和麦当劳的大企业赞助商的赚钱机会,它们的在中国和世界各地的雇员看不到什么好处。
在伦敦,巴黎和旧金山发生街头抗议活动后,爆发的相互指责的竞赛激化了民族的紧张局势,该局势可能蔓延到更广泛的经济和政治冲突上去。对主办方来说,这是一个严重的失算,自1980年莫斯科奥运会以来,2008年奥运会已成为最政治化的竞赛。不过,那一年的抵制是由西方国家政府发起的,以卡特,撒切尔夫人作为急先锋并得到了他们的'朋友'邓小平(预示着中国市场化的开始)的热切支持。而今天的抗议活动从下面发起。由草根组织领导并获得非常少的国家层面上的支持和鼓励(正好相反)。事实是,到现在,抗议活动相当小,这证明了组织者在得到很少媒体和机构支持的情况下在逆境中运转着。
西方资本主义领导避免批评中国的名不副实的'共产'党(CCP),因为它们的经济是如此依赖于它的反工人和反民主的政策,而且还因为正如俗语所说的:人活在玻璃房里不应该扔石头!鉴于全世界都知道,在美国领导下的对伊拉克的占领导致大约50万人丧生,布什政府没有资格去对其他政权的行为指指点点。布什总统明显地不批评中国政权对西藏的镇压(据说自3月14日以来,有150个藏族人和20多个汉族人被杀害) ,或在作为一个整体的中国层面上,敦促北京,要和达赖喇嘛'对话' 和保持'克制' 。谈到西藏,根据中国社科院的徐由于(音译)的说法,听说有中共高层领导人这样说: "我们背后有布什的支持,所以不会有任何问题。" [瑞典Dagens Nyheter新闻, 2008年3月25日],这是复制来的近几年的对台湾的模式,既北京和华盛顿之间密切的合作以便制约即将卸任的支持独立的总统陈水扁政府的模式。
来自底层的抗议活动
国际上,各国政府对待西藏问题比起对待中国政权和发生军事镇压的苏丹和缅甸的联系问题上的批评要更为平淡,但海外资本主义真正关注的焦点是中国在非洲和东南亚不断增长的经济和外交影响力。但是,因为西方国家经济上日益依赖于中国,即使这些问题也一直被低调处理。当世界报( 2008年3月29日)问及法国外交部长库什内尔是否他的政府在西藏问题上的批评由于受到中国的经济力量的影响而“有限”的时候,这一现实被说穿了。 "事实上,这使得事情更加困难, "库什内尔作答。 "如果西藏想要而且有能力购买EPR [法语造]核反应堆,人权问题会立即被提升到和CAC40指数的经济问题的一个水平上。 "他说时谈到了巴黎股市的主要指数CAC40指数。据说法国总统萨尔科齐考虑对奥运开幕式的'抵制',但,这明显是一个伎俩以便能恢复据民意调查已经下滑的支持率。作为国事访问,去年11月就是这个萨尔科齐带领30人的代表团,其中包括一半他的内阁成员访问北京,而其人权部长却留在巴黎!萨尔科齐带走了200亿欧元的中国政府合同。
然而,这志得意满并可获巨额利润的资本主义国家政府之间的生意安排,由于奥运会引发的民族主义情绪的高涨而变得令人心烦。在欧洲,最近在金融时报(英国, 2008年4月15日)上的一项民意调查显示了一个重大的态度转变,英国,法国,德国和意大利的人们现在把中国看作一个比美国对全球稳定的威胁更大的国家。在美国,中国被视为一个比北韩或伊朗更大的威胁。这也反映在美国总统竞选中,该选举始终是一个猛击中国的机会,虽然这通常在赢家一旦当选后会淡化。尤其是希拉里正在挣扎着继续竞选,在布什的计划参加奥运开幕式的问题上圆满结束她的竞选。作为白宫西藏特使的副国务卿多布里扬斯基和达赖喇嘛会晤将在下周举行,这会进一步加深危机。在流亡西藏领导的基地的印度,藏族示威者可能得到来自印度教原教旨主义人民党(BJP)的“支持”而有着莫名的快乐,这个人民党(BJP)强烈反对克什米尔和阿萨姆邦和印度其他地区的人民的自决权,但它假惺惺指责辛格政府"对中国的公然的绥靖政策" 。
对主办者来说,保卫奥运火炬(或被中国媒体称之为'圣火')的遍布世界各地的庞大的安全警戒线宣告着这是一个灾祸。巴黎警方发言人告诉卫报[英国, 2008年4月8日]说,市的保安行动"有点像为布什总统进行的" 。这样的媒体形象,特别是负责守护圣火的由中国人民武装警察部队(PAP)“飞龙” 精选人员组成团队的高姿态并且有时表现为好斗的角色比藏族流亡政府和中国人权组织的游说和宣传更让人联想到在即将举办奥运会的中国和西藏的镇压和缺乏民主权利的问题。
在一个新的对中国和国际奥委会主办方的冲击中,足球运动员马拉多纳退出了布宜诺斯艾利斯的火炬接力,假定马拉多纳与卡斯特罗的古巴政府和委内瑞拉的总统乌戈查韦斯政府-这两个政权已经公开表示支持中国军事镇压西藏-联系紧密的话,该举动是突兀的。
强硬的形势
在写作本文时,形势越来越强硬。但是中国独裁政府拒绝取消涵盖六大洲的有史以来最长的火炬接力( 130天),因为这会被看作在国际压力面前表现为软弱的迹象,退却可能会严重动摇一党专政的地位。各种抗议团体意识到来自国际上的越来越多的支持,当然由于资产阶级政客正忙于选举便使用虚伪的和民族主义的论调。他们采取这一狡猾的立场,是因为统治阶级,尤其是占主导地位的帝国主义国家,震惊于中国政权在有关奥运的问题上的顽固立场并认为这是中国政权在未来其他-更重要的-经济和地缘政治争端上会采取更强硬的立场的一个迹象。
国际奥林匹克委员会(IOC),突然发现自己处在作为抗议行动目标的八国集团,世贸组织和其他象征着公司的贪婪和强权政治的对象之列。如果在主要国家存在强大的工人阶级政党,他们将有可能呼吁工人团结起来与全球性的政治和宗教压迫和资本主义的剥削斗争。不幸的是,由于没有一个代表工人阶级或站在国际主义立场的重要组织,围绕着抗议的争论在各方面反而摆出民族主义的调子。示威普遍地被西方媒体称为"反中国的"或"亲中的"示威 ,把独裁政权和被压迫的人民群众混为一谈(经常代表美国和其他外国公司) 。许多中国人看来,这似乎是一项针对作为传统上被西方种族主义统治者看低的人民的他们的运动,基于这个原因,在此阶段,许多人在中共政权的支持下正纷纷站在民族主义路线上。
事实上为西藏自由运动代言的很多人都是西方人,而不是藏族人,这也有利于给共产党的宣传提供口实说抗议活动是由西方国家政府和中央情报局组织的,他们利用西藏问题对中国进行攻击。正如我们所看到的正好相反。连达赖喇嘛和他的资产阶级西藏流亡政府-他们拼命试图和中国政权谈判-也不支持抗议或呼吁抵制奥林匹克。达赖喇嘛最近确认甚至在对西藏的镇压继续着的情况下,他的政府的特使已经开始与北京政权进行"私人"会谈。国家主席胡锦涛要求达赖喇嘛表现出"具体行动" 以便能够举行认真的会谈。北京希望西藏精神领袖自己能无条件地和抗议保持距离并敦促他的追随者与当局合作。在今后一段时间里,这中可能性并没有被排除,但会导致他和西藏流亡运动更深的分裂并进一步削弱其领导力,他的和解路线就遭到了严厉批评。
奥运是'非政治性'的吗?
各处的资本主义机关声称政治不应该带进体育,这是纯粹的伪善!1971年毛泽东治下,中国向西方打开大门就是以允许美国的国家乒乓球队在中国打球的决定开始的。今天,特别地看西藏一隅,中国政权正在利用奥运会问题作为一个具有高度政治性的话题。它进行了大规模的宣传活动,把据称是反中国倾向的针对奥林匹克的抗议制造成中国受到攻击而且必须保卫自己的样子。由于受到西方和日本帝国主义在过去犯下的罪行之苦,中国的民族主义已深深扎根。但细看该政权的政策,暴露了其目前立场的虚伪性。中共废除了该国曾经的广泛的福利制度(免费医疗,廉价公共住房,免费上学)以及资助这一切改革的官僚计划经济,都是为了拥抱资本主义经济和大量的外国资本。 50000家美国公司在中国境内经营并以减税,补贴土地和廉价劳动力的形式从中共政权那里得到大量的施舍。中国工人和农民到底有什么理由应该'保卫' 这个东西,或目前的政权推行的其他的资本主义政策呢?
中共政权与外国资本的战略联盟在北京奥运会中体现出来了。奥运是公司赞助的盛事,主要的作用是为其赞助商和新闻媒体及建筑商获得巨额利润。它提供给在艰难的经济中生存下来的工人除了暂时性的娱乐外几乎什么都没有!被中国政权改造成为中国'荣誉'一个象征的火炬接力已经似乎作为纳粹胜利的象征的1936年柏林奥运会开始了其进程。它和国际主义或和谐关系没有任何关系。3月通过西藏(包括计划攀登珠穆朗玛峰)、新疆和台湾的路线的中国政权的决定都不能被形容为'非政治性的'。这种过分的宣传噱头是要显示自己的力量并使民众从真正的问题:失业,低工资,致命的污染和急剧上升的食品价格上转移注意力的各处统治精英的特点。
从某种意义上说,世界人口的一半将'抵制'今年的奥运会,因为他们太穷而没有电视或不能停止劳作。专门兴建的北京国家体育场-'鸟巢' -能容纳最多9万1千名观众,或中国的人口的0.00007%。尽管事实上,他们的城市是中国一个富有的城市,大多数北京市民买不起体育场门票,在这些地方最好的座位将被富裕的外国人和中国的精英占用。运动场耗资35亿元( 3.5亿欧元)兴建。同时在中国, 2.6亿人,其中有许多是藏族和其他少数民族的人口,都无法获得安全的饮用水。由于在中国北方的荒漠化和地下含水层损耗,北京市本身正面临严峻的缺水问题。 为比赛期间三个星期里呆在该城市的外国记者、运动员和游客“解决”这个问题,北京全市已获准流干邻近省河北的用水储备,这正促使工业主和农民进行抗议。
2008年奥运会是为了庆祝这个'新中国',其乃这个资本主义全球化进程中的一个关键玩家,而其贫富差距现在比俄罗斯或印度更为极端。中国有106个美元计的亿万富翁,只比美国少。然而, 3亿人仍然生活在不到世界银行定义为绝对贫困的每一天一美元( 7元)的水平下。对于绝大多数仍旧贫困的中国人来说,如今所需要的是斗争和组织起来-而不是那浪费性的民族主义者和公司的盛会!
民族主义的冲突
所描绘的一切批评它的政策都是'攻击'中国和“企图分裂“中国,暂时,中共已成功地动员公众的支持,尤其是来自城市的中产阶层与生活在国外的华人社区阶层的支持。中文传媒三十年来没有使用过这样的反西方言论,他们几十年来一直试图效仿和垂涎西方的一切事物。即使是政权的批评者和中国左派部分也在一定程度上受到这种民族主义浪潮的席卷。中共是抄袭了布什和美国共和党的宣传方式,布什和美国共和党虚假地把反对伊拉克和阿富汗的战争都描绘成为'反美'和'支持恐怖'的 。结果-出轨-可以在类似的意义上导致对欺骗其人民的政府的大规模的失望和愤怒。但这一政策也带来了巨大的民族主义升级的和由政客机会主义地掀起的以反中国民族主义的形式出现的全球性反弹的风险。
资产阶级媒体在国际上再次鼓吹"西方价值观" 以反对亚洲的"专制资本主义" ,好象前者没有剥削和依赖后者。在最近几个星期,国外的警察部队已经逮捕了几乎和中国安全部队逮捕的西藏抗议者同样多的人(不过当然他们接下来得到的处理会不一样)。在伦敦,据报道,警方甚至拘捕身穿'自由西藏' T恤衫的青年-如此多的言论自由!
右翼评论家暗示民主权利是犹太教和基督教的资本主义社会所固有的。这完全是无稽之谈!在历史上,欧洲资本主义国家对亚洲大多数地区的统治使用类似于现在中国政权使用的方法,英国统治下的香港也没有自由选举,举例来说,1904年至第二次世界大战时期,英国军队侵略和占领下的西藏也是如此。大部分的欧洲当年并未享受普选直到1917年在俄罗斯发生布尔什维克革命后,该革命迫使各处的资本家在害怕反抗下开始意义深远的改革。历史已经表明,最终保证人的基本民主权利的是强大的有组织地开展的工人运动。现在在西方国家,尤其是自'反恐战争'开始以来,这些权利正日益受到攻击,这些权利只能通过持续的工作阶级斗争并最终推翻资本主义而代之以民主的社会主义社会才能维持。
如果不采取措施来消解奥林匹克的危机,这可能标志着一个新的竞争性资本主义阵营之间的'冷战'。4月9日旧金山大游行中见证的被政权认可的'亲中国'的阵营,各类右翼民族主义者,法西斯份子,国民党支持者和黑手党份子-没有中国工人阶级的朋友-正在抓住这个机会扩大其影响力。一位89民运事件的资深人士在T恤衫上写着“莫忘天安门事件”在旧金山游行而遭到了身体上的攻击并被亲中国政权者称为'汉奸'。在澳大利亚,因为本地中国国旗供应已告罄,动员'保卫'4月24日奥运圣火的华人组织不得不额外订购以准备库存。同时,藏族民族运动鼓吹独立并反对达赖喇嘛的'更大的自治权'诉求的主张,这因为镇压而更显优势。官方2008年奥运会的口号-'同一个世界,同一个梦想-成为一个笑话!
从反日示威中得到教训
正如2005年发生的反日的街头抗议活动表明的,当它开始威胁到中国的出口市场和外来投资时,中国政权可以消解抗议,并封锁民族主义互联网大合唱。在今天的不稳定环境下,其对中国的经济的威胁将更为严重。没有大的经济体如中国那样更加依赖于全球市场。另一个-甚至更大-威胁到中国政权的是由承受超级剥削的工人阶级形成的,这些工人阶级将抓住机会为增加工资和反对外国资本家而获得其他方面的改善而罢工,这些外国资本家拥有中国工业的四分之一(虽然这些公司和中国'的'民族资本联系甚深) 。在2005年4月至5月,大连市40000名工人,深圳12000名工人罢工以反对他们的日本老板。他们要求建立自由工会组织,虽然他们没有赢得这个关键的诉求,但罢工赢得了可观的经济让步。
紧接着法国政客(具有讽刺意味的,包括那和社会党和绿党一起统治巴黎城的共产党)的'侮辱'和被认为是攻击中国残奥运动员金晶,中国正在进行抵制法国商品的一项运动。她被中国媒体称为"轮椅上的天使" ,并因为她使得巴黎示威者夺取奥运圣火的企图失败而被给予明星的地位。但这种抵制运动是反动的,并道明了中国境内目前的争论中哪个社会阶层是最响亮的。十分之九的中国人都买不起法国葡萄酒或路易威登手袋,所以从这个意义上讲,他们已经'抵制'这些货物。互联网活动份子也呼吁一个全国性的抵制作为在中国的最大的外国零售商的家乐福的运动。但这一运动-如果成功-将主要伤害该公司的40000名中国员工,而不是家乐福的法国老板。
比较而言,去年7月四川3000名工人痛击了法国水泥跨国公司拉法基,该公司关闭了在江油市附近的工厂。而民族主义者在那个时候没有呼吁抵制法国商品。接着, 2000名既今天护卫奥运圣火并镇压藏族示威者的准军事警察( PAP)镇压了工人两周的罢工。一名25岁的女工自杀以抗议法国公司与它的中国帮凶。不像今天的奥林匹克抗议活动或西藏的暴动,四川的抗议在该国媒体从未报道过。
西藏-出路何在?
正如社会主义者所警告说的:中国政权正在利用西藏事件以及现在的针对奥运的抗议活动以获得公众支持,以便其进一步镇压和抑制对其反穷人政策的所有批评。从宣传的角度而言,政权从汉人与回族穆斯林平民在3月14日的骚乱中受到攻击的事件中得到了很大的帮助。在宣布由群众特别是工人阶级自我成立的组织为非法的政权下,遗憾的是有一个种族间的暴力高风险存在着。中国的谚语: "杀鸡敬猴" !今天在藏族人身上应用了,但目前的讯息-"服从或予以粉碎!" -是特别针对庞大的中国工人阶级的。应该记住,在1989年3月在西藏作为该政党老板的胡锦涛军事镇压了西藏并导致数百名死亡。 3个月后,该同样的方法被用-以更大的流血事件-在北京的工人和青年身上。
镇压西藏遵循的模式同于中国政府用于其他对权力和权威构成挑战的大规模抗议活动的模式。2005年12月6日在广东省的汕尾大屠杀是一个很好的例子。官方统计, 3名村民为抗议兴建一所高污染电厂被打死。当地居民说, 13人死亡,并指责当局隐瞒尸体和为了掩盖事件真相而恐吓村民的的行为。汕尾的所有受害者都是汉族中国人。国家的电视台从来没有报道这些画面,这有别于西藏人暴乱事件的画面几乎每天被报道至数周之久。事实上,西藏事件是唯一显示于该国电视上的政治动乱的情形,据官方公布的暴乱,焚烧警车,以及其他暴力行为的图像每周连篇累牍地报道。 据报于今年3月福建反污染抗议活动中,7名示威者和1名警察被打死。以此为例。这些事件的新闻-其中没有藏人参加了-当然已经完全被封锁消息了。
西藏的诉求宗教和政治权利的抗议活动,最近几周得到其他中西部地区和多数突厥语为母语的新疆的抗议的回应,并且已经受到了国际上工人阶级和青年的极大的同情。这一切与这些国家的资产阶级立场完全不同,这些资产阶级对苦难的中国或西藏人民毫不关心,只捍卫他们自身的利润。中国政权和其他民族主义者说的在国外的大多数人从来没有到过西藏,不知道真实情况作为反驳的依据在很大程度上是无关宏旨的。2003年举行示威反对美国在伊拉克战争的30万人中大部分人没有去过伊拉克或美国,但他们见证了军事侵略。
对中国政权的一系列的错误判断的帮助下,西藏的冲突已被输入世界各地的人们的意识中。但这个矛盾在资本主义的基础上是不能得到解决的。中共政权再多的镇压也不能使大部分藏民甘心于他们现在所处的处境。但西藏流亡政府的资产阶级领导和各类几乎是宗教驱动的“西藏的朋友”的斗争也提供不了任何前进的道路。随着北京方面采取越来越严厉的措施,现在有预兆特别是一部分藏族青年被驱动接受个人恐怖主义的方法。社会主义者反对这种方法并认为这是一个有根本性的缺陷的斗争方法,只会给中国国家以籍口来推行更大的镇压,同时使和汉族的中国工人和农民团结起来并肩战斗更加困难。要从独裁与民族压迫中解放出来,只能通过基于工人阶级的力量的民主控制的和有组织的群众斗争。
敌人是资本主义
藏族和汉族的中国人几个世纪来一直有着密切的互动。许多藏族家庭敬仰毛泽东,因为他在结束封建主义和改善社会条件上起到的作用,虽然他的笨重的官僚主义方法-该方法只为斯大林专制所用-也疏远了许多人。但目前的冲突不仅是1959年或1989年的冲突再次出现(如需了解更多背景:请参阅我们的文章《西藏和民族问题》) 。在西藏,资本主义的发展极度加剧了社会紧张局势,由于大多数藏族人( 75 %的人生活在农村地区)与过去十年的经济繁荣无缘。主要的问题不是宗教,语言和民族自由的问题,虽然这些也是很重要的问题,最近的动乱是一个反弹以反对日益增长的经济富裕的汉人甚至回族人对西藏的支配,而西藏人在经济上被边缘化。 Pankaj Mishra在卫报周刊(英国, 2008年3月28日)的报道中认定资本主义是敌人, 该报道是少数西方一语中的的报道之一。
社会主义者维护西藏人民决定自己未来的权利,直至包括独立的权利。但在西藏各族裔社会之间甚至藏族人之间有很大的分化。北京政权扶植藏族官员和学者们这个重要阶层,这些人担心如果达赖喇嘛政府作为通过谈判解决问题的一部分被允许返回的话,他们的特权和地位将受到动摇,而他们更恐惧的是群众。而对于流亡政府来说,在中国内的更大的自治的“中间道路”已经不再是一个“策略”,而是表达他们这些前封建主能够成为由北京输入大量资本而蓬勃发展的香格里拉旅游的资本主义利益相关者的愿望。 大部分外部的资本主义评论家不知道这里事实上有两个互为竞争对手的藏族资产阶级精英,一个内部的和一个外部的,以拉萨为基础的精英比北京中共高层更敌视与达赖喇嘛的交易。
在这场争端中,中国,西藏和在国际上的工人阶级必须采取一个独立的不同于民族资产阶级阵营的立场-明确反对种族主义和民族沙文主义,并且支持工人阶级的团结和国际主义。具体而言,西藏广大人民群众为争取基本的民主权利和结束国家镇压以及民主地对经济的控制权利的斗争需要和整个中国正在展开的工人阶级和农民的斗争结合起来。这项运动必须争取:
*结束一党专政和国家的镇压
*集会自由,言论、宗教信仰的自由
*组织建立独立工会,农会和政党的权利,包括首要的任务建立一个战斗的工人党
*结束私有化和新自由主义的攻击。把所有外国人和中国人私有的大公司在民主的工人控制和管理下收归国有。基于选举产生的工厂委员会,农会和其他受欢迎的机关进行真正的社会主义计划生产。结束国家官僚的特权。
*西藏人民和其他少数民族享有自决权,同时认识到资本主义和民族压迫(帝国主义)只能通过以建立作为世界社会主义联邦一部分的民主的和自愿的中国和其他亚洲国家的社会主义联邦为目标的国际社会主义的斗争才能得到克服。
Olympic Games in crisis amid global protests
Hardening positions over Tibet and Western ’insults’ to China threaten wider crisis
chinaworker.info
The Beijing Olympic Games have been plunged into crisis. The protests following the Olympic torch on its global relay have revived international criticism of the policies of the Chinese regime in Tibet and on ’human rights abuses’ (a deliberately vague term that means state repression). The reaction in China has been a wave of nationalism led by the state-controlled media to ’defend China’s Olympics’, as if the Games were not primarily a money-making opportunity for big corporate sponsors like Adidas, Samsung, Coca Cola and McDonald’s, whose workers – in China and worldwide – will see none of the benefits.
The blame game that erupted after street protests in London, Paris and San Fransisco has led to sharpening national tensions that could spill over into a wider economic and political conflict. In a disastrous miscalculation for all the organisers the 2008 Games have become the most politicised Games since Moscow in 1980. But whereas the boycott that year was led by Western governments, spearheaded by Jimmy Carter, Margaret Thatcher and eagerly supported by their ’friend’ Deng Xiaoping (heralding the start of China’s long march to the market), today’s protests have developed from below. They have been led by grassroots organisations and have received very little support and encouragement (rather the opposite is true) at state level. The fact that the protests have been fairly small is proof that the organisers have largely operated in a ’headwind’ with little media or establishment backing – until now.
Western capitalist leaders have avoided criticism of China’s misnamed ’communist’ party (CCP) because their economies are so dependent on its anti-worker and anti-democratic policies, but also because as the saying goes: People who live in glasshouses shouldn’t throw stones! Given what the world knows about the half a million people killed under the US occupation of Iraq, the Bush Administration is hardly in a position to pronounce judgement on the actions of other regimes. President Bush has noticeably not criticised the Chinese regime for its repression in Tibet (where reportedly 150 Tibetans and more than 20 Han Chinese have been killed since 14 March), or in China as a whole, urging Beijing instead to ’talk’ to the Dalai Lama and show ’restraint’. Referring to Tibet, a top CCP leader was heard to say, ”We have Bush behind us, so there won’t be any problems,” according to Xu Youyu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. [From Dagens Nyheter, Sweden, 25 March 2008] This replicates the pattern from Taiwan in recent years, where Beijing and Washington have cooperated closely to restrain the outgoing government of pro-independence president Chen Shui-bian.
Protests from below
Governments internationally have been more muted over Tibet than over the Chinese regime’s links with Sudan and Burma, where military crackdowns have occurred, but where the real focus of concern for overseas capitalism is China’s growing economic and diplomatic clout in Africa and Southeast Asia. Even those concerns, however, have been played down because of the West’s growing economic dependence on China. This reality was spelt out bluntly by the French Foreign Minister, Bernhard Kouchner, who was asked by Le Monde (29 March 2008) if his government’s criticism over Tibet was ’limited’ by China’s economic power. ”Indeed that makes things more difficult,” Kouchner replied. ”If Tibet wanted and had the means to buy EPR [French made] nuclear reactors, human rights would immediately be on a level footing with the CAC 40,” he said referring to the Paris stock market’s main index. French president Sarkozy is allegedly considering a ’boycott’ of the Olympic opening ceremony, but this is an obvious ploy to rebuild his sinking support in opinion polls. When the same Sarkozy visited Beijing on a state visit last November, with a 30-strong delegation that included half his cabinet, the Minister for Human Rights was left behind in Paris! Sarkozy came away with €20 billion worth of Chinese government contracts.
Yet this smug and hugely profitable business arrangement between the various capitalist governments could now be upset by an upsurge of nationalist sentiment triggered by the Olympics. A recent opinion poll in the Financial Times (UK, 15 April 2008) revealed a major shift in attitudes in Europe, with people in Britain, France, Germany and Italy now seeing China as a bigger threat to global stability than the US. In the US, China was seen as a bigger threat than North Korea or Iran. This is also reflected in the US presidential race, always an opportunity for China-bashing, although this is usually toned down by the winner once elected. Especially Hillary Clinton, who is struggling to stay in the race, has rounded off on Bush’s plan to attend the opening Olympic ceremony. A meeting between the White House envoy on Tibet, Paula Dobriansky, and the Dalai Lama, due to be held next week, could further deepen the crisis. In India, the base of exile Tibetan leaders, Tibetan protesters may have the dubious pleasure of being ’supported’ by the Hindu fundamentalist BJP, which vehemently opposes self-determination for the peoples of Kashmir, Assam and other parts of India, but hypocritically accuses Manmohan Singh’s government of ”blatant appeasement towards China”.
The images beamed all over the world of a massive security cordon to shield the Olympic torch (or ’sacred flame’ as the Chinese media call it), are a propaganda disaster for the organisers. A Paris police spokesman told The Guardian [UK, 8 April 2008] that the city’s security operation, ”was a bit like that put in place for George Bush”. Such media images, especially the high profile and at times aggressive role of a squad from the elite ’Flying Dragons’ unit of China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) charged with guarding the torch, have done more to connect the issue of repression and lack of democratic rights in China and Tibet with the coming Olympics than any amount of lobbying and publicity by Tibetan exiles or Chinese human rights groups. In a fresh blow to the Chinese and IOC organisers, the footballer Diego Maradona pulled out of the torch relay in Beunos Aires, an unexpected move given Maradona’s close links to Castro’s Cuba and the government of Hugo Ch·vez in Venezuela – two regimes that have publicly supported China’s military crackdown in Tibet.
Hardening positions
At the time of writing positions are hardening. The Chinese dictatorship refuses to cancel the longest ever torch-relay (130 days) covering six continents, because this would be seen as a sign of weakness in the face of international pressure, a retreat that could seriously undermine the position of the one-party state. The various protest groups sense growing public support internationally, but of course capitalist politicians are now jumping on the bandwagon for electoral reasons, using hypocritical and nationalist arguments. This shifting stance is because the ruling class, particularly in the dominant imperialist states, are alarmed by the Chinese regime’s intransigence over Olympic-related issues and see this as a sign of a tougher stand in future over other – more important – economic and geo-political disputes.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) suddenly finds itself in the company of the G8, WTO and other symbols of corporate greed and power politics that are the target of protests. With strong working class parties in key countries it would be possible to issue an appeal for workers’ unity against political and religious repression and capitalist exploitation globally. Unfortunately, given that none of the main groupings involved represent a working class or internationalist position, the debate surrounding the protests has assumed a nationalistic tone on all sides. The demonstrations are universally described by the Western media as ”anti-China” or ”pro-China”, lumping together the dictatorial regime and the masses it oppresses (often on behalf of US and other foreign companies). To many Chinese this appears to be a campaign against them as a people, traditionally looked down upon by racist Western rulers, and for this reason many at this stage are lining up on nationalist lines behind the CCP regime.
The fact that many spokesmen for the Free Tibet movement are Westerners, not Tibetans, also helps feed the propaganda of the CCP that the protests are organised by Western governments and the CIA, who exploit the Tibetan issue to attack China. As we have seen, the opposite is true. Not even the Dalai Lama and his bourgeois Tibetan exile government – who are desperate for negotiations with the Chinese regime – support the protests or the call for an Olympic boycott. The Dalai Lama confirmed recently that envoys of his government have entered into ”private” talks with the Beijing regime even as the clampdown in Tibet continues. President Hu Jintao demands that the Dalai Lama show ”concrete action” in order for serious talks to take place. Beijing wants the Tibetan leader to distance himself even more categorically from the protests, and to urge his followers to cooperate with the authorities. This is not excluded in the coming period, but would provoke deep schisms within the Tibetan exile movement and further undermine a leadership that is heavily criticised for its conciliatory line.
Are the Olympics ’non-political’?
The claim by the capitalist establishment everywhere that politics shouldn’t be brought into sport is pure hypocrisy! China’s opening to the West under Mao Zedong in 1971 began with the decision to allow the US national table tennis team to play in China. Today, backed into a corner over Tibet in particular, the Chinese regime is using the issue of the Olympics as part of a highly political gambit. It has given massive publicity to the allegedly anti-Chinese slant of the Olympic protests to create the idea that China is under attack and must defend itself. Chinese nationalism has deep roots as a result of the crimes committed by Western and Japanese imperialism in the past. But a closer look at the regime’s policies exposes the hypocrisy of its current position. The CCP has dismantled the country’s once extensive welfare system (free health care, cheap public housing, free schooling) and the bureaucratically planned economy that financed these reforms, in order to embrace capitalist economics and massive amounts of foreign capital. 50,000 US companies operate from inside China and receive massive handouts from the CCP regime in the form of tax breaks, subsidised land, and cheap labour. Why on earth should workers and peasants in China ’defend’ this, or the other capitalist policies of the present regime?
The CCP regime’s strategic alliance with foreign capital is embodied in the Beijing Olympics. The Olympics is a corporate sporting spectacle, the main role of which is to make huge profits for its sponsors and the media and construction industries. It offers little for working people other than a temporary distraction from the hard grind of economic survival. The torch relay which has been transformed by the Chinese regime into a symbol of Chinese ’honour’ actually began life at the 1936 Berlin Olympics as a symbol of Nazi triumphalism. It has nothing whatsoever to do with internationalism or harmonious relations. The Chinese regime’s decision to route the march through Tibet (including a plan to scale Mount Everest), Xinjiang and Taiwan cannot be described as ’non-political’. Such lavish publicity stunts are the hallmark of ruling elites everywhere that want to show their strength and deflect popular attention from the real issues: jobs, low wages, deadly pollution and surging food prices.
Half the world’s population will ’boycott’ this year’s Olympics in the sense that they are too poor to get to a television or to stop working. The specially-built Beijing National Stadium – or ’Bird’s Nest’ – can hold a maximum of 91,000 spectators, or 0.00007 percent of China’s population. Despite the fact their city is one of the richest in China, most citizens of Beijing cannot afford a ticket to the arena, where the best seats will be occupied by wealthy foreigners and the Chinese elite. The stadium has cost 3.5 billion yuan (350 million euros) to build. Meanwhile 260 million people in China, including many Tibetans and other minorities, have no access to safe drinking water. Beijing itself faces a severe water shortage as a result of desertification in northern China and depletion of the underground aquifer. To ’solve’ this problem for the three weeks that foreign journalists, athletes and tourists are in the city for the Games, the city of Beijing has been allowed to drain the neighbouring province of Hebei of its water reserves, prompting protests from industrialists and farmers there.
The 2008 Olympics is intended to celebrate this ’New China’, a key player in the process of capitalist globalisation, but where the wealth gap is now more extreme than in Russia or India. China has 106 dollar billionaires, only the USA has more. Yet 300 million people still live on less than one dollar (7 yuan) per day, the World Bank’s definition of absolute poverty. For the vast majority of China’s still poor population what’s needed is struggle and organisation – not extravagant nationalist and corporate pageants!
Clash of nationalisms
By portraying all criticism of its policies as an ’attack on’ and ’attempt to split’ China, the CCP has succeeded temporarily in mobilising public support, especially from the urban middle classes and sections of the Chinese community living abroad. Not for thirty years has such anti-Western rhetoric been used by the Chinese media, who for decades have rather tried to emulate and covet all things Western. Even regime critics and sections of the Chinese left have been swept along to some extent by this nationalist wave. The CCP is copying the propaganda of Bush and the US Republicans, who falsely portrayed all opposition to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as ’anti-American’ and ’pro-terror’. The results – further down the line – can be similar in the sense of massive disillusionment and anger against a government that lies to its people. But this policy also entails huge risks for an escalation of Chinese nationalism and a global backlash in the form of anti-China nationalism opportunistically whipped up by politicians.
The bourgeois media internationally is once again trumpeting ”Western values” as against Asia’s ”authoritarian capitalism”, as if the former did not exploit and rest upon the latter. Police forces outside China have arrested almost as many Tibetan protesters in recent weeks as Chinese security forces (although of course their subsequent treatment will not be the same). In London, it was reported that police even arrested youth wearing ’Free Tibet’ tee-shirts – so much for freedom of speech!
Right-wing commentators imply that democratic rights are intrinsic to Judeo-Christian capitalist societies. This is nonsense! Historically, the European capitalist states ruled much of Asia using similar methods to those the Chinese regime uses today: There were no free elections in Hong Kong under British rule, for example, or in Tibet which was invaded and occupied by British troops from 1904 until the Second World War. Most of Europe did not enjoy universal suffrage until after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, which forced the capitalists elsewhere to institute far-reaching reforms for fear of revolt. History has shown that the ultimate guarantor of basic democratic rights is a strong organised workers’ movement. These rights are increasingly coming under attack in Western countries especially since the start of the ’war on terror’, and can only be maintained by sustained working class struggle and ultimately by overthrowing capitalism and replacing it with a democratic socialist society.
Unless steps are taken to diffuse the Olympic crisis, this could mark the beginning of a new ’Cold War’ between rival capitalist camps. Within the regime-sanctioned ’pro-China’ camp, as seen by their big demonstration in San Fransisco on 9 April, an assortment of right-wing nationalists, fascists, Kuomintang supporters and mafia – no friends of the Chinese working class – are seizing this opportunity to extend their influence. A veteran of the 1989 Beijing events was physically attacked and called a ’traitor’ by pro-regime Chinese at the San Fransisco demonstration for a tee-shirt saying ’Don’t forget Tienanmen’. In Australia, Chinese organisations that are mobilising to ’defend’ the Olympic Torch on 24 April have had to order extra stocks of Chinese national flags as local supplies have been exhausted. The official 2008 Olympic slogan – ’One world, one dream’ – has become a joke! Meanwhile within the Tibetan national movement advocates of independence as opposed to the ’greater autonomy’ espoused by the Dalai Lama are gaining ground as the repression intensifies.
Lessons from anti-Japan protests
As the anti-Japan street protests in 2005 showed, however, the Chinese regime can move to diffuse the protests and lock down the nationalist internet chorus when this begins to pose a threat to its export markets and foreign investments. In today’s precarious environment the threats to China’s economy are even more serious. No large economy is more dependent on global markets than China. Another – even greater – threat to the Chinese regime is posed by the super-exploited working class, which could seize the opportunity to go on strike for wage increases and other improvements against the foreign capitalists who own a quarter of China’s industry (although these companies are heavily enmeshed with ’national’ Chinese capital). In April-May 2005, 40,000 workers in Dalian and 12,000 in Shenzhen, downed tools against their Japanese bosses. Among their demands were free trade unions and while they did not win this crucial demand, the strikes secured substantial economic concessions.
A campaign is now underway in China for a boycott of French goods following the ’insult’ delivered by French politicians (ironically including the Communist Party, which runs the city of Paris together with the Socialist Party and Greens), and the perceived attack on Chinese paralympic athlete, Jin Jing. She has been dubbed the ”angel in a wheelchair” by Chinese media and given star status after she fought off an attempt to seize the Olympic torch by a Paris protester. But this boycott campaign is reactionary, and says a lot about which social classes are most vocal in the current debate inside China. Nine-tenths of Chinese people cannot afford to buy French wine or Louis Vuitton handbags, so in that sense they are already ’boycotting’ these goods. Internet activists are also calling for a nationwide boycott of Carrefour, the biggest foreign retailer in China. But this campaign – if successful – will mainly hurt the company’s 40,000 Chinese employees rather than Carrefour’s French bosses.
Compare this stance to when 3,000 workers in Sichuan last July fought a bitter struggle against the French cement multinational Lafarge, which closed their factory near Jiangyou City. There were no calls from the nationalists for a boycott of French goods at that time. Then, a 2,000-strong contingent of the same paramilitary police (PAP) that today guards the Olympic flame and suppresses Tibetan demonstrators, was used to crush the workers’ two-week strike. One 25-year old woman worker committed suicide in protest against the French company and its Chinese state heavies. Unlike today’s Olympic protests, or Tibet’s riots, the protests in Sichuan were never reported in the state media.
Tibet – What’s the solution?
As socialists have warned the Chinese regime is using events in Tibet, and now the Olympic protests, to garner public support for its much greater use of repression and to silence all criticism of its anti-poor policies. From a propaganda standpoint the regime was helped enormously by the attacks on Han Chinese and Hui Muslim civilians during the 14 March riots. There is unfortunately a high risk for inter-ethnic violence under a regime that outlaws self-organisation by the masses, especially by the working class. There is a Chinese saying: ”Kill the chicken to scare the monkey”! Today an example is being made of the Tibetans, but the message – ”obey or be crushed!” – is aimed particularly at the huge working class of China. It should be remembered that in March 1989 Hu Jintao, then party boss in Tibet, organised a military crackdown in Tibet with hundreds killed. Three months later the same methods were used – with even greater bloodshed – against the workers and youth of Beijing.
The repression in Tibet follows a pattern from other mass protests that pose a challenge to the power and authority of the Chinese government. The Shanwei massacre on 6 December 2005 in Guangdong province is a case in point. Officially, three villagers were shot dead for protesting against the construction of a high-polluting power plant. Local residents say 13 were killed and accuse the authorities of hiding corpses and terrorising villagers as part of a cover-up. All the victims in Shanwei were Han Chinese. These images were never shown on state television, unlike the footage of rioting Tibetans which has been shown almost daily for several weeks. In fact, the Tibetan events are the only case of political unrest to be shown on television, in a country where according to official figures, riots, burning of police cars, and other acts of violence, occur on an almost weekly basis. Seven protesters and one policeman were reportedly killed in March in anti-pollution protests in Fujian province, for example. News of these events – in which no Tibetans took part – has of course been completely blacked out.
The protests demanding religious and political rights in Tibet, echoed in recent weeks by protests in other Western regions and in the majority Turkic-speaking province of Xinjiang, have met with great sympathy from working people and youth internationally. This has nothing to do with the stand of the capitalist classes in these countries who do not give a damn for the plight of the Chinese or Tibetan peoples, providing their own profits are safeguarded. The retort of the Chinese regime and other nationalists that most people abroad have never been to Tibet and don’t know the real situation there is largely irrelevant. Most of the 30 million people who demonstrated against the US war in Iraq in 2003 had not been to Iraq or the US, but recognised military aggression when they saw it.
The Tibetan conflict has been pushed to the fore of people’s consciousness around the world, helped by a series of miscalculations on the part the Chinese regime. But this conflict cannot be solved on a capitalist basis. No amount of repression by the CCP regime will reconcile the majority of Tibetans to the conditions they experience today. But neither do the bourgeois leadership of the Tibetan struggle in exile and the assortment of mostly religiously motivated ’friends of Tibet’ offer any way forward. With increasingly heavy-handed measures from Beijing’s side, there are now warning signs that a section of the Tibetan youth especially could be driven in the direction of individual terrorism. Socialists oppose this as a fundamentally flawed method of struggle that will only give the Chinese state an excuse for greater repression, while making a united struggle alongside the Han Chinese workers and peasants more difficult. Liberation from dictatorship and national oppression can only be achieved through democratically controlled and organised mass struggle, based above all on the forces of the working class.
’Capitalism is the enemy’
The Tibetan and Han Chinese communities have lived in close interaction for centuries. Many Tibetan households revere Mao Zedong for his role in ending feudalism and improving social conditions, although his ham-fisted bureaucratic methods – the only methods available to a Stalinist dictatorship – also alienated many. The current conflict however is not just a re-run of the clashes in 1959 or 1989 (for more background: see our article Tibet and the National Question). The development of capitalism in Tibet has aggravated social tensions to the extreme, as the majority of Tibetans (75% of whom live in rural areas) have missed out from the last decade’s economic boom. Rather than primarily an issue of religious, linguistic and national freedom, although these are also important issues, the recent unrest was a backlash against the growing domination of the Tibetan economy by wealthier Han Chinese and even Hui, while Tibetans are economically marginalised. ”Capitalism is identified as the enemy,” exclaimed Pankaj Mishra in the Guardian Weekly (UK, 28 March 2008) in one of the few Western reports to hit the mark.
Socialists defend the right of the Tibetan people to decide their own future, up to and including the right to independence. But there is great polarisation in Tibet, between ethnic communities and even among the Tibetan people themselves. The Beijing regime has groomed a substantial layer of Tibetan officials and academics who fear for their privileges and positions if the Dalai Lama’s government is allowed to return as part of a negotiated settlement, and fear the masses even more. While for the exile government the ’middle way’ of greater autonomy within China is no longer a ’tactic’, but expresses the desire of these former feudal masters to become capitalist stakeholders in a booming tourist ’Shangri La’ financed by big infusions of capital from Beijing. Unbeknown to most outside capitalist commentators there are in fact two rival Tibetan bourgeois elites, one internal and one external, with the Lhasa-based elite even more hostile to a deal with the Dalai Lama than the CCP tops in Beijing.
The working class in China, Tibet and internationally must take an independent position from all the national bourgeois camps in this dispute – clearly opposing racism and national chauvinism, and standing for working class unity and internationalism. Concretely, the masses in Tibet need to link their struggle for basic democratic rights, an end to state repression, and democratic control over the economy, to the unfolding struggle of the working class and peasantry throughout China. This movement must fight for:
* An end to one-party rule and state repression
* For freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and religious worship
* For the right to organise, to build independent trade unions, peasant associations and political parties, including the all-important need for a fighting workers’ party
* An end to privatisations and neo-liberal attacks. Nationalise all major companies – foreign and Chinese-owned – under democratic workers’ control and management. For a genuine socialist plan of production based on elected factory committees, rural associations and other popular organs. End the privileges of state officials.
* The right to self-determination for the Tibetan people and other minorities, while recognising that capitalism and national oppression (imperialism) can only be overcome through international socialist struggle, with the aim of establishing a democratic and voluntary socialist federation of China and other Asian states as part of a world socialist federation
2008年4月26日星期六
2008年4月24日星期四
我译:中国的经济-泡沫爆裂之唳
中国的经济-泡沫爆裂之唳
股市低迷,利润前景暗淡,而通胀预示着更多的不稳定
Vincent Kolo,香港
这个奥运年,对中国政权来说什么都不对头。根据目前的状况,中国的经济仍然以两位数的比率扩大着,美国巨大的信用泡沫的破裂带来的全球资本主义危机越来越靠近中国。尤其是,美元的崩溃,现在的"次级"的货币,特别是由于美国中央银行(联邦储备委员会)在6个月内恐慌性削减其主要贷款利率3个百分点至2.25 % ,开始造成中国的经济的真正的苦痛。温家宝总理最近说的他对美元贬值"深感忧虑" 并非一无是处。
人民币对美国货币的升值已形成中国南方的作为出口火车头的珠江三角洲(PRD)某些衰退的征象, 该地区占了中国的国内生产总值的八分之一。根据一些估计数字,过去一年中,这个地区有1000家制鞋工厂倒闭,他们大多迁到便宜,管制较少的内陆省份,还有越南和其他低工资经济体。作为珠三角的一个工业城市的东莞的当地政府近日宣布了一项新的基金来帮助外国公司进行技术上的升级,把面临人民币的上升趋势冲击的劳动力密集行业转移出去,如鞋类和纺织品。
美元贬值以多种方式影响中国,首先是显著的出口增长放缓(尚未收缩)。二月份,中国富有传奇色彩的贸易盈余下降64 % 。基于今年头2月,与整个2007年14 %的增长相比,对美国市场出口停留在同一水平。由于投机者争相通过购进上升货币如人民币来使资本保值,美元的下跌带来了一场新的"热钱"进入中国的洪水。按照目前的趋势,在近两年来攀爬15个百分点后,今年中国货币对美元将升值另外的7 % 。炒家甚至对更大升值进行赌博,北京政权为了控制通货膨胀,有可能采取一次性升值的措施,以年率8.7 %运行。我们不能排除此一举动的可能性,尽管它取决于政权认为最大的危险在哪里:粮食暴动和通货膨胀驱动的抗议,还是由货币升值带来的出口部门工厂的倒闭和可能的罢工之潮。
害怕通货膨胀
世界上没有多少政权比中国的名不副实的'共产党'政权更怕通胀。通货膨胀是1949年还有1989年带来革命性剧变的一个重要因素。通货膨胀的压力,特别是急剧的食品价格上涨,与去年同期比,食品价格上涨了23 % ,无疑也是上个月藏族地区暴动背后的一个重要因素,再加上压抑了的不满,宗教和民族的迫害,共同作用产生了20年来也许50年来西藏最严重的骚乱。北京政权担心学生中可能爆发骚乱,已下令中国各地的大学增加对它们的食堂的补贴,这令人浮想起1949年和1989年的另一种现象。
像印度尼西亚,埃及,摩洛哥,阿根廷,墨西哥及其他几个国家的政府一样,中国政权已重新对基本食品,如食用油和大米实行价格管制,但由于国家不再控制食物分销业,这些都不是特别有效。"中国社科院的易选龙(音译)在中国日报( 2008年3月4日)评论说:"对商品价格的行政控制对市场的发展的当前阶段影响不大,企业与市场有各种手段来打消国家的价格管制的影响。上个月作为一个顶级制度经济学家的高辉清说:"中国在全球经济一体化中是世界经济的四轮马车而不是驾车手。由于大陆物价上涨的百分之七十可以归因于国际因素,国家自己没有能力处理这个问题。" [南华早报, 2008年3月19日] 。
中国现在是主要的农产品如大豆类,玉米和肉的进口国,而国内农产品价格越来越多地反映出世界市场价格,已达到历史高峰,并定留在那里。中国日报(2008年 3月22日-23日)引述"国际粮食政策研究所一份新的报告说世界农业正处于危机之中"。除其他事项外,它指向了极端的天气现象,土地供应缩减,消费的增加(如在中国)和生物燃料的生产。这份报告还警告涌动的食品价格上涨是"一个重大的政治关切" 。在短期内,物价上涨提升一些农民的收入,而社会的一大部分,无论在城市和农村,特别是最贫穷的阶层,都大大地不如一年前。在南部和中部地区由于严重的冬季,再加上中国北方一个为期两年的干旱,这些就破坏了国家的可耕地的六分之一,这将进一步加大今年农产品物价上升的压力。这就是为什么政府已把控制通货膨胀放在其'头号'优先的位置。但正如中国工人和农民都知道的,该政权的意图和它的实际效果之间有着很大的差距!
美国联邦储备委员会大幅削减利率的行动已严重限制了中国政权和中央银行的活动空间。尽管在2005年松动了其钉住美元的汇率政策,人民币仍和美钞紧密地联系在一起。不过,因为"次贷"危机的加深,两个经济体的利率差急剧扩大。为经济过热刹车,去年加息6次后,中国人民银行(PBoC)的基本贷款利率目前为百分之七点五,与此相比,美国的为2.25 %。这已导致新一波的投机性资金流入中国,这给决策者带来了一些问题。在今年首两个月,中国的外国直接投资( FDI )比去年同期激增75 %以上,达到180亿美元。如果这种趋势全年持续下去,这将标志着一个新的外国直接投资纪录。
这种资本必须由中央银行通过用人民币更换美元来'消化',这导致了多余的进一步扩大的货币供应量,这反过来又刺激通胀。大部分的外国“投资”是纯粹的投机,投机到房地产交易,这有助于推高地价,从而形成了在任何时候都可能破裂的滔天的地产泡沫,而在沿海的一些地区可能已经爆裂。华尔街日报报导说在一些顶级城市楼价下降了30 %之多,并补充说: "中国的地产商是处于包围之中。在许多国家的主要市场,资产价格均呈现疲软迹象,以及资本市场完全被这些-以及其他-产品所包围"。 [华尔街日报, 2008年3月26日] 。
房地产泡沫...仍在膨胀
激增的房价已经和其他经济方面的问题组合起来。许多普通的中国人由于价格而止步于房地产市场外。在70个最大的城市,与去年同期比较,1月份整体房价飙升11.3 % ,为3年来增幅最大。超级富豪大地产商已积累梦幻般的个人财富-他们经常处在中国的超级富豪榜的顶部 -这一事实激起了政治性的不满情绪。去年的福布斯名单上有一半以上的富豪,中国的40个最富有的个人,涉及地产界。
'共产党'经营的中国日报( 8-9 2008年3月)的一篇社论宣告了"今年是中国1998年取消其数十年之久的福利分房制度的十周年 " 。正如本文所指出: "虽然迅速满足了少数富人的需要,蓬勃发展的房地产市场已经在很大程度上忽视了低收入者或许多中等收入的家庭的可以负担的起的房子需要,更不用提需要栖身之所的城市贫民的需要了。"
螺旋式上升的住屋费用是为什么消费者支出甚至继续处在远远低于其他'发展中'国家的低迷的水平一个重要原因。去年,消费开支占到中国国内生产总值的40 %左右,与之相比,美国达到70 %以上,即使在印度也达到59 % 。许多资本主义经济学家以及最重要的是由中国政权提出的中国国内消费可以平衡美国消费在世界市场上所造成的下滑,这一想法是荒谬的。中国工资过低,其基本必需品如房屋和上学的费用实在太高。中国可靠的薪金统计资料是几乎不可能找到的。没有止境的声称城市里工人在最近几年里至少有了'很大'的工资增幅。然而,这是一个谬论,最多只适用于城市中在私营和特别是高技术行业里的较小的某些工人阶层。这一年只有30 %的中国工人要缴纳个人所得税,个人所得税起征点是月收入1600元( 160欧元)。那么,中国7亿5千万的强壮劳动力中有5亿2千5百万中国人的收入少于每月1600元人民币-一个非常可信的数字。没有巨大的职工工资增长,资本家当然会全力抵制工资增长,这些工人是被排斥在刺激消费以补偿美国经济影响带来的收缩的宏伟设计之外。
新屋主花他们每月的收入的一半供楼并不鲜见。央视报道( 2008年3月15日)特写了一对北京的夫妇为他们的两个卧室的公寓每月要支付逾4000元人民币给银行的事例,占他们每月的收入的60 %。除了房屋花费抢占了一个城镇居民家庭的收入越来越大的份额外,教育和医疗费用也极端的高,由1990年占城镇居民的总开支的百分之十上升到了2006年的30 %左右 [中国日报, 2008年3月14日] 。
这也解释了为什么在与中国有关方面,坚实的新自由主义机构如经合组织和经济学家这样的期刊也已经成为福利国痴迷者,要求其统治者重建基本公共服务以作为一种手段来哄人们减少储蓄,多花点他们还很低水平的工资在消费品上。尤其对于大多数农村,卫生保健基础设施是一团糟。四分之三的中国的总医疗资源集中在城市地区,只覆盖了35 %的人口。据中国日报( 2008年3月14日) ,占世界百分之二十二的人口的中国只有2 %的世界医疗资源。在此基础上,7亿5千万的农村人口,约占世界人口的八分之一,只能得到0.5 % 的世界的医疗资源。
股市泡沫...破裂!
在世界上,2008年,中国股市一直是表现得最差之一,只有越南遭受了更大的损失。在上海交易所的16年的历史上,2008年第一季度是最坏的,主要的SCI指数失去了34 % 的价值。用金融市场行话来说,下降百分之十是一个'调整' ,而下降20 % 是一个'熊市' 。当然,今天世界上的股市真的是一个大中型赌场,只是间接地反映实体经济的进程。不过,对中国股票市场的恐慌是即将出现危机的一个征兆,对于整体经济来说也是一个严重问题的来源。
自去年10月的高峰以来,超过12万亿元人民币的股票价值已被摧毁,相当于半年中国的国内生产总值。在四年前,股票市场甚至还不是中国经济的一个重要的因素,随着2005年金融部门的改革,这种情况改变了,其中最重要方面意味着不只是少数公司的股份,该国的主要公司的所有股份都成为可交易的。这导致了一连串的大多是最大的国有公司,银行及公用设施发起非常有利可图的首次公开募股(IPOs) ,并利用人们的庞大储蓄。在过去两年中,中国主导的全球公开招股占2007年的35 %。在今年头几个月,由于市场大幅下跌,这种"上市泡沫"已经进入突然停顿。许多顶级公司现正以低于它们首个交易日的价格进行交易,留下易上当受骗的'投资者'在那里暴跳如雷。这个过程由中石油象征性地表现出来,去年10月当该公司漂浮在上海交易所时,它暂时性地成为世界上最有价值的公司。自那时以来,该公司的市值下跌了62 %,-这发生在一家伴随着石油处在100美元一桶的价位时的石油公司身上!
2005-07年中国的股市泡沫目前已破裂,并进一步造成严重的经济问题。基于兴旺的价格或股票,主要企业已越来越少地依赖于银行的资金并能规避中央政府用来遏止过度投资和它的必然结果:能力过剩,利润下降,并有可能破产的贷款限制。尽管政府努力遏制这种增长,2007年固定资产投资增长了惊人的24.8 % ,高于2006年0.9个百分点。
几乎可以肯定,近两年来的首次公开招股的热潮帮助把投资泡沫推高到了荒唐的新的高度。它也使得以千百万计的小型储蓄户取出储蓄而投入到股票市场这个'赌场'里 。讽刺的是,自1949年革命以来,赌博在中国是非法的。理由很充分!许多中国的新一族的小'投资者' 现在正再次面对灾难性的损失,其结果能够导致政治上的不稳定。一位退休女服务员张莉颖(音译)向国际先驱论坛报( 2008年4月2日)说:"我的丈夫责怪我那么愚蠢以至于失去了我们全家的积蓄。" 互联网聊天网站充满着对政府的愤怒的评论,并为市场的破坏性滑坡而指责他们。
因此如果'熊市'继续下去,可能会有更多的经济危机影响,这是最有可能的,因为中国的金融业也受到世界市场的动荡的严重影响。一些评论家淡化股市的意义,因为即使有1亿5千万份个人交易帐户,中国市场也没有老的工业化国家那样的"财富效应" ,在这些老的工业化国家,40% , 50%或者至60 %的人口拥有和股市有联系的储蓄。但就中国的情况而言,很多的个人账户其实是公司甚至银行所用的"假帐户"以便在市场中投机。这样高的非法的交易产生了去年主要的中国公司利润的相当大的一部分-根据某种估计是百分之十五到二十。香港JP摩根的乌尔里希京解释说:"公司有大量的过剩现金,而且大量的这样的现金漏进了股票市场" 。 [国际先驱论坛报, 2008年4月2日] 。
大炒家在市场套牢前都抽离了,留下小股民去承受惨重的损失。由于原材料和能源成本的上升以及更困难的出口前景,还有生产能力严重过剩的作用,企业无论如何都要面临利润的压缩,这个时候,延长的熊市,关闭额外地"快速获得"利润的这一来源,对中国的大公司的资产负债表有不利影响。这些过程都是自我强化的。最近几天大公司如中石油和中国电信的一连串的盈利警告助长了股市的低迷。另一个市场大跌的原因是将有今年的第一次的加息以作为政府反通胀政策的一部分的传言。
来自20世纪90年代的教训-突发的危机
中国的经济景观以惊人的速度变化着。去年主导经济争论的是'过热'的危险。然后在今年1月份,随着该国政府宣布由过去四年中实施的"谨慎"的财政货币政策转到"紧缩"的预算政策,通货膨胀的祸害显得很大。如今,在全球性危机的阴影下,这种情况正在发生变化。如果粮食和原材料(包括能源)价格被排除在外,中国的经济数据仍显示出显著的通货紧缩的特点(通货紧缩是通货膨胀的反面:价格下跌),特别是在制造业和出口部门。减去食品和能源后的通货膨胀率只有1.6 % ,而不是8.7 % 。纺织品价格,在中国已下跌了0.6 % ,而以去年为例,在电子产品,钢铁和汽车方面也有类似的价格下跌。
这些压力作为大规模-但无纪录的-整个行业中的过剩能力的结果和作为有史以来最大的投资热潮的结果而强化。产能过剩,由于全球经济低迷而更为恶化,意味着更多的商品追逐较少的市场,必然有价格下跌的压力。在某一个点上,利润将消失以及公司倒闭。从那里开始,连锁反应至银行和通过借款以支付他们的投资热潮的大多数国有公司。
不良贷款的爆发可能即将来临,预示着的严重性不亚于美国的银行危机,尽管具有不同的特点。在这样一种情况下实施的旨在限制信贷和压缩通货膨胀的"紧的"或限制性的财政政策将是灾难性的。不仅中国政权将被迫迅速改变方向到扩张性或"凯恩斯主义"的政策下,一些评论家认为,这已是未阐明的目标了。汇丰中国首席经济学家曲红彬(音译)说:"我期望大陆是半心半意地实施其货币紧缩政策并能根据情况在一定程度上放宽该政策 " 。作为很具影响力的周刊的新华的展望杂志最近也有一篇文章要求中国政权"为美国经济衰退作好准备" 。
但不只是美国经济衰退!中国的经济可能很快将面临类似十年前东南亚资本主义经历的萎缩,尽管是一个更大规模上的萎缩。在20世纪90年代中期,因为东南亚的经济经历了快速的投资驱动的增长,它们的货币升值迅速。然而,到1997年,其出口的引擎开始减速,因为便宜的生产者-包括中国-分食了市场份额。投机的"热钱"已经涌入这些国家以便利用这次繁荣期,"热钱"的突然抽回,造成第一次信用和银行危机(并非完全不同于今天的美国危机),然后是一波企业破产的浪潮和严重的经济衰退。在美国资本主义和国际货币基金组织的帮助下,他们被迫接受的政策完全与布什政府和美国联邦储备委员会今天实施政策相反,即大规模的连续加息和'紧缩开支的预算。
这一梦魇般情景不是我们马克思主义者想象中虚构出来的事情。到目前为止,世界银行已修订其中国增长预测两次,一月修改为从10.8 %至9.6 % ,上周再次修改至9.4 % 。这是一个增长预期的大幅度减少,减少1.4 % 。不过,中国国际资本公司(中金公司)财务公司刚刚公布了更危言耸听的预测,其警告明年国内生产总值增长率可能会下降至7.5 % 。中金公司经济学家在他们的研究报告中指出:"中国的经济正处于一个十字路口。""如果政策调整不适当的话,这一年经济可能面临高通胀,,但明年可能演变成停滞" 。在这种情况下,中金公司警告说:"中国的失业率和银行不良债务将显着上升,公司的利润将大幅萎缩。"
对中国而言,增长率处在百分之七左右将表明其已经处在衰退的边缘,这尤其将会对劳动力市场产生影响,作为可能的结果是爆炸性上升的城市失业率。每年, 1000万个新的城市求职者涌向市场,这还不包括增加着的农村移民劳动力。过去的4-5年,中国经济以双位数字增长,而创造的就业机会只增加了1 % 。几个因素,其中包括由北京奥运以及在一些冬季雪灾中受灾最严重地区一个短期的投资热潮创造的的建筑和服务领域里的数以万计的临时工作,明年将消失,增加了减速甚至衰退的可能性。
因此很显然,中国的经济正在走向未知不详之地。经过20年的基本上持续快速增长后,放缓,或低迷将在中国社会创造前所未有的紧张局势,包括执政党内的公开的分裂和爆发民众抗议。因此在面对日益增加的资本主义打击中,建立战斗的和民主的工人组织-特别是独立工会和工厂委员会-来争取工人的利益的需要比以往任何时候都更大。
注:在外汇交易的背景下,中国法定货币是所谓的'人民币' (人民的钱),但国内交易中称为'元',即人民币是货币,但纸币和硬币是元。
China's economy - the sound of bubbles bursting
Stock market slumps, profit outlook darkens, while inflation threatens more instability
Vincent Kolo, Hong Kong
Nothing is going right for the Chinese regime in this Olympic year. While China's economy is still, based on current projections, expanding at double-digit rates, the global capitalist crisis arising from the bursting of the giant credit bubble in the United States gets closer to China every week. In particular, the collapse of the dollar, now a "subprime" currency, especially since the US central bank (Federal Reserve) has panic cut its main lending rate by 3 percentage points in six months, to 2.25 percent, is beginning to inflict real pain on China's economy. Not for nothing did Premier Wen Jiabao recently say he was "deeply worried" by the falling dollar.
The renminbi's rise against the US currency has led to some of the features of a recession in southern China's export powerhouse, the Pearl River Delta (PRD), a region that accounts for one-eighth of China's GDP. Based on some estimates, 1,000 shoe factories have closed down in this region in the last year, most of them moving to cheaper, less regulated inland provinces, or to Vietnam and other lower-wage economies. The local government in Dongguan, an industrial city in the PRD, recently announced a new fund to help foreign companies there upgrade technologically, to shift out of labour-intensive lines such as footwear and textiles, which have faced the brunt of the renminbi's rise.
The dollar's fall affects China in a number of ways, firstly in a marked slowdown in export growth (not yet a contraction). China's legendary trade surplus plunged 64 percent in February. Based on the first two months of this year, exports to the US market are stuck at the same level, compared to a 14 percent growth overall for 2007. But the dollar's slide has also led to a fresh flood of "hot money" into China, as speculators jostle to preserve the value of their capital by buying into rising currencies like the renminbi. On present trends, the Chinese currency is set to appreciate by a further 7 percent this year against the dollar, after climbing 15 percent in the past two years. The speculators are even gambling on a larger, one-off revaluation, possibly triggered by the Beijing regime's desire to purge inflation, running at an annual rate of 8.7 percent. Such a move cannot be ruled out, although it depends on where the regime sees the greatest danger: from food riots and protests driven by inflation, or from a wave of factory closures and possible strikes in the export sector brought about by currency appreciation.
Fear of inflation
Few regimes in the world fear inflation more than China's misnamed 'communist party'. Inflation was an important ingredient in the revolutionary upheavals of 1949 and also 1989. Inflationary pressures, especially galloping food prices, which are 23 percent higher than a year ago, were undoubtedly also an important factor behind the riots in Tibetan areas last month, which combined with pent-up discontent over religious and national persecution to produce the worst unrest in Tibet for 20, perhaps 50 years. The Beijing regime has ordered universities across China to increase subsidies in their cafeterias, fearing possible unrest among students, another phenomenon conjuring up images of 1949 and 1989.
Like the governments of Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Argentina, Mexico and several other countries, the Chinese regime has reintroduced price controls on basic foodstuffs such as cooking oil and rice, but these are not particularly effective given that the state no longer controls the food distribution industry. "Administrative control over commodity prices has little effect in the current stage of market development. Businesses and the market have various means to negate State price controls," commented Yi Xuanrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in China Daily (4 March 2008). And as a top regime economist, Gao Huiqing, said last month, "China is in the wagon of the world economy in terms of globalisation. But it is not the helmsman. As 70 percent of mainland price rises can be attributed to international factors, the nation cannot tackle the problem on its own." [South China Morning Post, 19 March 2008].
China is now a major importer of farm produce such as soja beans, corn and meat, and domestic farm prices increasingly reflect world market prices, which have hit historic highs and are set to stay there. "World agriculture is in crisis," stated a new report from the International Food Policy Research Institute, quoted in China Daily (22-23 March 2008), pointing among other things to extreme weather phenomena, shrinking land availability, increased consumption (as in China) and bio-fuel production. This report went on to warn surging food prices are "a major political concern". In the short-term, the price hikes have lifted incomes for some farmers, while a large section of society, both urban and rural, and especially the poorest strata, are substantially worse off now compared to a year ago. The severe winter in southern and central China, combined with a two-year drought in northern China, has damaged one-sixth of the country's arable land, putting further upward pressure on farm prices this year. This is why the government has designated the fight againt inflation its 'number one' priority. But as Chinese workers and peasants know, there is a huge gap between the regime's stated intentions and its actual results!
The actions of the US Federal Reserve, in drastically cutting interest rates, has seriously limited the room to manoeuvre of the Chinese regime and central bank. Despite the loosening of its peg to the dollar in 2005, the renminbi is still closely tied to the greenback. But interest rates in the two economies are diverging sharply, as the "subprime" crisis deepens. After raising interest rates six times last year, to put a brake on an overheating economy, the People's Bank of China's (PBoC) base lending rate is currently 7.5 percent, compared to a rate of 2.25 percent in the US. This has sucked a fresh wave of speculative capital into China, presenting a number of problems for policy makers. In the first two months of this year, China saw foreign direct investment (FDI) surge 75% above the level for the same period last year, to $18 billion. Should this trend continue for the whole year it would mark a new FDI record.
This capital must be 'sterilised' by the central bank, by replacing dollars with yuan, leading to a further unwanted expansion of the money supply, which in turn fuels inflation. Much of this foreign 'investment' is purely speculative, ploughed into real estate deals which help drive up land prices thereby feeding a monstrous property bubble that could burst at any time, and in some coastal regions may already have burst. The Wall Street Journal reports that property prices have declined by as much as 30 percent in some top-tier cities, adding that "China's property developers are under siege. Property prices are showing signs of weakness in many of the country's key markets, and capital markets have all but seized up for these - and other - offerings." [Wall Street Journal, 26 March 2008].
Property bubble... still inflating
The surge in home prices has compounded problems on other economic fronts. Many ordinary Chinese have been priced out of the housing market. In the 70 largest cities, overall house prices surged 11.3 percent in January from a year earlier, the biggest increase for three years. Super-rich property tycoons have amassed phantasmagorical personal fortunes - they regularly top the various ranking lists of China's super rich - a fact that fuels political discontent. Over half the tycoons on last year's Forbes list of China's 40 wealthiest individuals were involved in the property sector.
"This year marks the tenth anniversary of China's removal of its decades-old welfare housing system in 1998," proclaimed an editorial in the 'communist' party-run China Daily (8-9 March 2008). As this paper noted, "While rapidly meeting the need of the few rich, the booming property market has largely ignored the demand of lower or many middle-income families for affordable houses, not to mention the urban poor's need of shelter."
The spiralling cost of housing is one important factor why consumer spending continues to languish at levels far below even those of other 'developing' countries. Last year, consumer spending accounted for around 40 percent of GDP in China, compared to more than 70 percent in the US, and 59 percent even in India. The idea, put forward by many capitalist economists, and by the Chinese regime above all, that the Chinese consumer is poised to 'take up the slack' in world markets caused by falling US consumption, is a fallacy. Chinese salaries are too low, and the cost of basic necessities like housing and schools is too high. Reliable statistics of salaries in China are virtually impossible to find. There is no end of claims that workers in the cities at least have seen 'significant' wage increases in recent years. But this is a fallacy, at most applying to a smaller layer of urban-based workers in the private and especially hi-tech sectors. Only 30 percent of Chinese workers will pay income tax this year, and the threshold for personal income tax is 1,600 yuan (160 euros) per month. So, 525 million of China's 750 million strong labour force earn less than 1,600 yuan a month - a very credible figure. Without huge increases in wages, which the capitalists of course will resist tooth and claw, these workers are excluded from the grand designs of boosting consumption to compensate for the contraction of the US economy.
It is not uncommon for new homeowners to spend half their monthly income on mortgage repayments. A CCTV report (15 March 2008) featured a couple from Beijing who pay over 4,000 yuan a month to the bank for their two bedroom apartment, 60% of their monthly income. In addition to housing costs eating up a growing share of an urban family's income, education and medical costs are also extreme, rising from 10 percent of an urban resident's total expenditure in 1990, to 30 percent in 2006 [China Daily, 14 March 2008].
This explains why solidly neo-liberal agencies like the OECD and journals like The Economist have become welfare-state-zealots in relation to China, urging its rulers to rebuild basic public services as a means to coax the population to save less, and spend more of their still very low wages on consumer goods. For the rural majority especially, health care infrastructure is a shambles. Three quarters of China's total medical resources are concentrated in the urban areas, home to just 35% of its population. According to China Daily (14 March 2008), with 22 percent of the world's population, China disposes of only 2 percent of the world's medical resources. On this basis, the 750-strong rural population, roughly one-eighth of the world's population, have access to just 0.5% of the world's medical resources.
Stock market bubble... burst!
The Chinese stock market has been one of the worst performers in the world in 2008, only Vietnam has suffered bigger losses. The first quarter of 2008 was the worst in the Shanghai exchange's 16-year history, with the main SCI index losing 34% of its value. In financial market jargon a fall of ten percent is a 'correction', while a drop of 20 percent is a 'bear market'. Of course, stock markets in today's world are really over-sized casinos that only indirectly reflect processes in the underlying economy. Nevertheless, the panic on the Chinese stock market is both a symptom of impending crisis, but also a source of serious problems for the wider economy.
Since last October's peak, more than 12 trillion yuan of share values has been wiped out, a sum equivalent to half China's GDP. While the stock market was not an important factor in China's economy even four years ago, this changed with the financial sector reforms of 2005, the most important of which meant that all the shares, not just a minority, of the country's major companies became tradeable. This led to a succession of top, mostly state-owned companies, banks and utilities, launching what were very lucrative initial public offerings (IPOs) and tapping into the huge pool of savings of the population. China dominated the global IPO rankings in the last two years, accounting for 35% of IPOs worldwide in 2007. This "IPO bubble" has come to an abrupt halt in the first months of this year as the market has plummeted. Many top companies are now trading at below the price they realised on their first day of trading, leaving gullible 'investors' in a rage. This process is symbolised by PetroChina, briefly the world's most valuable corporation when it was floated on the Shanghai exchange last October. Since then the company's market capitalisation has plummeted 62 percent - and that for an oil company, with the oil price at $100-a-barrel!
China's stock market bubble of 2005-07, which has now burst, caused further serious problems for the economy. Based on the booming price or equities, major companies were less dependent on the banks for funds and were able to circumvent central government lending constraints designed to curb over-investment and its inevitable results: overcapacity, falling profits and possible bankruptcy. Fixed-asset investment grew by a staggering 24.8% in 2007, 0.9 percentage points higher than in 2006, despite government efforts to rein in this growth.
The IPO mania of the last two years almost certainly helped to lift the investment bubble to a new level of absurdity. It also pulled millions of small savers into the stock market 'casino'. Ironically, gambling is illegal in China, since the revolution of 1949. And for a very good reason! Many of China's new breed of small 'investors' are now nursing catastrophic losses and, once again, the result can be political instability. "My husband condemns me as so stupid that we lost our family's savings," said Zhang Liying, a retired waitress, to the International Herald Tribune (2 April 2008). Internet chat sites are full of angry comments turning on the government, and blaming them for the market's devastating slide.
And there is likely to be more economic fall-out if the 'bear market' continues, as is most likely, as China's financial sector is shaken by the turbulence in global markets. Some commentators downplay the stock market's significance because even with 150 million individual trading accounts, the Chinese market has not accounted for the same kind of "wealth effect" as in older industrialised countries, where 40, 50 or even 60 percent of the population hold savings linked to the stock market. But in China's case, many of the individual accounts are actually "fake accounts" used by companies and even banks to speculate in the market. This highly illegal trade generated a sizeable portion - 15 to 20 percent by some estimates - of the profits of major Chinese companies last year. "Companies had a lot of excess cash, explained Jing Ulrich of JP Morgan in Hong Kong. "And a lot of that cash did leak into the stock market". [International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2008].
The big speculators mostly got out before the market tanked, leaving the small traders to take the heavy losses. But a prolonged bear market, by closing off this source of additional "quick fix" profits, will have a detrimental impact on the balance sheets of China's big companies, at a time when profits are anyway facing a squeeze from rising raw material and energy costs, a tougher export outlook, and the effects of serious overcapacity. These processes are self-reinforcing. A string of profit warnings in recent days at major corporations like PetroChina and China Telecom has fed the stock market gloom. Another cause of the market plunge are rumours of an interest rate hike, the first this year, as part of the regime's anti-inflation policies.
Lessons from 1990s - sudden crisis
The economic landscape in China is changing at breakneck speed. Last year the economic debate was dominated by the danger of 'overheating'. Then in January, the scourge of inflation loomed large, with the government announcing a shift to "tight" budget policies, away from the "prudent" fiscal policy of the last four years. Now, in the shadow of the global crisis, the situation is changing again. If food and raw material (including energy) prices are excluded, China's economy shows still shows significant deflationary features (deflation is the opposite of inflation: falling prices) particularly in the manufacturing and export sectors. The inflation rate, minus food and energy, is only 1.6% instead of 8.7% a year. Textile prices in China have fallen 0.6% in the last year for example. There are similar price declines in electronic products, steel and autos.
These pressures can intensify as a result of massive - as yet unrecorded - surplus capacity throughout industry, the result of the biggest investment boom in history. Overcapacity, aggravated by a global downturn, means more goods chasing fewer markets and inevitable downward pressure on prices. At a certain point, profits are annihilated and companies go bust. From there, the chain leads to the banks, mostly state-owned, which lent to the companies to fund their investment binge.
An explosion of non-performing loans could be just around the corner, threatening a banking crisis every bit as serious as America's, albeit with different features. In such a scenario a "tight" or restrictive fiscal policy aimed at limiting credit and squeezing inflation would be catastrophic. Not only would the Chinese regime be forced to rapidly change direction towards an expansive or "Keynesian" policy, some commentators believe this is already its unstated goal. "I expect the mainland will be half-hearted in applying its tight monetary policies and loosen to some extent when the situation demands." argued Qu Hongbin, the cheif China economist at HSBC. Outlook, the influential weekly journal of Xinhua, also recently had an article urging the Chinese regime to "prepare for a US recession".
But it's not just a US recession! China's economy could soon be facing a similar crunch to that experienced by South East Asian capitalism ten year ago, although on a much larger scale. In the mid 1990s, South East Asian currencies were appreciating rapidly as their economies experienced rapid investment-driven growth. By 1997, however, their export engines began to slow as cheaper producers - China among them - ate into their market share. The speculative "hot money" that had flooded into these countries to take advantage of the boom, pulled back abruptly, causing first a credit and banking crisis (not wholly dissimilar from the US crisis of today) and then a wave of corporate bankruptcies and a severe recession. This with the help of US capitalism and the IMF, who imposed policies completely opposite to what the Bush Administration and Federal Reserve are doing today i.e. massive interest rate rises and 'austerity' budgets.
This - nightmare - scenario is not a figment of our, Marxist, imagination. The World Bank has so far this year revised its growth forecasts for China down twice, from 10.8% to 9.6% in February, and last week again, to 9.4%. This is a substantial reduction, of 1.4 percent, in growth expectations. But a more alarmist prognosis has just been released by the financial company, China International Capital Corp (CICC) which warned GDP growth could slip to 7.5 percent next year. "China's economy is now at a crossroads," CICC economists wrote in their research note. "If policy adjustments are not appropriate, the economy may face high inflation this year but could turn sluggish next year." In that case, warned CICC, "China's unemployment rate and banks' bad debt will markedly rise and companies' profits will shrink substantially."
In Chinese terms, growth of around seven percent would be a borderline recession, especially in terms of the effect this would have on the labour market, with an explosion of urban unemployment as the likely result. Every year, 10 million new urban job seekers come onto the market, not including the increase in the migrant labour force. As it is, with double-digit growth, employment has only grown by 1 percent a year over the last 4-5 years. Several factors, including the tens of thousands of temporary jobs in construction and services created by the Beijing Olympics, and a short-term investment boom in some of the worst-hit areas of winter strife, that will not apply next year, increase the likelihood of a slowdown and even recession.
Therefore clearly, the Chinese economy is headed to uncharted territory. After two decades of largely continuous rapid growth a slowdown, or slump, will create unprecedented tensions in Chinese society including open splits in the ruling party, and an explosion of popular protest. The need for fighting and democratic workers' organisations - especially independent trade unions and factory committees - to struggle for workers' interests in the face of increased capitalist attacks, is therefore greater than ever.
Footnote: The Chinese currency is called 'renminbi' (people's money) in the context of foreign exchange dealings, but 'yuan' when used for domestic transactions, i.e. renminbi is the currency, but the notes and coins are yuan.
股市低迷,利润前景暗淡,而通胀预示着更多的不稳定
Vincent Kolo,香港
这个奥运年,对中国政权来说什么都不对头。根据目前的状况,中国的经济仍然以两位数的比率扩大着,美国巨大的信用泡沫的破裂带来的全球资本主义危机越来越靠近中国。尤其是,美元的崩溃,现在的"次级"的货币,特别是由于美国中央银行(联邦储备委员会)在6个月内恐慌性削减其主要贷款利率3个百分点至2.25 % ,开始造成中国的经济的真正的苦痛。温家宝总理最近说的他对美元贬值"深感忧虑" 并非一无是处。
人民币对美国货币的升值已形成中国南方的作为出口火车头的珠江三角洲(PRD)某些衰退的征象, 该地区占了中国的国内生产总值的八分之一。根据一些估计数字,过去一年中,这个地区有1000家制鞋工厂倒闭,他们大多迁到便宜,管制较少的内陆省份,还有越南和其他低工资经济体。作为珠三角的一个工业城市的东莞的当地政府近日宣布了一项新的基金来帮助外国公司进行技术上的升级,把面临人民币的上升趋势冲击的劳动力密集行业转移出去,如鞋类和纺织品。
美元贬值以多种方式影响中国,首先是显著的出口增长放缓(尚未收缩)。二月份,中国富有传奇色彩的贸易盈余下降64 % 。基于今年头2月,与整个2007年14 %的增长相比,对美国市场出口停留在同一水平。由于投机者争相通过购进上升货币如人民币来使资本保值,美元的下跌带来了一场新的"热钱"进入中国的洪水。按照目前的趋势,在近两年来攀爬15个百分点后,今年中国货币对美元将升值另外的7 % 。炒家甚至对更大升值进行赌博,北京政权为了控制通货膨胀,有可能采取一次性升值的措施,以年率8.7 %运行。我们不能排除此一举动的可能性,尽管它取决于政权认为最大的危险在哪里:粮食暴动和通货膨胀驱动的抗议,还是由货币升值带来的出口部门工厂的倒闭和可能的罢工之潮。
害怕通货膨胀
世界上没有多少政权比中国的名不副实的'共产党'政权更怕通胀。通货膨胀是1949年还有1989年带来革命性剧变的一个重要因素。通货膨胀的压力,特别是急剧的食品价格上涨,与去年同期比,食品价格上涨了23 % ,无疑也是上个月藏族地区暴动背后的一个重要因素,再加上压抑了的不满,宗教和民族的迫害,共同作用产生了20年来也许50年来西藏最严重的骚乱。北京政权担心学生中可能爆发骚乱,已下令中国各地的大学增加对它们的食堂的补贴,这令人浮想起1949年和1989年的另一种现象。
像印度尼西亚,埃及,摩洛哥,阿根廷,墨西哥及其他几个国家的政府一样,中国政权已重新对基本食品,如食用油和大米实行价格管制,但由于国家不再控制食物分销业,这些都不是特别有效。"中国社科院的易选龙(音译)在中国日报( 2008年3月4日)评论说:"对商品价格的行政控制对市场的发展的当前阶段影响不大,企业与市场有各种手段来打消国家的价格管制的影响。上个月作为一个顶级制度经济学家的高辉清说:"中国在全球经济一体化中是世界经济的四轮马车而不是驾车手。由于大陆物价上涨的百分之七十可以归因于国际因素,国家自己没有能力处理这个问题。" [南华早报, 2008年3月19日] 。
中国现在是主要的农产品如大豆类,玉米和肉的进口国,而国内农产品价格越来越多地反映出世界市场价格,已达到历史高峰,并定留在那里。中国日报(2008年 3月22日-23日)引述"国际粮食政策研究所一份新的报告说世界农业正处于危机之中"。除其他事项外,它指向了极端的天气现象,土地供应缩减,消费的增加(如在中国)和生物燃料的生产。这份报告还警告涌动的食品价格上涨是"一个重大的政治关切" 。在短期内,物价上涨提升一些农民的收入,而社会的一大部分,无论在城市和农村,特别是最贫穷的阶层,都大大地不如一年前。在南部和中部地区由于严重的冬季,再加上中国北方一个为期两年的干旱,这些就破坏了国家的可耕地的六分之一,这将进一步加大今年农产品物价上升的压力。这就是为什么政府已把控制通货膨胀放在其'头号'优先的位置。但正如中国工人和农民都知道的,该政权的意图和它的实际效果之间有着很大的差距!
美国联邦储备委员会大幅削减利率的行动已严重限制了中国政权和中央银行的活动空间。尽管在2005年松动了其钉住美元的汇率政策,人民币仍和美钞紧密地联系在一起。不过,因为"次贷"危机的加深,两个经济体的利率差急剧扩大。为经济过热刹车,去年加息6次后,中国人民银行(PBoC)的基本贷款利率目前为百分之七点五,与此相比,美国的为2.25 %。这已导致新一波的投机性资金流入中国,这给决策者带来了一些问题。在今年首两个月,中国的外国直接投资( FDI )比去年同期激增75 %以上,达到180亿美元。如果这种趋势全年持续下去,这将标志着一个新的外国直接投资纪录。
这种资本必须由中央银行通过用人民币更换美元来'消化',这导致了多余的进一步扩大的货币供应量,这反过来又刺激通胀。大部分的外国“投资”是纯粹的投机,投机到房地产交易,这有助于推高地价,从而形成了在任何时候都可能破裂的滔天的地产泡沫,而在沿海的一些地区可能已经爆裂。华尔街日报报导说在一些顶级城市楼价下降了30 %之多,并补充说: "中国的地产商是处于包围之中。在许多国家的主要市场,资产价格均呈现疲软迹象,以及资本市场完全被这些-以及其他-产品所包围"。 [华尔街日报, 2008年3月26日] 。
房地产泡沫...仍在膨胀
激增的房价已经和其他经济方面的问题组合起来。许多普通的中国人由于价格而止步于房地产市场外。在70个最大的城市,与去年同期比较,1月份整体房价飙升11.3 % ,为3年来增幅最大。超级富豪大地产商已积累梦幻般的个人财富-他们经常处在中国的超级富豪榜的顶部 -这一事实激起了政治性的不满情绪。去年的福布斯名单上有一半以上的富豪,中国的40个最富有的个人,涉及地产界。
'共产党'经营的中国日报( 8-9 2008年3月)的一篇社论宣告了"今年是中国1998年取消其数十年之久的福利分房制度的十周年 " 。正如本文所指出: "虽然迅速满足了少数富人的需要,蓬勃发展的房地产市场已经在很大程度上忽视了低收入者或许多中等收入的家庭的可以负担的起的房子需要,更不用提需要栖身之所的城市贫民的需要了。"
螺旋式上升的住屋费用是为什么消费者支出甚至继续处在远远低于其他'发展中'国家的低迷的水平一个重要原因。去年,消费开支占到中国国内生产总值的40 %左右,与之相比,美国达到70 %以上,即使在印度也达到59 % 。许多资本主义经济学家以及最重要的是由中国政权提出的中国国内消费可以平衡美国消费在世界市场上所造成的下滑,这一想法是荒谬的。中国工资过低,其基本必需品如房屋和上学的费用实在太高。中国可靠的薪金统计资料是几乎不可能找到的。没有止境的声称城市里工人在最近几年里至少有了'很大'的工资增幅。然而,这是一个谬论,最多只适用于城市中在私营和特别是高技术行业里的较小的某些工人阶层。这一年只有30 %的中国工人要缴纳个人所得税,个人所得税起征点是月收入1600元( 160欧元)。那么,中国7亿5千万的强壮劳动力中有5亿2千5百万中国人的收入少于每月1600元人民币-一个非常可信的数字。没有巨大的职工工资增长,资本家当然会全力抵制工资增长,这些工人是被排斥在刺激消费以补偿美国经济影响带来的收缩的宏伟设计之外。
新屋主花他们每月的收入的一半供楼并不鲜见。央视报道( 2008年3月15日)特写了一对北京的夫妇为他们的两个卧室的公寓每月要支付逾4000元人民币给银行的事例,占他们每月的收入的60 %。除了房屋花费抢占了一个城镇居民家庭的收入越来越大的份额外,教育和医疗费用也极端的高,由1990年占城镇居民的总开支的百分之十上升到了2006年的30 %左右 [中国日报, 2008年3月14日] 。
这也解释了为什么在与中国有关方面,坚实的新自由主义机构如经合组织和经济学家这样的期刊也已经成为福利国痴迷者,要求其统治者重建基本公共服务以作为一种手段来哄人们减少储蓄,多花点他们还很低水平的工资在消费品上。尤其对于大多数农村,卫生保健基础设施是一团糟。四分之三的中国的总医疗资源集中在城市地区,只覆盖了35 %的人口。据中国日报( 2008年3月14日) ,占世界百分之二十二的人口的中国只有2 %的世界医疗资源。在此基础上,7亿5千万的农村人口,约占世界人口的八分之一,只能得到0.5 % 的世界的医疗资源。
股市泡沫...破裂!
在世界上,2008年,中国股市一直是表现得最差之一,只有越南遭受了更大的损失。在上海交易所的16年的历史上,2008年第一季度是最坏的,主要的SCI指数失去了34 % 的价值。用金融市场行话来说,下降百分之十是一个'调整' ,而下降20 % 是一个'熊市' 。当然,今天世界上的股市真的是一个大中型赌场,只是间接地反映实体经济的进程。不过,对中国股票市场的恐慌是即将出现危机的一个征兆,对于整体经济来说也是一个严重问题的来源。
自去年10月的高峰以来,超过12万亿元人民币的股票价值已被摧毁,相当于半年中国的国内生产总值。在四年前,股票市场甚至还不是中国经济的一个重要的因素,随着2005年金融部门的改革,这种情况改变了,其中最重要方面意味着不只是少数公司的股份,该国的主要公司的所有股份都成为可交易的。这导致了一连串的大多是最大的国有公司,银行及公用设施发起非常有利可图的首次公开募股(IPOs) ,并利用人们的庞大储蓄。在过去两年中,中国主导的全球公开招股占2007年的35 %。在今年头几个月,由于市场大幅下跌,这种"上市泡沫"已经进入突然停顿。许多顶级公司现正以低于它们首个交易日的价格进行交易,留下易上当受骗的'投资者'在那里暴跳如雷。这个过程由中石油象征性地表现出来,去年10月当该公司漂浮在上海交易所时,它暂时性地成为世界上最有价值的公司。自那时以来,该公司的市值下跌了62 %,-这发生在一家伴随着石油处在100美元一桶的价位时的石油公司身上!
2005-07年中国的股市泡沫目前已破裂,并进一步造成严重的经济问题。基于兴旺的价格或股票,主要企业已越来越少地依赖于银行的资金并能规避中央政府用来遏止过度投资和它的必然结果:能力过剩,利润下降,并有可能破产的贷款限制。尽管政府努力遏制这种增长,2007年固定资产投资增长了惊人的24.8 % ,高于2006年0.9个百分点。
几乎可以肯定,近两年来的首次公开招股的热潮帮助把投资泡沫推高到了荒唐的新的高度。它也使得以千百万计的小型储蓄户取出储蓄而投入到股票市场这个'赌场'里 。讽刺的是,自1949年革命以来,赌博在中国是非法的。理由很充分!许多中国的新一族的小'投资者' 现在正再次面对灾难性的损失,其结果能够导致政治上的不稳定。一位退休女服务员张莉颖(音译)向国际先驱论坛报( 2008年4月2日)说:"我的丈夫责怪我那么愚蠢以至于失去了我们全家的积蓄。" 互联网聊天网站充满着对政府的愤怒的评论,并为市场的破坏性滑坡而指责他们。
因此如果'熊市'继续下去,可能会有更多的经济危机影响,这是最有可能的,因为中国的金融业也受到世界市场的动荡的严重影响。一些评论家淡化股市的意义,因为即使有1亿5千万份个人交易帐户,中国市场也没有老的工业化国家那样的"财富效应" ,在这些老的工业化国家,40% , 50%或者至60 %的人口拥有和股市有联系的储蓄。但就中国的情况而言,很多的个人账户其实是公司甚至银行所用的"假帐户"以便在市场中投机。这样高的非法的交易产生了去年主要的中国公司利润的相当大的一部分-根据某种估计是百分之十五到二十。香港JP摩根的乌尔里希京解释说:"公司有大量的过剩现金,而且大量的这样的现金漏进了股票市场" 。 [国际先驱论坛报, 2008年4月2日] 。
大炒家在市场套牢前都抽离了,留下小股民去承受惨重的损失。由于原材料和能源成本的上升以及更困难的出口前景,还有生产能力严重过剩的作用,企业无论如何都要面临利润的压缩,这个时候,延长的熊市,关闭额外地"快速获得"利润的这一来源,对中国的大公司的资产负债表有不利影响。这些过程都是自我强化的。最近几天大公司如中石油和中国电信的一连串的盈利警告助长了股市的低迷。另一个市场大跌的原因是将有今年的第一次的加息以作为政府反通胀政策的一部分的传言。
来自20世纪90年代的教训-突发的危机
中国的经济景观以惊人的速度变化着。去年主导经济争论的是'过热'的危险。然后在今年1月份,随着该国政府宣布由过去四年中实施的"谨慎"的财政货币政策转到"紧缩"的预算政策,通货膨胀的祸害显得很大。如今,在全球性危机的阴影下,这种情况正在发生变化。如果粮食和原材料(包括能源)价格被排除在外,中国的经济数据仍显示出显著的通货紧缩的特点(通货紧缩是通货膨胀的反面:价格下跌),特别是在制造业和出口部门。减去食品和能源后的通货膨胀率只有1.6 % ,而不是8.7 % 。纺织品价格,在中国已下跌了0.6 % ,而以去年为例,在电子产品,钢铁和汽车方面也有类似的价格下跌。
这些压力作为大规模-但无纪录的-整个行业中的过剩能力的结果和作为有史以来最大的投资热潮的结果而强化。产能过剩,由于全球经济低迷而更为恶化,意味着更多的商品追逐较少的市场,必然有价格下跌的压力。在某一个点上,利润将消失以及公司倒闭。从那里开始,连锁反应至银行和通过借款以支付他们的投资热潮的大多数国有公司。
不良贷款的爆发可能即将来临,预示着的严重性不亚于美国的银行危机,尽管具有不同的特点。在这样一种情况下实施的旨在限制信贷和压缩通货膨胀的"紧的"或限制性的财政政策将是灾难性的。不仅中国政权将被迫迅速改变方向到扩张性或"凯恩斯主义"的政策下,一些评论家认为,这已是未阐明的目标了。汇丰中国首席经济学家曲红彬(音译)说:"我期望大陆是半心半意地实施其货币紧缩政策并能根据情况在一定程度上放宽该政策 " 。作为很具影响力的周刊的新华的展望杂志最近也有一篇文章要求中国政权"为美国经济衰退作好准备" 。
但不只是美国经济衰退!中国的经济可能很快将面临类似十年前东南亚资本主义经历的萎缩,尽管是一个更大规模上的萎缩。在20世纪90年代中期,因为东南亚的经济经历了快速的投资驱动的增长,它们的货币升值迅速。然而,到1997年,其出口的引擎开始减速,因为便宜的生产者-包括中国-分食了市场份额。投机的"热钱"已经涌入这些国家以便利用这次繁荣期,"热钱"的突然抽回,造成第一次信用和银行危机(并非完全不同于今天的美国危机),然后是一波企业破产的浪潮和严重的经济衰退。在美国资本主义和国际货币基金组织的帮助下,他们被迫接受的政策完全与布什政府和美国联邦储备委员会今天实施政策相反,即大规模的连续加息和'紧缩开支的预算。
这一梦魇般情景不是我们马克思主义者想象中虚构出来的事情。到目前为止,世界银行已修订其中国增长预测两次,一月修改为从10.8 %至9.6 % ,上周再次修改至9.4 % 。这是一个增长预期的大幅度减少,减少1.4 % 。不过,中国国际资本公司(中金公司)财务公司刚刚公布了更危言耸听的预测,其警告明年国内生产总值增长率可能会下降至7.5 % 。中金公司经济学家在他们的研究报告中指出:"中国的经济正处于一个十字路口。""如果政策调整不适当的话,这一年经济可能面临高通胀,,但明年可能演变成停滞" 。在这种情况下,中金公司警告说:"中国的失业率和银行不良债务将显着上升,公司的利润将大幅萎缩。"
对中国而言,增长率处在百分之七左右将表明其已经处在衰退的边缘,这尤其将会对劳动力市场产生影响,作为可能的结果是爆炸性上升的城市失业率。每年, 1000万个新的城市求职者涌向市场,这还不包括增加着的农村移民劳动力。过去的4-5年,中国经济以双位数字增长,而创造的就业机会只增加了1 % 。几个因素,其中包括由北京奥运以及在一些冬季雪灾中受灾最严重地区一个短期的投资热潮创造的的建筑和服务领域里的数以万计的临时工作,明年将消失,增加了减速甚至衰退的可能性。
因此很显然,中国的经济正在走向未知不详之地。经过20年的基本上持续快速增长后,放缓,或低迷将在中国社会创造前所未有的紧张局势,包括执政党内的公开的分裂和爆发民众抗议。因此在面对日益增加的资本主义打击中,建立战斗的和民主的工人组织-特别是独立工会和工厂委员会-来争取工人的利益的需要比以往任何时候都更大。
注:在外汇交易的背景下,中国法定货币是所谓的'人民币' (人民的钱),但国内交易中称为'元',即人民币是货币,但纸币和硬币是元。
China's economy - the sound of bubbles bursting
Stock market slumps, profit outlook darkens, while inflation threatens more instability
Vincent Kolo, Hong Kong
Nothing is going right for the Chinese regime in this Olympic year. While China's economy is still, based on current projections, expanding at double-digit rates, the global capitalist crisis arising from the bursting of the giant credit bubble in the United States gets closer to China every week. In particular, the collapse of the dollar, now a "subprime" currency, especially since the US central bank (Federal Reserve) has panic cut its main lending rate by 3 percentage points in six months, to 2.25 percent, is beginning to inflict real pain on China's economy. Not for nothing did Premier Wen Jiabao recently say he was "deeply worried" by the falling dollar.
The renminbi's rise against the US currency has led to some of the features of a recession in southern China's export powerhouse, the Pearl River Delta (PRD), a region that accounts for one-eighth of China's GDP. Based on some estimates, 1,000 shoe factories have closed down in this region in the last year, most of them moving to cheaper, less regulated inland provinces, or to Vietnam and other lower-wage economies. The local government in Dongguan, an industrial city in the PRD, recently announced a new fund to help foreign companies there upgrade technologically, to shift out of labour-intensive lines such as footwear and textiles, which have faced the brunt of the renminbi's rise.
The dollar's fall affects China in a number of ways, firstly in a marked slowdown in export growth (not yet a contraction). China's legendary trade surplus plunged 64 percent in February. Based on the first two months of this year, exports to the US market are stuck at the same level, compared to a 14 percent growth overall for 2007. But the dollar's slide has also led to a fresh flood of "hot money" into China, as speculators jostle to preserve the value of their capital by buying into rising currencies like the renminbi. On present trends, the Chinese currency is set to appreciate by a further 7 percent this year against the dollar, after climbing 15 percent in the past two years. The speculators are even gambling on a larger, one-off revaluation, possibly triggered by the Beijing regime's desire to purge inflation, running at an annual rate of 8.7 percent. Such a move cannot be ruled out, although it depends on where the regime sees the greatest danger: from food riots and protests driven by inflation, or from a wave of factory closures and possible strikes in the export sector brought about by currency appreciation.
Fear of inflation
Few regimes in the world fear inflation more than China's misnamed 'communist party'. Inflation was an important ingredient in the revolutionary upheavals of 1949 and also 1989. Inflationary pressures, especially galloping food prices, which are 23 percent higher than a year ago, were undoubtedly also an important factor behind the riots in Tibetan areas last month, which combined with pent-up discontent over religious and national persecution to produce the worst unrest in Tibet for 20, perhaps 50 years. The Beijing regime has ordered universities across China to increase subsidies in their cafeterias, fearing possible unrest among students, another phenomenon conjuring up images of 1949 and 1989.
Like the governments of Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Argentina, Mexico and several other countries, the Chinese regime has reintroduced price controls on basic foodstuffs such as cooking oil and rice, but these are not particularly effective given that the state no longer controls the food distribution industry. "Administrative control over commodity prices has little effect in the current stage of market development. Businesses and the market have various means to negate State price controls," commented Yi Xuanrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in China Daily (4 March 2008). And as a top regime economist, Gao Huiqing, said last month, "China is in the wagon of the world economy in terms of globalisation. But it is not the helmsman. As 70 percent of mainland price rises can be attributed to international factors, the nation cannot tackle the problem on its own." [South China Morning Post, 19 March 2008].
China is now a major importer of farm produce such as soja beans, corn and meat, and domestic farm prices increasingly reflect world market prices, which have hit historic highs and are set to stay there. "World agriculture is in crisis," stated a new report from the International Food Policy Research Institute, quoted in China Daily (22-23 March 2008), pointing among other things to extreme weather phenomena, shrinking land availability, increased consumption (as in China) and bio-fuel production. This report went on to warn surging food prices are "a major political concern". In the short-term, the price hikes have lifted incomes for some farmers, while a large section of society, both urban and rural, and especially the poorest strata, are substantially worse off now compared to a year ago. The severe winter in southern and central China, combined with a two-year drought in northern China, has damaged one-sixth of the country's arable land, putting further upward pressure on farm prices this year. This is why the government has designated the fight againt inflation its 'number one' priority. But as Chinese workers and peasants know, there is a huge gap between the regime's stated intentions and its actual results!
The actions of the US Federal Reserve, in drastically cutting interest rates, has seriously limited the room to manoeuvre of the Chinese regime and central bank. Despite the loosening of its peg to the dollar in 2005, the renminbi is still closely tied to the greenback. But interest rates in the two economies are diverging sharply, as the "subprime" crisis deepens. After raising interest rates six times last year, to put a brake on an overheating economy, the People's Bank of China's (PBoC) base lending rate is currently 7.5 percent, compared to a rate of 2.25 percent in the US. This has sucked a fresh wave of speculative capital into China, presenting a number of problems for policy makers. In the first two months of this year, China saw foreign direct investment (FDI) surge 75% above the level for the same period last year, to $18 billion. Should this trend continue for the whole year it would mark a new FDI record.
This capital must be 'sterilised' by the central bank, by replacing dollars with yuan, leading to a further unwanted expansion of the money supply, which in turn fuels inflation. Much of this foreign 'investment' is purely speculative, ploughed into real estate deals which help drive up land prices thereby feeding a monstrous property bubble that could burst at any time, and in some coastal regions may already have burst. The Wall Street Journal reports that property prices have declined by as much as 30 percent in some top-tier cities, adding that "China's property developers are under siege. Property prices are showing signs of weakness in many of the country's key markets, and capital markets have all but seized up for these - and other - offerings." [Wall Street Journal, 26 March 2008].
Property bubble... still inflating
The surge in home prices has compounded problems on other economic fronts. Many ordinary Chinese have been priced out of the housing market. In the 70 largest cities, overall house prices surged 11.3 percent in January from a year earlier, the biggest increase for three years. Super-rich property tycoons have amassed phantasmagorical personal fortunes - they regularly top the various ranking lists of China's super rich - a fact that fuels political discontent. Over half the tycoons on last year's Forbes list of China's 40 wealthiest individuals were involved in the property sector.
"This year marks the tenth anniversary of China's removal of its decades-old welfare housing system in 1998," proclaimed an editorial in the 'communist' party-run China Daily (8-9 March 2008). As this paper noted, "While rapidly meeting the need of the few rich, the booming property market has largely ignored the demand of lower or many middle-income families for affordable houses, not to mention the urban poor's need of shelter."
The spiralling cost of housing is one important factor why consumer spending continues to languish at levels far below even those of other 'developing' countries. Last year, consumer spending accounted for around 40 percent of GDP in China, compared to more than 70 percent in the US, and 59 percent even in India. The idea, put forward by many capitalist economists, and by the Chinese regime above all, that the Chinese consumer is poised to 'take up the slack' in world markets caused by falling US consumption, is a fallacy. Chinese salaries are too low, and the cost of basic necessities like housing and schools is too high. Reliable statistics of salaries in China are virtually impossible to find. There is no end of claims that workers in the cities at least have seen 'significant' wage increases in recent years. But this is a fallacy, at most applying to a smaller layer of urban-based workers in the private and especially hi-tech sectors. Only 30 percent of Chinese workers will pay income tax this year, and the threshold for personal income tax is 1,600 yuan (160 euros) per month. So, 525 million of China's 750 million strong labour force earn less than 1,600 yuan a month - a very credible figure. Without huge increases in wages, which the capitalists of course will resist tooth and claw, these workers are excluded from the grand designs of boosting consumption to compensate for the contraction of the US economy.
It is not uncommon for new homeowners to spend half their monthly income on mortgage repayments. A CCTV report (15 March 2008) featured a couple from Beijing who pay over 4,000 yuan a month to the bank for their two bedroom apartment, 60% of their monthly income. In addition to housing costs eating up a growing share of an urban family's income, education and medical costs are also extreme, rising from 10 percent of an urban resident's total expenditure in 1990, to 30 percent in 2006 [China Daily, 14 March 2008].
This explains why solidly neo-liberal agencies like the OECD and journals like The Economist have become welfare-state-zealots in relation to China, urging its rulers to rebuild basic public services as a means to coax the population to save less, and spend more of their still very low wages on consumer goods. For the rural majority especially, health care infrastructure is a shambles. Three quarters of China's total medical resources are concentrated in the urban areas, home to just 35% of its population. According to China Daily (14 March 2008), with 22 percent of the world's population, China disposes of only 2 percent of the world's medical resources. On this basis, the 750-strong rural population, roughly one-eighth of the world's population, have access to just 0.5% of the world's medical resources.
Stock market bubble... burst!
The Chinese stock market has been one of the worst performers in the world in 2008, only Vietnam has suffered bigger losses. The first quarter of 2008 was the worst in the Shanghai exchange's 16-year history, with the main SCI index losing 34% of its value. In financial market jargon a fall of ten percent is a 'correction', while a drop of 20 percent is a 'bear market'. Of course, stock markets in today's world are really over-sized casinos that only indirectly reflect processes in the underlying economy. Nevertheless, the panic on the Chinese stock market is both a symptom of impending crisis, but also a source of serious problems for the wider economy.
Since last October's peak, more than 12 trillion yuan of share values has been wiped out, a sum equivalent to half China's GDP. While the stock market was not an important factor in China's economy even four years ago, this changed with the financial sector reforms of 2005, the most important of which meant that all the shares, not just a minority, of the country's major companies became tradeable. This led to a succession of top, mostly state-owned companies, banks and utilities, launching what were very lucrative initial public offerings (IPOs) and tapping into the huge pool of savings of the population. China dominated the global IPO rankings in the last two years, accounting for 35% of IPOs worldwide in 2007. This "IPO bubble" has come to an abrupt halt in the first months of this year as the market has plummeted. Many top companies are now trading at below the price they realised on their first day of trading, leaving gullible 'investors' in a rage. This process is symbolised by PetroChina, briefly the world's most valuable corporation when it was floated on the Shanghai exchange last October. Since then the company's market capitalisation has plummeted 62 percent - and that for an oil company, with the oil price at $100-a-barrel!
China's stock market bubble of 2005-07, which has now burst, caused further serious problems for the economy. Based on the booming price or equities, major companies were less dependent on the banks for funds and were able to circumvent central government lending constraints designed to curb over-investment and its inevitable results: overcapacity, falling profits and possible bankruptcy. Fixed-asset investment grew by a staggering 24.8% in 2007, 0.9 percentage points higher than in 2006, despite government efforts to rein in this growth.
The IPO mania of the last two years almost certainly helped to lift the investment bubble to a new level of absurdity. It also pulled millions of small savers into the stock market 'casino'. Ironically, gambling is illegal in China, since the revolution of 1949. And for a very good reason! Many of China's new breed of small 'investors' are now nursing catastrophic losses and, once again, the result can be political instability. "My husband condemns me as so stupid that we lost our family's savings," said Zhang Liying, a retired waitress, to the International Herald Tribune (2 April 2008). Internet chat sites are full of angry comments turning on the government, and blaming them for the market's devastating slide.
And there is likely to be more economic fall-out if the 'bear market' continues, as is most likely, as China's financial sector is shaken by the turbulence in global markets. Some commentators downplay the stock market's significance because even with 150 million individual trading accounts, the Chinese market has not accounted for the same kind of "wealth effect" as in older industrialised countries, where 40, 50 or even 60 percent of the population hold savings linked to the stock market. But in China's case, many of the individual accounts are actually "fake accounts" used by companies and even banks to speculate in the market. This highly illegal trade generated a sizeable portion - 15 to 20 percent by some estimates - of the profits of major Chinese companies last year. "Companies had a lot of excess cash, explained Jing Ulrich of JP Morgan in Hong Kong. "And a lot of that cash did leak into the stock market". [International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2008].
The big speculators mostly got out before the market tanked, leaving the small traders to take the heavy losses. But a prolonged bear market, by closing off this source of additional "quick fix" profits, will have a detrimental impact on the balance sheets of China's big companies, at a time when profits are anyway facing a squeeze from rising raw material and energy costs, a tougher export outlook, and the effects of serious overcapacity. These processes are self-reinforcing. A string of profit warnings in recent days at major corporations like PetroChina and China Telecom has fed the stock market gloom. Another cause of the market plunge are rumours of an interest rate hike, the first this year, as part of the regime's anti-inflation policies.
Lessons from 1990s - sudden crisis
The economic landscape in China is changing at breakneck speed. Last year the economic debate was dominated by the danger of 'overheating'. Then in January, the scourge of inflation loomed large, with the government announcing a shift to "tight" budget policies, away from the "prudent" fiscal policy of the last four years. Now, in the shadow of the global crisis, the situation is changing again. If food and raw material (including energy) prices are excluded, China's economy shows still shows significant deflationary features (deflation is the opposite of inflation: falling prices) particularly in the manufacturing and export sectors. The inflation rate, minus food and energy, is only 1.6% instead of 8.7% a year. Textile prices in China have fallen 0.6% in the last year for example. There are similar price declines in electronic products, steel and autos.
These pressures can intensify as a result of massive - as yet unrecorded - surplus capacity throughout industry, the result of the biggest investment boom in history. Overcapacity, aggravated by a global downturn, means more goods chasing fewer markets and inevitable downward pressure on prices. At a certain point, profits are annihilated and companies go bust. From there, the chain leads to the banks, mostly state-owned, which lent to the companies to fund their investment binge.
An explosion of non-performing loans could be just around the corner, threatening a banking crisis every bit as serious as America's, albeit with different features. In such a scenario a "tight" or restrictive fiscal policy aimed at limiting credit and squeezing inflation would be catastrophic. Not only would the Chinese regime be forced to rapidly change direction towards an expansive or "Keynesian" policy, some commentators believe this is already its unstated goal. "I expect the mainland will be half-hearted in applying its tight monetary policies and loosen to some extent when the situation demands." argued Qu Hongbin, the cheif China economist at HSBC. Outlook, the influential weekly journal of Xinhua, also recently had an article urging the Chinese regime to "prepare for a US recession".
But it's not just a US recession! China's economy could soon be facing a similar crunch to that experienced by South East Asian capitalism ten year ago, although on a much larger scale. In the mid 1990s, South East Asian currencies were appreciating rapidly as their economies experienced rapid investment-driven growth. By 1997, however, their export engines began to slow as cheaper producers - China among them - ate into their market share. The speculative "hot money" that had flooded into these countries to take advantage of the boom, pulled back abruptly, causing first a credit and banking crisis (not wholly dissimilar from the US crisis of today) and then a wave of corporate bankruptcies and a severe recession. This with the help of US capitalism and the IMF, who imposed policies completely opposite to what the Bush Administration and Federal Reserve are doing today i.e. massive interest rate rises and 'austerity' budgets.
This - nightmare - scenario is not a figment of our, Marxist, imagination. The World Bank has so far this year revised its growth forecasts for China down twice, from 10.8% to 9.6% in February, and last week again, to 9.4%. This is a substantial reduction, of 1.4 percent, in growth expectations. But a more alarmist prognosis has just been released by the financial company, China International Capital Corp (CICC) which warned GDP growth could slip to 7.5 percent next year. "China's economy is now at a crossroads," CICC economists wrote in their research note. "If policy adjustments are not appropriate, the economy may face high inflation this year but could turn sluggish next year." In that case, warned CICC, "China's unemployment rate and banks' bad debt will markedly rise and companies' profits will shrink substantially."
In Chinese terms, growth of around seven percent would be a borderline recession, especially in terms of the effect this would have on the labour market, with an explosion of urban unemployment as the likely result. Every year, 10 million new urban job seekers come onto the market, not including the increase in the migrant labour force. As it is, with double-digit growth, employment has only grown by 1 percent a year over the last 4-5 years. Several factors, including the tens of thousands of temporary jobs in construction and services created by the Beijing Olympics, and a short-term investment boom in some of the worst-hit areas of winter strife, that will not apply next year, increase the likelihood of a slowdown and even recession.
Therefore clearly, the Chinese economy is headed to uncharted territory. After two decades of largely continuous rapid growth a slowdown, or slump, will create unprecedented tensions in Chinese society including open splits in the ruling party, and an explosion of popular protest. The need for fighting and democratic workers' organisations - especially independent trade unions and factory committees - to struggle for workers' interests in the face of increased capitalist attacks, is therefore greater than ever.
Footnote: The Chinese currency is called 'renminbi' (people's money) in the context of foreign exchange dealings, but 'yuan' when used for domestic transactions, i.e. renminbi is the currency, but the notes and coins are yuan.
订阅:
博文 (Atom)