我译综观2008年的材料

综观2008年的材料

对中国的统治者来说，工业减速和美国资本主义模式的破裂预示着深刻的危机的开始。

本文应与以前的综观2007年的文章 ——中国处于十字路口一并阅读。在该文章中概述了未来的社会和政治危机的重要特点，因此在此不赘述了。

对整个世界尤其是中国产生巨大影响的并导致华尔街金融垮台的美国资本主义的债务危机是资本主义历史上一个开创性的时刻。现在很少有人谈论经济“脱钩”或怀疑中国和其他主要新兴经济体如印度和俄罗斯将被拖入全球经济漩涡。在这个阶段，唯一的未知因素是危机的深度和持续时间及期限。

2008年，人们清楚地看到中国处在工业经济放缓的第一阶段。所有经济增长率的预测正在向下修正。在2006-07年度实现国内生产总值增长11.8 ％ 后，预测2008年的增长在9%至9.6 ％之间 ，下一年为8％至9 ％。

来自在香港的瑞士信贷集团的陶东警告说：“在一个社会里，每年新的求职者超过新增非农就业岗位达2000万人，甚至经济增长下降到百分之八就等于衰退。”他告诉彭博新闻说“低于百分之九将使当局很紧张 ”。

闭幕式后的几个星期里，中国伟大的奥运时刻已经逐渐成为历史。取代欢呼的人群的是越来越多的愤怒的农民、学生和处于困境中的农民工和荡产的股民。导致超过13000名婴儿住院并致死4个婴儿的有毒牛奶丑闻是中国社会一个令人震惊的'现实写照'。涉及20多家公司包括食品行业中非常大的公司的这个丑闻是几乎完全缺乏管制的结果。2005年政府决定免除超过2100家的公司在食品和乳制品业的管制措施，由它们自己的标准来认定就足够了。由于缺乏控制，乳品行业的中间商通过增加工业化学品三聚氰胺的措施来提高原料奶的蛋白质水平。于事无补的是当局命令新闻界奥运会期间“所有的食品安全问题是禁地”。 奥运会开幕6天前省级领导人（河北）知道了污染问题。然后采取行动可以拯救生命和减少无尽的痛苦。丑闻中心地的几家公司在中国和外国的股票市场上上市而且奶制品行业在短短几年中从几乎是零爆发成为具有200亿美元的产业。受害的孩子们的家长开始组织起来在互联网上发贴表达他们的要求并联系律师活动家，期待着起诉乳品公司。
仅2008年9月4日一天里，在三个省-河南，湖南和浙江爆发了大规模抗议-合起来有10 0000人走上街头，和安全部队发生了冲突。英国广播公司评论说“在中国，社会动乱是常见的，但很少达到这个规模”。这些抗议从学校学生（河南申邱县）抗议房地产开发商夺取他们的学校体育场到在14岁的工人遭受了严重事故后10000名农民工和当地居民（浙江宁波）包围工厂。中共展望杂志公布的统计数字显示， '群体性事件'曲线呈继续上升的状态，2006年记录达惊人的90000次抗议-几乎每天都有2 50起！这是2003年5.8万起、2004年7.4万、2005年8.7万后又一次增加。尽管国民生产总值的数字令人眼花缭乱，这些数字指明了深刻的社会弊病。

南方都市报专栏作家文云超说“谁说今天的中国是和谐的，我将抽他 ”。 “随着社会不稳定的问题的增加示威数增长着。”

在蓬勃发展的城市厦门，上海和重庆，数千人参加了针对环境有害的建设项目的非法街头游行。2007年几千名退伍军人至少在三个城市暴乱以抗议待遇不公，非官方退伍军人网站上大量地报告这些事件。在过去，兵役意味这国有企业保证有工作，但现在不再适用，这是对工人和农民以前权益饿许多攻击之一。
仅在中国南部的珠江三角洲，罢工和工厂停工持续不断的，而且每天都在发生涉及1000个或更多的工人的停工。大多数的这些斗争因为新闻封锁而未见于报道。通常管理人员，政府官员和安全部队严厉地处理他们。中国目前有170万警察部队， 100多万武警（PAP）和2百万武装部队。在最近几年新开设了3 0000个新派出所。1989年群众运动后，由于正规军表现出不愿意出动镇压，PAP得到了增强。部署在西藏和新疆的'反恐'力量中，武警是该政权主要的镇压工具。
学生动乱也有所增加，一个仍困扰政权的1989年记忆的不祥预兆。89年运动是由全面地对通货膨胀，腐败的不满以及实现基本民主权利的愿望引起的-这些都是目前的局势的特征。政府在当前的五年计划（ 2006-2010年）的期限中设定的公共就业水平最高限度为650万，造成严重的大学毕业生失业。2007年413万毕业生中120万人没有找到工作，在2008年更有150万大学毕业生面临着同样的命运。
中国已经发生一系列重大灾害：四川地震（ 8.7万人死亡或失踪） ，中国许多地区出现极其寒冷的冬天的，随后是半世纪里最严重的夏季降雨。这些事件使一部分人口带有政治色彩并质疑政府的作用。经济学家的评论说：“四川地震造成了数以百万计的潜在的不满者 ”。

在对地震最初的反应中，国家处在震惊中，22日温家宝在国家电视台含泪的表现使他得到了广泛阶层的爱戴，并作为官方关怀的一个例子'。但是地震五个月之后，四川的省级政府抱怨它只收到承诺的用于重建四分之一的钱，需要更多的1800亿美元。全省将需要几年时间才能恢复到地震前国内生产总值达到的水平，意味着困难，失业和数以百万计人口只能住临时住房。‘豆腐渣学校’ 在世界各地传开。中国电影导演潘剑林一部“谁杀了我们的孩子？”的纪录片中反映了这个问题，导演说“这些建筑的质量槽糕透了 ”。
甚至由于地方服务的衰减、国有资产被盗，贪污腐败，滥用权力，镇压，以及一大堆其他罪行已成为家常，低级别的中共机器也遭到了群众越来越多指责，高层领导人基本上屏蔽于大众批评之外。

在2008年，民政的剧变成功地迫使中央政府纪律处分和牺牲一些地方大员 。贵州省“6.28” 瓮安事件就是一例，为期两天达50000名的观众围攻派出所和摧毁数十辆车辆。北京迅速解除当地警察局长和党委书记的职务。同样，在有毒牛奶丑闻中，负责全国产品质量和安全的局长和产生丑闻的中心城市的石家庄的党委书记的职务也被解除。在山西省，仅几周前，在一个非法煤矿场的泥石流导致271人死亡，省长孟学农辞职，毫无疑问，上面'说服'了他。孟立即被称为“中国最倒霉的官员” -在2 003年，他因为在处理SARS爆发事件的不当而被解除北京市市长的职务。
通过牺牲腐败或无能的官员，北京希望赢得时间和在危机扩大之前化解危机，但这是以鼓励其他人在将来走上斗争之路为代价的，并进一步削弱了党的国家机器。

在他的书《向农民道歉》中，山西省白蜀县（音译）前副党委书记马英卢（音译）正确地描述了作为保护中共政权内在核心的“防火墙”的中国政府的五个层次。在2003年他写道：“今天，中央领导仍安全， ” “但较低层次的防火墙[即村和乡镇的政府]已经完全瘫痪，中间层[即省级]防火墙处于危险之中。“
中国执政党的执政地位一直因它有能力保持不可阻挡的经济增长而得到护卫。但是，这北京政权的国内生产总值的'王牌' ，现在也受到来自全球资本主义的危机和其自身的内部矛盾威胁。由于消费市场的不足和非常过剩的生产能力，中国的经济模式是不可持续的。而在先进的资本主义经济体，私人债务的积累在一定时期里给这一资本主义的基本矛盾提供了一条出路，中国有限的国内市场被前所未有的资本投资和出口部门的快速扩张'克服'了。
随着美国次级债和房地产泡沫的破裂，作为常常具有浪费性的和高度投机性的巨额投资的结果的中国自身的危机才刚刚开始。在中国由于在经济领域巨大的国家支持的信用发挥着作用，这一过程很可能被拖延，但这只是一个时间和程度的问题而不是趋势的问题。
在全国范围内，2008年上半年，约67000家中小型企业倒闭，大约20万人因此失去工作。受害最严重的地区是最为融入全球经济的比较富裕的和更为工业化的沿海省份，例如根据香港工业联合会的消息，世界500强最大公司中有176家在那里有基地的广东正在经历“20年来最恶劣的状况 ”。 自2007年年底广东省一半以上的制鞋企业（超过2200家工厂）已经关闭或搬迁。现在纺织部门的利润正大大地减少至大约营业额的百分之一点五，而且广东省的政府报告说，与2007年同期相比，2008年上半年服装和配件的销售几乎下降了三分之一。
由于货币升值，原材料成本上升和因劳动力短缺而被迫放弃声名狼藉的他们低工资，出口商已经遭到挤压。较新的低工资竞争对手，如越南和孟加拉，以及中国的贫穷省份，甚至东欧和墨西哥，正在资本主义'恶性竞争'中获得优势。
作为珠江三角洲一个出口业大市的东莞市的市领导谈到了当地经济“萧条”。 2008年市政府发起了两项救助资金以支持受到出口衰退打击的中小型企业。在作为世界第四繁忙的港口的深圳港口，“出口危机”是显而易见的，该港口的货运量的增长已经放慢，只有去年水平的一半。业内分析人士预测严重依赖于中国的全球集装箱航运业将遭到 “普遍的下半年的损失”，这发生在世界经济和作为重要市场的美国，欧盟和日本正式进入衰退之前。
其他沿海出口省份，如浙江，江苏，山东和福建也苦不堪言。浙江省的外贸研究中心主任描述那里的局势是“灾难性的” 。省内公司五分之一-超过10000公司-2 0 08年的损失总额已达三百六十亿元（5 3 亿美元） 。省政府介入拯救由于其出口的缝纫机下降了百分之四十四，因而无力偿还其债权人近10亿元（一亿四千六百万美元）的债务而濒临破产的有5000名员工的飞跃集团）。正如在东莞和其他地区一样，政府下令延期来自当地银行的贷款以使公司继续生存下去。
目前的危机极不可能的只限于出口部门。2008年整个经济中投资速度已经放缓至5年来的最低水平。这是多种因素共同作用的结果，其中房地产泡沫的破裂和利润率的下降是最重要的因素。这种低迷也已开始影响到作为长达10年的建设热潮的支柱的钢铁行业，住宅建筑如饥似渴地吸收了约百分之二十的钢铁需求。该研究公司特钢宣布中国的钢铁工业自2008年中旬以来价格下降多达百分之二十而处在“衰退”中 。

在一项行业调查中，国家发展和改革委员会哀叹这样的事实，即“由地方政府启动的大多数钢铁项目未经中央的批准” 。该委员会过去在毛派斯大林计划经济时期是中国的计划机构。这份声明强调了时代已经大大地改变。评论家们很早就预测了中国的钢铁工业合并的破坏性时代的到来。
发电产业有着类似的情况。正如中国专家尼古拉斯拉迪（Nicholas Lardy）指出： “中国已建立这么多的发电厂以至于有些地区现在能力过剩。但是投入到将更有效地利用发电能力的国家电网的建设资金却已滞后。 “ [华尔街日报， 08年9月30日]
一个行业跟着一个行业中出现了同样的图景：没有规划，激烈的地区性竞争，长期过度投资和浪费。这也表现在最现代的电信行业。2008年8月国家审计署报告说2002年至2006年超过11200亿元（1640美元）用于建设电信公司的基本设施，但只有三分之一的电信电缆安装使用。前中国联通总裁杨贤足说“电信方面的投资性浪费可建几个三峡大坝” ，三峡大坝指建在长江上的世界上最大的水电工程。
中国的股市泡沫自2007年10月达峰值以来已经破裂。这是2008年世界上50家最大的证券交易所中表现的最差的。实际上，2005年当一系列重大的国有企业被推向市场以来所有的投机性收益已被抹去。1.36亿股民（ '投资者' ）被诱骗到股市中，百分之七十的股民的年收入低于10000美元，自2007年10月以来，在12个月里他们平均损失了三分之二的资金。
虽然他们不到人口总数的十分之一，因此股市下跌的“负财富效应” 比起在西方来说较为有限，对中国统治者来说，这些荡产的股民是重要的阶层。这是中共的主要社会基础-城市中产阶级-而且希望依赖这个阶层的消费来把出口导向型的经济转向内需拉动型经济。有能力购买所有那些汽车和平板电视这个阶层是完全破产了？
作者威利林评论道：“有迹象表明，党的领导层最担心的一场恶梦可能会比预期的更早发生：中产阶级成员加入'处于不利地位的阶层，如农民和工人举行抗议，甚至暴乱，以发泄他们的不满”。
婚姻破裂，自杀和心理疾病所有这些都是市场附带后果的表现。在一些地区，如陕西省，在2008年春季，投资者聚众闹事，并包围了当地的股票经纪处。官方的这种下降是“对市场经济来说是正常的” 声明已激怒了许多人。网民已经张贴愤怒的评论，如： “即使是资本主义美国也通过干预以挽救其市场，为什么中国政府不做同样的事呢？ ”

然而股市的崩溃正在迅速升级为更大和更严重的金融泡沫。虽然官方统计数字给予的印象是楼价总体而言仍在上升，而事实上看情况不是如此。在北京，上海，杭州，宁波，海口，而且在内陆城市如成都，武汉，南宁，西安，兰州，乌鲁木齐，房屋价格正在下降。所有这些城市在2007年经历了投机性增长。现在一些地区报告的价格下降了百分之十到四十之间而且房地产公司已经开始了价格战。
正如工业领域一样，许多地方的房地产市场遭受极端过剩之苦。深圳市土地和房管局的报告说，按目前的销售价格，深圳的开发商将花超过10年的时间才能出售完现有的所有房屋存量。中国现在拥有世界上最大的购物商场，准备靠消费猛增来赚钱，但并没有实现。东莞市南中国购物中心是世界最大的购物中心，但只租出不到百分之十的店面。三分之一的北京写字楼空置的。当然，在现实中，不是有“太多的”建筑，在中国为普通百姓的住房严重短缺。但是，利润制度是无法解决这一矛盾的。
在中国大多数人欢迎房价的下跌。目前百分之七十的城市居民买不起新的公寓。据北京师范大学金融研究中心的研究，在中国一所公寓的平均价格约平均每年家庭可支配收入的13倍，远远高于国际平均水平的3至6倍。当然，虽然1984年时在旧的国家控制制度下的住房的质量往往有许多有待改进之处，但中国的平均租金只是家庭收入的百分之一。
但是，当金融泡沫展开，他们往往趋向一个恶性循环，即价格下降，面临损失的投机者抛售资产以获得现金，随后空房的存量增加，造成价格进一步下跌。这对更广的经济可能产生的影响是大大降低随后的投资水平，信贷条件普遍收紧（ “信贷紧缩” ）以及坏帐急剧上升威胁到银行业的稳定。当然，银行面临倒闭的威胁，中国政权将尝试保尔森式救助。不同于美国政府的是，他们有相当的可支配的储备。中国的未偿债务水平相当于GDP的15.7%，是低的。它还拥有世界上最大的外汇储备，接近2万亿美元的价值，虽然这些储备有很大一部分有力地'植入'以支撑美元的价值，防止全球货币体系的崩溃。

中国的房地产业（即投机）已经占了最近几年所有固定资产投资的三分之一以上，可能多达一半。据一些调查，价格需要下跌百分之五十才能恢复中国的房地产市场。在此基础上，摆在面前的是不良贷款发生爆炸。据官方统计，今天中国银行系统的该级别的不良贷款达6000亿美元，但实际数字可能达到11000亿美元（相当于一半以上的中国的外汇储备） 。大约四分之一的国内生产总值，这高于日本在1990年代初的水平。
因此，中国可能会步入1990年日本'泡沫经济'破裂的相似地步。这十年中间，超过三分之二的日本公司没有利润，只能通过银行更多的信贷以维持生命的延续。这就是所谓的“僵尸经济” 。银行背后站着中央银行和政府，其公共债务比率由经合组织中最低水平国转变为最高水平的国家之一。然而，相反，在20世纪90年代，今天的美国，欧洲和亚洲新兴经济体持续增长给日本的资本主义提供了部分的出路。中国目前的问题发生在非常不利的全球危机关头。
未来的危机将迎来中国复杂的国内政治的一个新的时期。它标志着1989年时代的结束。较富裕的沿海区域是首先遭到危机打击的，并可能会遭到最严重的打击。这将是现在形势的一个逆转，以往这些省份的发展和经济实力的增长是以内陆省份为代价的。在资源上的权力斗争以形成国家政策将变得更加激烈。共产党两个主要派别之间的'上海帮' （它的主要基地是沿海省份）和胡锦涛的' 团派 '内很好的平衡将动摇。大幅经济衰退可能公开党内严重的分裂。正如中共早期阶段，对抗的派系可以通过走上街头扩大他们背后的舆论支持。经济冲突也将加剧。
“没有'中国市场'这么回事。在经济发展的不同阶段，中国是一个地区性市场的拼凑物，它作为一个民族结合在一起，但因治理上的差别、通讯的困难、区域竞争和落后的基础设施而分离。 “这是来自科技顾问组的一个准确的描述。 [中国的市场， Cambashi有限公司， 2005 ]

经济衰退对一些地区的打击远远超过其他地区的话，地区贸易保护主义的趋势将增强。
面对出口下降，沿海省份的比较现代的工厂的将把它们的市场目标转向其他省份，并要求中央政府出台政策以给予便利。较穷的省份的弱势产业将尽最大努力阻止这一点。结果可能出现高涨的地区主义和省际争夺，这将不可避免地通向北京。威利林使用术语“军阀”来形容省级领导人，说明多年来他们已就一系列重要问题成功地抗拒中央政府的政策。
今后一段时期将看到为抵制经济危机影响而爆发的大规模斗争和第一次独立的工人运动的'绿芽'。它也标志着出现如20世纪90年代危机期间在台湾、香港和其他东亚地区那样的大规模的民主运动。为了避免这样的发展，中共某些阶层想要重新启动陷入僵局的争取'政治改革'的进程。北京中央党校的研究人员报告认为这项工作是“当务之急” 。但是，本报告主张的改变是要加强法制和使媒体更自由，而不是独立组织，成立政党，还有选举的权利。
在中共高层中有一种对任何真正的对党的控制的开放或放松的病态的恐惧，担心这将打开大规模的不满闸门。相反，一些有限的地方实验已经付之实行。例如，深圳市已表示将在党的结构内推出多个候选人选举，这有可能扩大到市人民政治协商会议。然而，'民主'的问题，尤其以其模糊的形式，可以在一定条件下被集团、地区或个人所用作为斗争的一部分以获得让步或改变政府的政策的方向。这可能会在人民群众中产生共鸣并引发一场远远超出其发出者的设想的运动。
自1989年以来二十年内，国内生产总值的快速增长，所有大经济体中的最快的速度，一直是中共政权的重要的支柱。这种所谓的'奇迹'已经几乎成为保护统治集团的神奇的力量，给人经济永远不会衰退的感觉 。国内和国外资本家迎合这个政权并允许中共在城市中产阶级中创建一个新的社会基础。30年来国内生产总值的增长已达到年均百分之九点六的速度，使得40岁以下的中国人认为这是'常态' 。这至少是中共统治集团内具有相对凝聚力的基础-没有了1989年前所具有的很多不稳定的公开分裂的特征。因此在世界上很少政权会因正在展开的全球资本主义的危机而失去更多。在中国和全球范围内急迫的事是发起具有明确的社会主义纲领的新的战斗的劳工运动来应付危机。
Perspectives material 2008
Industrial slowdown and the implosion of the US capitalist model signal the onset of a deep crisis for China’s rulers
[This document should be read together with the previous document, Perspectives 2007 – China at the Crossroads. Important features of the coming social and political crisis are outlined in that document and are therefore not repeated in this material].
The debt crisis of US capitalism, which produced the Wall Street financial meltdown, represents a seminal moment in the history of capitalism, with huge effects for the whole world, not least China. Few people now speak about economic “decoupling” or doubt that China, and other major emerging economies such as India and Russia, will be drawn into the global economic maelstrom. The depth of the crisis, its timing, duration, these are the only unknowns at this stage.
In 2008, it became clear China was in the first stages of an industrial slowdown. All forecasts for economic growth are being revised downwards. After achieving GDP growth of 11.8% in 2006-07, predictions for 2008 range between 9 to 9.6%, and 8 to 9% for the following year.
“In a society where the number of new job-seekers each year exceeds the number of jobs created by 20 million, a decline in economic growth to even 8 percent would be tantamount to a recession,” warned Tao Dong, from Credit Suisse AG in Hong Kong. Anything “below 9 percent would make the authorities quite nervous,” he told Bloomberg News.
Within a few weeks of the closing ceremony, China’s great Olympic moment had faded into history. In place of the cheering crowds are growing numbers of angry farmers and students, embattled migrant workers and ruined stock market investors. The toxic milk scandal that hospitalised more than 13,000 babies, killing four, was a shocking ‘reality check’ for Chinese society. This scandal, involving more than 20 companies including the very largest in the food sector, was the result of almost complete deregulation. The government decided in 2005 to exempt more than 2,100 companies in the food and dairy industry from regulatory controls, judging their own standards to be adequate. In the absence of controls, dairy industry middlemen took to adding the industrial chemical melamine to boost the protein level of raw milk. Matters were not helped by the regime’s orders to the press that “all food safety issues are off-limits” for the duration of the Olympics. Provincial-level leaders (in Hebei) knew of the contamination problem six days before the Olympic Games opened. Action then could have saved lives and untold suffering. Several of the companies at the centre of the scandal are listed on the Chinese and foreign stock markets, and the dairy sector has exploded from almost nothing to a $20 billion industry in a few short years. Parents of contaminated children began to organise, posting their demands on the internet, contacting activist lawyers, and looking to sue the dairy companies.
On just one day, 4 September 2008, mass protests erupted in three provinces – Henan, Hunan and Zhejiang – drawing a combined 100,000 onto the streets, leading to clashes with security forces. “Social unrest is common in China, but rarely on this scale,” commented the BBC. These protests ranged from school students (Shenqiu county, Henan) protesting the seizure of their school sports fields by property developers, to 10,000 migrant workers and local citizens (Ningbo, Zhejiang province) besieging a factory after one 14-year old worker suffered a serious accident. The CCP journal Outlook published statistics showing that the curve of ‘mass incidents’ continues to rise, with a staggering 90,000 protests recorded in 2006 – almost 250 every day! This was an increase from 87,000 in 2005, 74,000 in 2004, and 58,000 in 2003. These figures point to a deep malaise in society despite the dazzling GDP figures.
“I will slap anyone who says today’s China is harmonious,” remarked Wen Yunchao, a columnist for the Southern Metropolis Daily. “The amount of demonstrations is growing as social issues of instability are increasing.”
In booming cities like Xiamen, Shanghai and Chongqing, thousands have taken part in illegal street marches against environmentally harmful construction projects. Several thousand demobilized soldiers rioted in at least three cities in 2007 against the terms of their discharge, giving rise to reports of vast unofficial networks of retired soldiers. In the past, military service led to a guaranteed job at a state-owned enterprise, but this no longer applies, one of many attacks on the former rights of workers and peasants.
In southern China’s Pearl River Delta alone, strikes and factory flare-ups are continual, with a stoppage involving 1,000 workers or more occurring every day. The majority of these struggles go unreported due to state censorship. Often, they are dealt with harshly by managers, officials and security forces. China currently has 1.7 million in its police force, 1 million paramilitary police (PAP) and 2 million in the armed forces. 30,000 new police stations have been opened in recent years. The PAP was beefed up after the mass movement of 1989, as the army showed a reluctance to be used. Deployed in Tibet and Xinjiang on ‘anti-terror’ missions, the PAP is the main repressive tool of the regime.
Student unrest is also on the rise, an ominous portent for a regime still haunted by the memory of 1989. That movement was fuelled by general discontent over inflation, corruption, and the desire for basic democratic rights – all features of the current situation. The government has capped civil service employment at the level of 6.5 million for the duration of the current (2006-10) Five Year Plan, resulting in serious unemployment among university graduates. In 2007, 1.2 million out of a total 4.13 million graduates failed to find jobs, and a further 1.5 million graduates face the same fate in 2008.
China has been hit by a series of major disasters: the Sichuan earthquake (87,000 people dead or missing), the coldest winter in many parts of China, and then the worst summer rains for half a century. These events have politicised a section of the population and raised major questions about the government’s role. “The Sichuan earthquake has created millions of potential malcontents,” commented The Economist.
During the initial earthquake response, with the nation in shock, Wen Jiabao’s tearful appearances on national television endeared him to a broad layer, as an example of a ‘caring official’. But five months after the quake, Sichuan’s provincial government was complaining it had only received one-quarter of the money promised for reconstruction, a further $180 billion is needed. The province will need several years to get back to the GDP levels achieved before the quake, spelling hardship, unemployment and makeshift housing for millions. The scandal of the ‘tofu schools’ is known throughout the world. Chinese film director, Pan Jianlin, has captured this issue in a documentary, Who Killed Our Children? “The quality of these buildings was terrible,” the director says.
Even as the lower echelons of the CCP apparatus are increasingly cursed by the masses as local services decay, state-owned property is stolen, corruption, abuse of power, repression, and a litany of other crimes have become the norm, the top leaders have largely been shielded from popular criticism.
In the course of 2008, popular upheavals succeeded in pressuring the central government into disciplining and sacrificing some local satraps. This was the case in the “6/28” incident in Weng’an, in Guizhou province, where for two days crowds of up to 50,000 laid siege to the police station and destroyed dozens of vehicles. Beijing swiftly sacked the town’s police chief and party boss. Likewise, during the toxic milk scandal, the national products quality and safety chief as well as the mayor and party boss in Shjiazhuang, the city at the centre of the scandal, were removed. In Shanxi province, just weeks earlier, a mudslide at an illegal coalmine dump killed 271 people and the provincial governor, Meng Xuenong, resigned, undoubtedly ‘persuaded’ from above. Meng instantly became known as the “unluckiest official in China” – in 2003 he was dismissed as Beijing’s mayor for mishandling the SARS outbreak.
By sacrificing corrupt or inept officials, Beijing hopes to win time and defuse crises before they grow, but this comes at the price of emboldening others to take the road of struggle in future, and of further undermining the party-state apparatus.
In his book, Apologise to the Peasantry, the former vice party secretary of Baishu County in Shanxi province, Ma Ying Lu, aptly described the five layers of government in China as “firewalls” protecting the inner core of the CCP regime. “Today the central leadership are still safe,” he wrote in 2003, “but the lower level firewalls [i.e. village and country governments] have totally collapsed, and middle layer [i.e. provincial] firewalls are in danger.”
China’s ruling party has been protected by its apparent ability to deliver unstoppable economic growth. But this too, the Beijing regime’s GDP ‘trump card’, is now threatened both from the global capitalist crisis and its own internal contradictions. The Chinese economic model, with an under-dimensioned consumer market and vastly over-dimensioned production base, is unsustainable. Whereas in the advanced capitalist economies, the accumulation of private debt offered a way out – for a period – from this basic capitalist contradiction, in China the limits of the domestic market have been ‘overcome’ by unprecedented levels of capital investment and rapid expansion of the export sector.
Following the collapse of the US ‘subprime’ model and housing bubble, China’s own crisis, the result of huge amounts of often wasteful and highly speculative investment, is just beginning. The process can be more protracted in China due the vast sums of state-backed credit at play in the economy, but this is a question of timescale and degree, not overall direction.
Nationally, in the first half of 2008, about 67,000 small and medium-sized enterprises collapsed, throwing roughly 20 million out of work. The worst hit areas are the wealthier, more industrialised coastal provinces, which are the most integrated into the global economy. Guangdong for example, where 176 of the world’s 500 largest companies have a base, is experiencing “the worst conditions for 20 years,” according to the Federation of Hong Kong Industry. Half of the shoe manufacturing industry in Guangdong (over 2,200 factories) has closed down or relocated since the end of 2007. Profits in the textile sector are now widely reduced to around 1.5 per cent of turnover, and Guangdong’s government reported that sales of garments and accessories fell by almost a third in the first half of 2008, over the same period in 2007.
Exporters have been squeezed by currency appreciation, rising raw material costs, and a labour shortage that forces them to lift notoriously low wages. Newer low-wage rivals such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, as well as poorer Chinese provinces and even Eastern Europe and Mexico, are gaining ground in the capitalist ‘race to the bottom’.
City leaders in Dongguan, an export industry behemoth in the Pearl River Delta, speak of a “depression” in the local economy. The city government launched two rescue funds in 2008 to support small and medium enterprises battered by the export downturn. The “export crisis” is evident at Shenzhen’s port, the world’s fourth busiest, where the growth of cargo volume has slowed to half last year’s level. Industry analysts predict “widespread second-half losses” in the global container shipping industry, which is heavily dependent on China. This is before the world economy, and the crucial markets of the US, EU, and Japan, have formally moved into recession.
Other coastal exporting provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong and Fujian are also suffering. The director of Zhejiang province’s foreign trade research centre described the situation there as “disastrous”. One-fifth of the province’s companies – over 10,000 firms – have booked losses in 2008 totalling 36 billion yuan ($5.3 bn). The provincial government stepped in to rescue Feiyue Group, with 5,000 employees, from bankruptcy after its exports of stitching machines fell 44 percent, leaving it unable to meet almost one billion yuan ($146m) in repayments to its creditors. As in Dongguan and other areas, the government ordered an extension facility from local banks to keep the company alive.
It is extremely unlikely that the current crisis can be contained within the export sector. The pace of investment in the whole economy has slowed in 2008, to its lowest level for five years. This is a result of several factors, of which the bursting of the property bubble and falling rate of profit are the most important. The downturn has also begun to impact on the steel industry, the backbone of the decade-long construction boom. Residential construction soaks up about 20 percent of steel demand. The research company, Mysteel, declared that China’s steel industry was in “recession”, with prices falling from mid-year 2008 by as much as 20 percent.
In a survey of the industry, the State Development and Reform Commission bemoaned the fact that, “the majority of the steel projects under construction were started up by local governments without the approval of the central authorities”. This commission used to be China’s planning agency, in the days of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. This statement underlines how times have changed. Commentators have long predicted a destructive phase of consolidation in China’s steel industry.
The situation is similar in the power generating industry. As China expert Nicholas Lardy points out: “China has built so many power plants that some regions now have excess capacity. But investments to create a national power grid, which would allow more efficient utilization of generating capacity, have lagged.” [Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2008]
In industry after industry the same picture emerges: no planning, ferocious regional rivalry, chronic over-investment and waste. This is shown in the telecom industry, one of the most modern. The National Audit Office reported in August 2008 that more than 1.12 trillion yuan ($164bn) was spent by telecom companies on the construction of basic facilities between 2002 and 2006, but only one-third of the installed telecom cables were used. “The wasted investment in telecommunications could have built several Three Gorges Dams,” said Yang Xianzu, the former head of China Unicom, referring to the world’s biggest hydro-power project on the Yangtze River.
China’s stock market bubble has imploded since its peak in October 2007. It was the worst performer among the world’s 50 largest bourses in 2008. Effectively, all the speculative gains after 2005, when a series of major state-owned companies were brought to market, have been erased. Of the 136 million gumin (‘investors’) lured into stocks, 70 percent earn less than $10,000 a year, and on average they have lost two-thirds of their capital in the twelve months since October 2007.
Although they constitute less than one-tenth of the total population, and so the “negative wealth effect” from falling stocks is more limited than in the West, these ruined gumin represent a crucial layer for China’s rulers. This is the CCP’s main social base – the urban middle-class – and moreover it is upon this layer that any hopes rest of ‘rebalancing’ the economy away from exports towards domestic consumption. Who will buy all those cars and flat-screen televisions if this layer is completely bankrupted?
“There are signs that the nightmare the party leadership fears most may come to pass sooner than anticipated: members of the middle-class joining ‘disadvantaged sectors’ such as peasants and migrant workers in staging protests and even riots to vent their grievances,” commented Willy Lam, the author.
Broken marriages, suicides and mental illness are all features of the market fallout. In some regions, such as Shanxi province in the spring of 2008, investors rioted and laid siege to a local stock brokerage. Official pronouncements that such falls are “normal for a market economy” have enraged many people. Netizens have posted angry comments such as: “Even the capitalist US is intervening to rescue its market, why isn’t the Chinese government doing the same?”
The crashing stock market is however being rapidly upstaged by the bursting of an even larger and more serious financial bubble. While official statistics give an impression of still rising property prices overall, things look different on the ground. Housing prices are falling in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Haikou, but also in interior cities such as Chengdu, Wuhan, Nanning, Xi’an, Lanzhou and Ürümqi. All these cities experienced spectacular growth in 2007. Several regions now report price falls of between 10-40 percent and property companies have embarked upon a price war.
As in industry, many parts of the property market suffer extreme levels of overcapacity. The Shenzhen Bureau of Land and Housing Management reports that, at the current rate of sales, it would take developers in Shenzhen more than a decade to sell all their existing stock of properties. China now boasts the world’s biggest shopping malls, built to cash in on a consumer explosion that has not materialised. Dongguan’s South China Mall is the biggest in the world, but less than ten percent of its store space has been leased. Fully one-third of Beijing’s offices space lies vacant. Of course, in reality, rather than ‘too much’ construction, there is an acute housing shortage in China – for ordinary people. But the profit system is incapable of solving this contradiction.
Most people in China will welcome falling property prices. Currently 70 percent of urban residents cannot afford to buy a new apartment. According to studies by Beijing Normal University Finance Research Centre, the average price of an apartment in China is about 13 times the average annual household disposable income, well above the international average of between three and six times. Although of course the standard of housing often left a lot to be desired, in 1984, under the old state-controlled system, average rents in China were just one percent of family income.
When financial bubbles unwind, however, they tend to move in a vicious cycle whereby prices fall, speculators facing losses dump assets to get their hands on cash, and the pool of empty property grows, causing prices to fall even more. The likely effects of this on the wider economy will be a much-reduced level of investment hereafter, a generalised tightening of credit terms (“credit crunch”) and a sharp rise in bad debts threatening the stability of the banking sector. Of course, faced with the threat of bank collapses, the Chinese regime will attempt a Paulson-style bailout. Unlike the US government, they have considerable reserves at their disposal. China’s level of outstanding debt, at 15.7 percent of GDP, is low. It also has the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, approaching $2 trillion worth, although a large part of these reserves are effectively ‘embedded’ in propping up the value of the dollar and preventing a collapse of the global money system.
China’s property sector (i.e. speculation) has accounted for more than a third of all fixed asset investment in recent years, possibly as much as half. According to some surveys, a 50 percent fall in prices will be needed to revive China’s real estate market. On this basis, an explosion of non-performing loans lies ahead. Officially, the level of non-performing loans in the Chinese banking system today is $600bn, but the real figure could be $1,100 (equal to more than half China’s forex reserves). At around a quarter of GDP, this is higher than the level in Japan at the start of the 1990s.
China could therefore arrive in a similar position to Japan when its ‘bubble economy’ burst in 1990. By the middle of that decade over two-thirds of Japanese companies were making no profits, kept alive by the banks extending more credit. This was called “the zombie economy”. Behind the banks stood the central bank and the government, whose public debt ratio shot from the lowest in the OECD to one of the highest. In contrast to today, however, the US, Europe and emerging Asian economies continued to grow in the 1990s, offering Japanese capitalism a partial escape route. China’s current problems occur during a far less favourable global conjuncture.
The coming crisis will usher in a new period in China’s complex internal politics. It marks the end of the post-1989 era. The wealthier coastal regions are being hit first by the crisis and will probably be hit hardest. This will be a reversal of the previous situation where these provinces have led development and increased their economic power at the expense of the inland provinces. The power struggle over resources, and to shape national policy will grow more intense. The fine balance inside the CCP, between the two dominant factions, the ‘Shanghai faction’ (which has its main base in the coastal provinces) and Hu Jintao’s ‘tuanpai’, will be shaken. A sharp economic downturn can open serious divisions within the party hierarchy. As in the old days of the CCP, rival factions can seek to mobilise opinion behind them by going to the streets. Economic conflicts too will intensify.
“There is no such a thing as ‘the Chinese market’. China is a patchwork of regional markets at various stages of economic development, bound together as a nation, but separated by differences in governance, communications challenges, regional rivalries and poor infrastructure.” This is an accurate description from a group of IT consultants. [The markets in China, Cambashi Ltd, 2005]
An economic downturn that hits some regions far harder than others will increase internal protectionist tensions. Faced with falling exports, the more modern factories of the coastal provinces will turn their aim inwards towards the markets of other provinces, demanding that the central government crafts policies to facilitate this. Poorer provinces with weaker industries will do their utmost to block this. The result can be an upsurge of regionalism and inter-provincial disputes that will inevitably feed their way upwards to Beijing. Willy Lam uses the term “warlords” to describe the provincial leaders, showing how for years they have successfully resisted central government policies on a range of important issues.
The coming period will see the eruption of mass struggle against the effects of economic crisis and the first ‘green shoots’ of an independent workers’ movement. It can also mark the emergence of a mass pro-democracy movement as in Taiwan, Hong Kong and in other parts of East Asia during the crisis of the 1990s. To avert such a development, some layers within the CCP want to restart the stalled process towards ‘political reform’. A report by researchers at the Central Communist Party School in Beijing argues this task is now “urgent”. But the changes advocated in this report are for a strengthened legal system and freer media, not for the right to organise independently, to form political parties and to stand in elections.
Among the CCP tops there is a morbid fear of any serious opening up or relaxation of the party’s control, a fear that this would open the floodgates of mass discontent. Instead, some limited local experiments have been floated. For example, Shenzhen has signalled it will introduce multi-candidate elections inside the CCP’s structures, possibly extending this to the city’s People’s Political Consultative Congress. However, the issue of ‘democracy’, especially in its vaguest forms, could under certain conditions be seized upon by a faction, region, or individual, as part of a struggle to wrest concessions or shift the direction of government policy. This could resonate with the masses and trigger a movement going well beyond what its authors envisaged.
Rapid GDP growth, the fastest of any large economy, has been the crucial pillar supporting the CCP regime in the two decades since 1989. This so-called ‘miracle’ has exercised an almost divine power of protection over the ruling group, conferring an aura of economic ‘invincibility’. It has ingratiated the regime with the capitalists at home and abroad and allowed the CCP to create a new social base among the urban middle-classes. GDP has grown by an annual average of 9.6 percent for 30 years, leading most Chinese under 40 years of age to believe this is ‘normal’. Not least, this has underpinned the relative cohesion of the CCP ruling group – the absence of the destabilising open splits that characterised much of its pre-1989 history. Few regimes in the world therefore have more to lose from the global capitalist crisis that is unfolding. What is urgent in China, and globally, is the building of a new fighting labour movement equipped with a clear socialist programme to meet the crisis.