我们之间的分歧(中国国家性质）

Our differences
我们之间的分歧
SO, WHAT ARE our differences with Vincent’s approach? Essentially, our criticism is that Vincent (to use Trotsky’s phrase) is giving “a finished definition to an unfinished process”. We agree that there is a counter-revolutionary transition towards capitalism, but we do not accept that, as Vincent argues, the process is complete and that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. He refers, for instance, to Trotsky’s comment that a restoration of capitalism may occur either along “the path of an abrupt counter-revolutionary overturn” or “the path of successive shift ings”, culminating in “a Thermidorian shift”. (Thermidor refers to the defeat in 1794 of the Jacobins, the most advanced party in the French revolution, a term used by Trotsky to denote a victory of the counter-revolution.) Vincent says: “This ‘path of successive shiftings’ is an excellent description of what has happened in China. Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”. It “has happened”, capitalism “has been restored”. In other words, the “Thermidorian shift” has taken place. In our view, however, there will be further “shiftings” and the process is not yet complete.
那么我们与文森特的方法之间的分歧是什么呢？从本质上讲，我们的批评是，文森特（使用托洛茨基的用词）是给“一个未完成的进程一个完成的定义” 。我们同意，有一个复辟到资本主义的反革命过渡，但我们不接受文森特认为的这一过程已经完成，既中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。比如，他提到托洛茨基的评论，即资本主义的复辟可能发生或者沿“突然反革命颠覆的道路”或“连续的蜕变的道路 ” ，最终以“ 热月政变”结束 。 （ 热月指的是在1794年法国革命中最先进的政党雅各宾派的失败，托洛茨基用这个词指反革命的胜利。 ）文森特说： “这'连续蜕变的道路'出色的描述了在中国发生了什么事。中国特色的资本主义类型已复辟“ 。 ”换言之， “ 热月政变”已经发生。然而，在我们看来，将进一步“ 蜕变”的过程尚未完成。
Vincent, in our view, puts forward a simplistic analysis of the complex process of transition, basing his categorical conclusion on a one-sided approach. For instance, on the role of the state, he rightly refers to the power of the “repressive one-party state of the CCP”. He also says, “This edifice of super-exploitation is built around the repressive one-party state of the CCP…” But he underestimates the role played by the powerful, ex-Stalinist state (the CCP and the state apparatus) in directing the transition. The regime has promoted the development of capitalist forces and the intervention of foreign, trans-national corporations, but it has also been determined to safeguard its monopoly of political power and overall control of the economy.
在我们看来，文森特对复杂的转型过程进行了简单化的分析，他的绝对的结论是片面的做法。举例来说，在国家的作用上，他正确地提到了“具有镇压性的共产党一党制国家”的力量 。他还表示， “这超级剥削的大厦是建立在具有镇压性饿共产党的一党制国家上的 ”但他低估了强大的前斯大林主义（中共及其国家机器）在指导过渡中所发挥的作用。该政权促进了资本主义力量的发展和外国跨国公司干预，但它也被确定为维护其政治权力的垄断和对经济的前面控制。
“[T]he state’s economic power”, writes Vincent, “has been seriously degraded”. True, the state no longer has the economic power that it had on the basis of the planned economy. Moreover, the development of capitalist forces has produced powerful centrifugal forces, which will tend to become stronger if the present course continues. But it is a mistake to imply (as Vincent does) that the Chinese state is now completely subservient to capitalist forces, within China and internationally.

文森特写道，“ 国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”诚然，国家不再拥有它在计划经济体制的基础上的经济力量。此外，资本主义势力的发展产生了强大的离心力，如果目前的路线继续下去，该离心力将趋于变得更加强大。但是，认为中国国家现在在中国和国际上已完全屈从于资本主义势力是错误的（如文森特所做的）。
The present Chinese state is not simply the equivalent of the state in Japan, Korea or Taiwan during their accelerated growth in the 1960s and 1970s, when (on the basis of the ‘Asian development model’) the state intervened in the economy to a much greater extent than in the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America. The surviving state-owned and state-controlled industries in China today are the product of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. They are not merely the equivalent of Japan’s keiretsu or South Korea’s chaebol, industrial-financial conglomerates that developed from big family-capitalist trusts.
当前的中国国家不是简单地等同于日本，韩国或台湾在其60年代和70年代的加速增长，根据“亚洲发展模式” ，那时国家比先进的资本主义经济的西欧和北美更大程度上干预经济。在今天的中国幸存的国有及国家控制的工业是斯大林主义计划经济产物。他们不仅仅是相当于作为从大家族资本主义的信托基金发展而来的工业金融集团的日本的keiretsu或韩国的财阀。

There is still a legacy of Maoism-Stalinism in China. Though fostering capitalist development, the state still controls powerful levers of economic influence. As we show in a separate section (China’s hybrid economy, pp27-30), the regime, through a cluster of huge state-owned enterprises (SOEs), effectively controls several key industrial sectors: telecoms, transport, energy, and defence production, etc. Though state-sector employment has been drastically reduced, the state sector still accounts for 38% (2004) of industrial output. It is true, as Vincent says, that most of the remaining SOEs have been ‘corporatized’: they no longer operate under a plan of production but, according to government policy, on the basis of market criteria. But it is an exaggeration to say: “The state industrial and commercial sector consist of completely autonomous and in most cases semi-privatised units”. In reality, many SOEs are run by ex-CCP bureaucrats or bosses currently nominated by the CCP, who (often on the basis of ‘soft loans’ – where there is no expectation of repayment – from state banks) aim at maximising investment and growth, rather than maximising enterprise profits.
在中国还有毛泽东斯大林主义遗产。虽然促进了资本主义发展，国家仍控制着强大的具有经济影响力的杠杆。正如我们在一个单独的章节（中国的混合经济，序言段27 - 30 ）显示的，该政权，通过一组庞大的国有企业（SOEs） ，有效地控制一些关键工业部门：电信，交通，能源和国防生产，虽然国家部门的就业已急剧减少，国家部门仍然占38 ％ （ 2004年）的工业产值。这是事实，正如文森特说的，这其余大部分国有企业已经'公司化' ：他们不再在生产计划下运作的，而是根据政府的政策和根据市场的标准运转。但说： “国家的工业和商业部门是完全自主的并在大多数情况下是半私有化的单位是有些夸大其词的。在现实中，许多国有企业是由前中共官僚或中共当前所提名的老板经营的，（通常在从国有商业银行获得'软贷款'的基础上，没有还款的预期）其目的是最大限度地投资和增长，而不是企业利润最大化。

As Vincent says, “The banking sector is majority state-owned…” and the big four state banks are responsible for over 70% of all loans. Loans are provided, moreover, not according to strictly market criteria but, in many cases, in order to further the regime’s policy objectives. Indeed, soft loans are regarded (both in China and by foreign, free-market critics) as a supplementary form of public spending.
正如文森特说的， “银行业是大多数国有的... ”而且四大国有商业银行负责70 ％以上的全部贷款。此外，它们没有严格按照市场标准提供贷款，在许多情况下，是为了推进该政权的政策目标。事实上，软贷款被看作（在中国和外国都遭到自由市场的批评）一种公共开支的补充形式。
The state, moreover, through central and provincial governments, is responsible for most infrastructure spending – and this investment is a major factor in driving China’s high growth rate. At the same time, sales of formerly state-owned land (combined with soft loans from state-controlled banks) have been a big element in China’s massive, speculative property boom.

此外，从中央到省级政府，国家主要负责基础设施开支-这种投资是推动中国的高增长率的一个主要因素。与此同时，销售原来的国有土地（结合从国家控制的银行获得软贷款）已成为中国巨大的投机性房地产热中的一大要素。
。
The enforcement of macroeconomic policy also gives the central government considerable power to determine the direction and priorities of economic growth. There are undoubtedly provincial governments and both SOE and private bosses who defy central government policies. Nevertheless, both the CCP and the state apparatus are used to enforce policy.
宏观经济政策的执行给予中央政府相当大的权力以确定经济增长的方向和优先事项。毫无疑问这里有无视中央政府的政策的省政府以及国有企业和私人老板。然而，无论是中共还是其国家机器都被用来执行政策。

我们的一致之处(中国国家性质）

我们的一致之处
BEFORE TAKING UP his arguments in more detail, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we will try to sketch out where we agree and where we disagree with Vincent Kolo. The Maoist-Stalinist planned economy (dominated by state-owned industry but undemocratically managed by a ruling bureaucracy), which began to crumble in the 1970s, no longer exists. Whatever state intervention there is, there will be no return to the Stalinist planned economy, which developed on the basis of the international class relations of a past era. The destruction in recent years of the social gains of the masses based on the planned economy – the ‘iron rice bowl’ (security of employment) and education, health and welfare provisions provided by state-owned enterprises and village communes – is a counter-revolutionary development that has had a devastating effect on workers and peasants. The leadership of the Chinese state – the CCP and the state apparatus – from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao has fostered the development of capitalist forces and sought to integrate China into the global economy. The leadership, recognising the failure of bureaucratic planning, has sought to develop a new social-economic base for its rule.
在更详细地就他的观点争论之前以及为了避免任何误解，我们将努力勾画出那里是我们认同文森特的和那里是我们不同意文森特的。毛派斯大林主义计划经济（由国有工业主导的，但却由处于统治地位的官僚进行非民主管理的）在20世纪70年代开始崩溃，已不复存在。无论是否存在国家干预，也不会再恢复到斯大林主义计划经济体制了，这个计划经济体制是建立在过去时代的国际阶级关系的基础上的。最近几年里，建立在计划经济基础上的群众取得的社会成果的丧失-国有企业和村镇公社所提供的'铁饭碗' （就业保障）和教育，卫生和福利的丧失-是一个反革命性的演变，对工人和农民产生了破坏性的影响。中国国家领导层-中共及其国家机器-从邓小平到胡锦涛促进资本主义势力的发展并设法将中国融入世界经济。该领导层承认官僚计划经济的失败，寻求发展它的统治的一种新的社会经济基础。
The growth of the capitalist market has been accompanied by the intensified, super-exploitation of the majority of workers and peasants (in both private and state-owned companies) and a grotesque widening of inequality. The growth of market relations has led to the emergence of a tiny stratum of capitalist billionaires and a wider layer of wealthy capitalists. The Chinese regime is one of the most repressive in the world and uses its massive apparatus to suppress all forms of opposition organisation, activity and discussion. The counter-revolutionary destruction of the social gains of the planned economy is virtually complete and China is heading in the direction of a ‘full’ capitalist economy.
资本主义市场的增长一直伴随着对大多数工人和农民（在私营和国有企业）强化的超剥削和不平等的异常地扩大。市场关系的增长导致出现了很小的作为亿万富翁的资本家阶层和更大的富裕的资本家阶层。中国政权是世界上最为具有镇压性的政权之一而且使用其庞大的国家机器来禁止一切形式的反对派组织，活动和讨论。对计划经济的社会成果的反革命破坏事实上已完成而且中国正在朝着完全的'资本主义经济方向而去。
We reject any claim by the regime (or its apologists) that they are developing the market – capitalist relations – in order to ‘strengthen socialism’, even in the limited sense of defending a state-planned economy. The regime no doubt fears a growing backlash against corruption, poverty wages, the growth of inequality and environmental destruction. But these social phenomena are the result of the policies they are pursuing. We judge the Chinese leaders by their deeds, not by the deceitful ‘socialist’ language they use in an attempt to legitimize their counter-revolutionary measures. We share the anger of Chinese workers and peasants at the squanderring of the gains of the 1949 revolution and the promotion of the most predatory elements of capitalism.
我们反对该政权（或其辩护士）的任何主张认为即使在捍卫国家计划经济的有限的意义上，他们正在发展的市场-资本主义的关系-是为了'加强社会主义'。毫无疑问该政权担心越来越强烈的反对腐败、底工资、不平等的增长和对环境的破坏。但是，这些社会现象是由于他们正在推行政策导致的。我们通过他们的行为而不是骗人的'社会主义'的语言来判断中国领导人，他们使用的这样的语言是企图合法化其反革命的措施。我们赞成中国工人和农民对毁弃1949年革命取得的成果而促进最掠夺性的资本主义因素的反革命表现出来的的愤怒。
There is also broad agreement with Vincent Kolo on the programme that should be adopted by Marxists in relation to China. We call for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be run under workers’ control and management, and for SOEs to be integrated in a plan of production under the direction of a workers’ government and managed by elected, democratic planning bodies. Large privately-owned firms should be nationalised – or re-nationalised – and also run democratically by workers as part of a planned economy. As internationalists, we also raise the issue of international collaboration between Chinese workers and workers in other countries with the aim of developing economic planning on an international level.
在与中国有关的方面马克思主义者应采用的纲要上。我们和文森特也有着广泛的一致的地方。我们呼吁国有企业（SOEs）在工人的控制和管理下经营，以及将国有企业纳入在工人政府的指导下的计划生产并由选举出来的民主的计划经济机构来管理。大型民营企业应当国有化-或重新国有化-并作为计划经济的一部分由工人民主地运行。作为国际主义者，我们还提出带着在国际水平上发展经济计划的目的，中国工人和其他国家工人之间的国际合作的问题。
We agree that (as Vincent says), “A political – ‘anti-bureaucratic’ – revolution is no longer enough to raise the working class to power”. But we do not accept his assertion that, “Nor is it correct to say a new revolution will combine tasks of the political and social revolution…” There are indisputably important sections of industry and banking remaining under state ownership and control, and a revolutionary overturn would entail placing them under workers’ control and management. A proletarian revolution would, of course, involve the overthrow of the present state and the expropriation of the Chinese and foreign capitalists. But the tasks facing the coming Chinese revolution, because of the remnants of Maoism-Stalinism, are in some ways more complex than in the advanced capitalist countries, and our revolutionary programme must reflect this reality.
我们认为， （如文森特所说） ， “政治上的-'反官僚' -革命不足以再使工人阶级获取权力”。但我们不接受他如下的说法， “说一场新的革命将结合政治和社会革命的任务是不正确地... ”无可争辩在中国，工业和银行业的重要部分仍处于国家所有和控制下，而且一个革命性的颠覆将需要对其进行工人的控制和管理。无产阶级革命，当然包括推翻目前的国家和中国和外国的资本家的剥削。但由于残余的毛泽东斯大林主义，在某些方面，将来的中国革命面临的任务要比先进的资本主义国家复杂得多，我们的革命纲要必须反映这一现实。

展望（中国国家性质）

展望
Perspectives
“THE STATE SECTOR today”, writes Vincent, “is a lever for developing the capitalist economy”, providing a framework of basic industries and infrastructure. This is evidently true. The regime is carrying out, under contemporary international conditions, the barbarous tasks of ‘primitive accumulation’, historically required as the basis for capitalist growth. There is a brutal process of forced urbanisation, as the poor peasantry are being driven from the land and are forced to seek low-paid work under atrocious conditions in the sweatshops and construction sites of the big cities. In the long run, if this development continues in an uninterrupted way, it would produce a ‘fully’ capitalist society. But this depends on perspectives.
文森特写道：“今天的国有部门是一个发展资本主义经济的杠杆” ，为基础工业和基础设施提供了一个框架。这显然是正确的。该政权在当代国际条件下正在执行'原始积累'的野蛮任务，资本主义增长历史性基础性的需要。有一个强迫城市化的残酷的过程，贫穷的农民正在被赶出土地，被迫在血汗工厂和大城市的建筑工地的恶劣的工作条件下寻求低工资的工作。从长远来看，如果这种发展以一个不间断的方式继续下去，这将产生一个'完全'的资本主义社会。但是，这有待观察。



If there were to be a long period of rapid growth in the world capitalist economy (continuing, for instance, the record 5% per annum growth of 2002-07), accompanied by 10% a year growth in the Chinese economy, then China could, theoretically, move steadily towards a ‘fully’ capitalist economy. At a certain point, on that basis, a strengthened Chinese bourgeoisie would come into conflict with the ex-Stalinist Bonapartist state and attempt to take direct control of a Chinese capitalist society (though the bourgeoisie would be increasingly challenged by a strengthened working class). Given the current implosion of the global capitalist finance system and the beginnings of a world recession, that does not seem the most likely perspective.
如果世界资本主义经济有一个漫长的快速增长的时期（例如，2002-07年连续的以创记录的5 ％的年增长率增长），伴随着中国经济以每年10 ％增长率增长，那么中国理论上可能稳步迈向'完全的'资本主义经济。在某个时刻，在此基础上，巩固了的中国资产阶级将与前斯大林主义波拿巴国家发生冲突并试图直接控制中国的资本主义社会（虽然资产阶级将越来越受到强大了的工人阶级的挑战） 。鉴于目前全球资本主义金融体系的爆裂，并开始了世界经济衰退，这似乎不是最有可能的前景。
If there is a prolonged world economic crisis, on the other hand, which would inevitably result in a serious downturn in the Chinese economy, the regime could be forced to intervene in the economy to prevent economic and social collapse, and head-off a revolutionary challenge from the Chinese workers and peasants. The Chinese leaders have already taken note of the abrupt swing of the US government from free-market fundamentalism to state intervention and the nationalisation of failed financial institutions. Faced with the prospect of failed industries collapsing, it is likely that the Chinese state will intervene and take them over. Given the history of the Chinese state and the existing extent of state ownership, this is likely to be on a bigger scale than in the major capitalist states.

另一方面，如果世界经济危机长期化，这将不可避免地造成中国经济的严重衰退，该政权可能会被迫干预经济，防止经济和社会崩溃，并制止来自中国的工人和农民的一种革命性的挑战。中国领导人已经注意到美国政府突然由自由市场原教旨主义回转到对经营不善的金融机构进行国家干预和国有化。面对经营失败的产业崩溃的前景，中国国家很可能将进行干预并接管它们。鉴于中国国家的历史和国家所有制的现有程度，这可能以比主要资本主义国家更大的规模进行。
The Chinese regime (as with Bismarck, the tsarist autocracy, and other Bonapartist regimes in the past) faces the problem that, in ‘breeding’ a new capitalist class in China, it is also breeding a new working class. Already there is a high level of social protest and strikes, often brutally repressed by the regime. In coming years the Chinese workers will increasingly form independent trade unions and their own political parties. The advanced layer of workers will in the course of struggles prepare to overthrow the regime and sweep away the capitalists, Chinese and foreign.
在中国政权（和俾斯麦、沙皇独裁政府以及过去的其他波拿巴政权一样）面临的问题是在中国“培育”一个新的资产阶级的同时它也培育了一个新的工人阶级。已经有一个高水平的社会抗议和罢工，这些往往被该政权残酷镇压。在未来几年的中国工人将越来越多地形成独立工会和自己的政党。工人的先进的层将在斗争过程中准备推翻该政权和扫除中国和外国的资本家。
We cannot predict the timescale of such events. But we should not take it for granted that China will automatically become a ‘fully’ capitalist society. In the coming years, events and the influence of Marxist ideas will give rise to a revolutionary movement aiming to overthrow the regime, sweep away capitalism, and re-establish nationalised property relations and planned production – this time under the democratic control of the working class and linked to an international perspective for a world socialist economy.
我们无法预测这类事件的时间表。但是，我们不应想当然地认为中国将自动成为一个'完全'的资本主义社会。在今后几年内，发生的事件和马克思主义思想的影响力将产生革命性的行动旨在推翻该政权和扫除资本主义以便重新确立国有财产关系和计划生产-这次是在工人阶级的民主控制下并与世界社会主义经济的国际前景连接起来。

继续-中国国家的性质（这些是草译，还待整理）

Method
方法
IN OUR VIEW, the possibility of swings by the Chinese regime between promoting accelerated capitalist development and increased state intervention to stabilise the economy is inherent in the contradictory, hybrid character of the Chinese state. This is why our method of analysis is important. In 1936, Leon Trotsky analysed the character of the Soviet Union in The Revolution Betrayed (chapter 9: Social Relations in the Soviet Union). The situation was obviously different from China today. But from the point of view of Marxist method, Trotsky’s analysis of the Soviet Union of that period as a transitional or intermediate social formation is very relevant to our approach to contemporary China.
在我们看来，中国政权可能在加速推进资本主义发展和增加国家干预以稳定经济之间的摇摆具有内在固有的矛盾，既中国国家的混合的性质。这就是为什么我们的分析方法是很重要的。 1936年，托洛茨基在《革命的背叛》（第9章：苏联的社会关系）中分析苏联的性质。这种情况显然不同于今日的中国。但是，从马克思主义的方法的角度来看，，托洛茨基对那个期间苏联的分析，把苏联看作一个过渡或中间的社会形态，相应地，这个方法也是我们对当代中国的分析方法。
Finished social categories, such as capitalism and socialism, wrote Trotsky, had to be abandoned in favour of “a more complete definition”, necessarily more “complicated and ponderous”. Trotsky summarised his analysis of the Soviet Union in nine points, summarising key features of the Soviet state and society, and posing several alternative perspectives for the fate of the Soviet state.
托洛茨基写道，不得不放弃完美的社会范畴，如资本主义和社会主义，这样有利于“更完整的解说” ，必然更加“复杂和沉重” 。托洛茨基在对苏联的分析中总结出了9点，总结了苏联国家和社会的主要特点并提到了作为苏联命运的几种可能性。

“Doctrinaires will doubtless not be satisfied with this hypothetical definition. They would like categorical formulae: yes-yes, and no-no. Sociological problems would certainly be simpler, if social phenomena had always a finished character. There is nothing more dangerous, however, than to throw out of reality, for the sake of logical completeness, elements which today violate your scheme and tomorrow may wholly overturn it. In our analysis, we have above all avoided doing violence to dynamic social formations which have had no precedent and have no analogies. The scientific task, as well as the political, is not to give a finished definition to an unfinished process, but to follow all its stages, separate its progressive from its reactionary tendencies, expose their mutual relations, foresee possible variants of development, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
“ 教条主义者无疑对这一假设的定义不会感到满意。他们喜欢绝对的公式：是就是是，非就是非。如果社会现象总是具有最终的性质，那么社会学的问题肯定会更简单。没有什么比脱离现实更危险的了，为了合乎逻辑的完整性，今天和您的计划不一致的东西可能明天完全相反。在我们的分析中，我们首先要避免对没有先例和没有相似物的动态的社会形态做出武断分析的作法。科学的任务，以及政治不能对一个未完成的过程给出完成的定义，而是循着其所有的阶段，把它的进步之处和它的反动倾向分离开，揭示其相互关系并预见到各种可能的演变以及在深谋远虑中找到行动根据。 “
In a notebook written in the 1930s, Trotsky made a further general comment that is extremely relevant to any discussion of the character of the Chinese state today: “Some objects [phenomena] are confined easily within boundaries according to logical classification, others present [us with] difficulties: they can be put here or there, but within a stricter relationship – nowhere. While provoking the indignation of systematisers, such transitional forms are exceptionally interesting to dialecticians, for they smash the limited boundaries of classification, revealing the real connections and consecutiveness of a living process”. (Trotsky’s Notebooks 1933-1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism, edited by Philip Pomper, NY Columbia University Press, 1986)
1930年代写的一本笔记本中，托洛茨基作出了进一步的一般性评论，该评论与对今天中国性质的任何讨论非常有关的： “按照逻辑分类，有些对象[现象]边界清晰易于界定，其他却给我们带来困难：他们可以这样也可以那样，但处在一个严格的关系中-到处都无。虽然激起系统主义者的愤慨，这种过渡形式对辨证家来说是非常有趣的，他们打破分类的边界限制，揭示了活生生的过程的真实的连接和连续性 “ 。 （1933年至1935年托洛茨基的笔记：关于列宁的著作，辩证法和进化论，Philip Pomper编辑 ，美国纽约哥伦比亚大学出版社， 1986年）
We believe that the transformation in China is also a process without precedent and that we have to ‘follow all stages’. Our analysis may appear more ‘complicated and ponderous’ than the simple assertion that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. However, it is necessary, in our view, to take account of the contradictory features of the transition and “foresee possible variants of developments, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
我们相信中国的变化也是没有先例的过程，我们必须追踪所有阶段。我们的分析可能会显得比简单地断言中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家更为'复杂和笨重'。然而，它是必要的，我们认为，考虑到过渡的矛盾的特点和“预见到演变的多种可能性并在深谋远虑中找到行动的根据。”
The role of the Bonapartist state
LINKED TO THE question of method is the issue of the role of the state, in particular the autonomous role that can be played – under certain conditions, for a certain period of time – by a Bonapartist state consisting of a powerful apparatus and army, together with a powerful ruling party, in the case of China. Vincent, in our view, does not take sufficient account of the role of the ex-Stalinist, Bonapartist state in steering the transition in China.
波拿巴国家的作用

与方法的问题联系在一起的是国家作用的问题，特别是由强大的国家机器和军队以及一个强大的执政党组成的波拿巴国家-在特定条件下，在一定的时间内-可发挥的自发的作用。在我们看来，就中国而言，文森特没有充分考虑到中国前斯大林主义者波拿巴国家在指导国家过渡上所发挥的作用。
“The class character of any social organism, regime, or party”, writes Vincent, “is determined by the class interests it serves – its social base”. As a general proposition, this is correct. But it is not sufficient for analysing the situation in China. The Chinese regime has abandoned defence of nationalised property and the planned economy, historically progressive relations of production, and is promoting the development of capitalist relations. But the situation in China is conditioned by the past development of the Maoist-Stalinist system after 1949. While defending the planned economy, the state was relatively independent, not subject to democratic checks by the working class. Now the regime has turned to a pro-capitalist, counter-revolutionary course. This undoubtedly serves the interests of an emerging Chinese capitalist class and international capital. But it would be too simplistic, at this stage, to say that the regime is simply the repressive agent or servant of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The Chinese state, a product of Maoism-Stalinism, has a large degree of autonomy in fostering and steering the development of capitalism while striving to preserve its own power.

文森特写道“任何社会有机体，政权，或政党的阶级性质是由它所服务的阶级利益决定的” 。一般来说，这是正确的。但它在分析中国的情况上是不够的。中国政权已放弃捍卫具有历史进步性的生产关系的国有财产和计划经济而促进发展资本主义的关系。但中国的情况是以过去1949年之后毛泽东斯大林主义制度的发展的为条件的。虽然当时的国家捍卫计划经济，但国家是相对独立的，不受制于由工人阶级监督的民主的。现在，这一制度已转向有利于资本主义的，反革命的路线。这无疑有利于新兴的中国资产阶级和国际资本。但是，如果在这一阶段说该政权完全是镇压的代理人或中国资产阶级的仆人就过于简单化了。中国这个国家是毛泽东斯大林主义的产物，在促进和指导资本主义发展的同时努力维护自己的权力上有很大程度的自发性。

There are analogies for this development in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, where they show that, under certain circumstances, a state power balancing between social classes (a ‘Bonapartist’ state) can play an autonomous role in sponsoring the development of capitalist industry and fostering the development of a capitalist class. In Germany during the 1870s, for instance, Otto von Bismarck – based on the Prussian monarchist state, the army elite and the Junker landlords – promoted the development of capitalist forces as the necessary basis for German imperialism’s increased military and economic power.
卡尔•马克思和恩格斯的著作对这种演变有类似的分析，他们在那里表明，在特定情况下，平衡社会各阶层的国家权力（波拿巴国家）可以发挥作用以帮助资本主义工业的发展和促进资产阶级的发展。德国在19世纪70年代，例如，奥托•冯•俾斯麦-基于普鲁士君主国家，军队精英和容克地主-促进了资本主义力量的发展并使该发展成为德国帝国主义增加其军事和经济力量的必要基础。

Another example is the Russian tsarist state during the second half of the 19th century. Based on archaic feudal landlordism, some tsarist leaders recognised that to survive as a military power they had to develop industry (especially railways and armaments). After the Crimean war (1853-56), Engels wrote, the Russian government “set about breeding a Russian capitalist class”. (The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism, 1890, Marx-Engels Collected Works vol 27) The tsarist state remained a powerful force in Russian society until the crisis of the first world war and its overthrow by the October revolution in 1917. Like Bismarck, the tsarist state in breeding a capitalist class also bred a small, but powerful, working class.
另一个例子是19世纪下半叶的沙俄国家。基于陈旧的封建地主所有制 ，一些沙皇领导人认识到，为了作为军事大国而存在，他们必须发展工业（特别是铁路和军备） 。恩格斯写道，克里米亚战争（ 1853至1856年）后 ，俄罗斯政府着手“培育俄罗斯资产阶级” 。 （沙俄的对外政策， 1890年，马克思恩格斯全集第27卷）沙皇国家在俄罗斯社会保留着强大的力量直到第一次世界大战的危机而在1917年十月革命下被推翻。和俾斯麦一样，培育资本家阶级的沙皇国家也孕育了规模不大但强有力的工人阶级。
In China, the former Maoist-Stalinist state has used its massive power to ‘breed’ a Chinese capitalist class. The regime has adapted the state (the party, the army and the apparatus) to the transition to capitalism. But the state retains considerable power, while the new capitalist forces are, at this stage, an emergent social class in the process of formation.
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的权力'培育了'中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家（党，军队和国家机器）适应向资本主义的过渡。但是，国家保留了相当大的权力，而在这一阶段新的资本主义势力作为一个新兴的社会阶层处在形成过程中。
The burgeoning capitalist elements are very diverse, ranging from small family businesses to the owners of giant corporations. At this stage, they lack social cohesion and, as yet, have not developed any independent political representation. Many of the capitalists are ex-bureaucrats or state-sector bosses, and retain close links with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the apparatus. They are mostly quite content to allow the state to create the conditions for the growth of capitalist business, and provide ‘social stability’, that is, to protect them from resistance and mass protest by workers and peasants. At this stage, there is no threat to the regime’s absolute political power from the emergent capitalist class.

新兴的资本主义的要素是非常多样的，从小型家族企业到大公司的业主。在这个阶段，他们缺乏社会凝聚力，迄今为止，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。许多资本家是前官员或国有部门的老板，并与中国共产党（中共）和国家机器保持着密切联系。他们大多相当地满意于用国家的力量来为资本主义企业的生长创造条件并提供'社会稳定'的环境 ，也就是保护他们免受工人和农民的大规模的抗议活动的影响。在这个阶段，没有来自这个新兴资产阶级的对该政权的绝对的政治权力的威胁。

新译文章《中国的国家性质》的部分（待全部译玩后校对整理）

The character of the Chinese state
Socialism Today’s China debate continues with a reply by LYNN WALSH to’s article, China’s Capitalist Counter-Revolution (Socialism Today No.114). In that article, Vincent argues that, to all intents and purposes, China is now a fully-fledged capitalist economy. Is it that clear cut?
中国的国家性质
当今社会主义关于中国性质的争论通过林恩•沃尔什（LYNN WALSH）对文森特•卡洛（Vincent Kolo）的文章《中国的资本主义反革命（114号当今社会主义）》的答辩继续着。在那篇文章中，文森特认为，从所有意图和目的看，中国现在是一个完全成熟的资本主义经济。这确定无疑吗？
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA are of crucial importance to socialists everywhere. The Chinese economy is now a major component of the global economy. With its increased economic and strategic weight, China is now a key player in relations between the major world powers. And political developments in China – the fate of the regime and struggles of the massive Chinese working class and poor peasantry – are of enormous significance internationally. At the same time, there has, not surprisingly, been a debate about the complex transition from a Maoist-Stalinist planned economy and the current character of the Chinese state.

对各处的社会主义者而言，中国的演变是至关重要的。中国经济现在是全球经济的一个重要组成部分。随着它的经济和战略性力量的增长，中国现在在世界主要大国关系之间扮演着一个关键的角色。中国的政治演变-政权的命运和中国工人阶级和贫困农民的大规模斗争-在国际上具有重大意义。与此同时，对于从毛泽东斯大林主义的计划经济到具有当前的特色的中国的复杂转变的争论也并不奇怪了。
In his article (www.socialismtoday.org/114/china), Vincent argued, in essence, that China is now a fully capitalist state. “The top echelons of the Chinese state… are now fully integrated into the global capitalist system”. In our view – the view of the leadership of the CWI – Vincent’s characterization is too categorical. The direction of travel of the Chinese state is clear enough, from the former Maoist-Stalinist planned economy, based on nationalised property, towards a capitalist economy. But, however powerful the locomotive, the train has not yet arrived at its destination. It is premature to declare: “Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”.
在他的文章（ www.socialismtoday.org/114/china ）中 ，文森特说，在本质上，中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。 “中国现在的高层已完全融入全球的资本主义制度中” 。在我们看来-工人国际委员会（CWI）的领导们的观点-文森特的描述是过于绝对。中国国家的走向是很清晰的，由基于国有所有制上的前毛派斯大林主义计划经济体制转向资本主义经济。但是，无论火车头有多么强大，火车还没有到达目的地。宣布：“中国特色的资本主义已经复辟” 是有些太早了 。
Although there are powerful and rapidly growing capitalist forces in China, the Chinese state is still a hybrid, combining remaining state-owned industries with ‘state capitalist’ enterprises (state-owned companies run on a more or less market basis) and with new elements of private capitalism (ranging from millions of individual businesses to giant Chinese and foreign corporations). The transition is not, in our view, complete and may not develop in a straight line. There can be significant twists and turns in the situation. It cannot be ruled out that, in the coming period of world economic crisis, the state will once again take over privately-owned corporations and some previously privatised companies threatened with collapse.
虽然在中国有强大的和迅速发展的资本主义势力，中国这个国家仍然是一个混合物，混合着具有“国家资本主义”企业（在或多或少的市场的基础上运行的国有企业）性质的剩余的国有工业和私人资本主义（从数以百万计的私营企业到大型的中国和外国公司）性质的新成分。在我们看来，转型还没有完成，也不会直线地发展演变。可能会出现曲折的局势。不能排除，在世界经济危机的今后一段时期里，国家将再次接管私人拥有的公司和一些濒临崩溃的曾经私有化的公司。
We believe that this debate is important and we welcome Vincent Kolo’s contribution. But, it may be asked, if both Vincent and ourselves agree that there is no longer a state-planned economy and that China is heading in a capitalist direction, is there a real difference? We believe there are important issues involved in this debate.

我们认为这场辩论是重要的，我们欢迎文森特投稿。但是，可能会问文森特和我们自己双方是否会同意在中国不可能重新出现国家计划经济，中国正在走向资本主义，这里有一个真正的区别吗？我们认为在本次辩论中有一些重要的问题。
First, there is the issue of method. Marxists should strive to analyse social phenomena (in this case, the changing Chinese state) in a rounded-out, scientific manner, not attempting to fit new developments into old stereotypes.
首先是方法的问题。马克思主义者应该努力以科学方式全面地分析社会现象（在这里是，中国国家的改变）而不是试图把新的发展状况纳入陈旧观念中。

A second issue, related to method, is the autonomous role that can be played under certain conditions by a powerful Bonapartist state (particularly an ex-Maoist-Stalinist state) in directing a social transformation from above.
第二个问题，与方法有关，是在一个强有力的波拿巴国家（特别是前毛派斯大林主义国家）的特定条件下在自上而下地领导社会变革中发挥作用的独立的角色的问题。
Third, there are issues of perspectives. It would be a mistake, in our view, to base ourselves on a single perspective that China will develop on purely capitalist lines, uninterrupted by turns in the direction of the regime. The advanced layers of the Chinese workers, in our view, have to be politically prepared for several different perspectives. In particular, they need to be prepared for the possibility that, faced with a deep economic crisis and a mass upsurge which threatens its survival, the regime will revert to much greater intervention in the economy, including taking over failing companies, in an attempt to defuse a potentially revolutionary situation.
第三，是一些展望的问题。在我们看来，立足于单一的角度认为中国将确立纯粹的资本主义路线而不会被其政权的转向而干扰将是错误的。在我们看来，中国工人的先进阶层，在政治上必须为几种不同的发展可能性做好准备。他们特别需要为如下可能性做好准备，面临着一个深刻的经济危机和威胁该政权生存的大规模斗争的升级，该政权将转向更大的对经济的干预，包括接管经营失败的公司来化解潜在的革命形势。

我译综观2008年的材料

综观2008年的材料

对中国的统治者来说，工业减速和美国资本主义模式的破裂预示着深刻的危机的开始。

本文应与以前的综观2007年的文章 ——中国处于十字路口一并阅读。在该文章中概述了未来的社会和政治危机的重要特点，因此在此不赘述了。

对整个世界尤其是中国产生巨大影响的并导致华尔街金融垮台的美国资本主义的债务危机是资本主义历史上一个开创性的时刻。现在很少有人谈论经济“脱钩”或怀疑中国和其他主要新兴经济体如印度和俄罗斯将被拖入全球经济漩涡。在这个阶段，唯一的未知因素是危机的深度和持续时间及期限。

2008年，人们清楚地看到中国处在工业经济放缓的第一阶段。所有经济增长率的预测正在向下修正。在2006-07年度实现国内生产总值增长11.8 ％ 后，预测2008年的增长在9%至9.6 ％之间 ，下一年为8％至9 ％。

来自在香港的瑞士信贷集团的陶东警告说：“在一个社会里，每年新的求职者超过新增非农就业岗位达2000万人，甚至经济增长下降到百分之八就等于衰退。”他告诉彭博新闻说“低于百分之九将使当局很紧张 ”。

闭幕式后的几个星期里，中国伟大的奥运时刻已经逐渐成为历史。取代欢呼的人群的是越来越多的愤怒的农民、学生和处于困境中的农民工和荡产的股民。导致超过13000名婴儿住院并致死4个婴儿的有毒牛奶丑闻是中国社会一个令人震惊的'现实写照'。涉及20多家公司包括食品行业中非常大的公司的这个丑闻是几乎完全缺乏管制的结果。2005年政府决定免除超过2100家的公司在食品和乳制品业的管制措施，由它们自己的标准来认定就足够了。由于缺乏控制，乳品行业的中间商通过增加工业化学品三聚氰胺的措施来提高原料奶的蛋白质水平。于事无补的是当局命令新闻界奥运会期间“所有的食品安全问题是禁地”。 奥运会开幕6天前省级领导人（河北）知道了污染问题。然后采取行动可以拯救生命和减少无尽的痛苦。丑闻中心地的几家公司在中国和外国的股票市场上上市而且奶制品行业在短短几年中从几乎是零爆发成为具有200亿美元的产业。受害的孩子们的家长开始组织起来在互联网上发贴表达他们的要求并联系律师活动家，期待着起诉乳品公司。
仅2008年9月4日一天里，在三个省-河南，湖南和浙江爆发了大规模抗议-合起来有10 0000人走上街头，和安全部队发生了冲突。英国广播公司评论说“在中国，社会动乱是常见的，但很少达到这个规模”。这些抗议从学校学生（河南申邱县）抗议房地产开发商夺取他们的学校体育场到在14岁的工人遭受了严重事故后10000名农民工和当地居民（浙江宁波）包围工厂。中共展望杂志公布的统计数字显示， '群体性事件'曲线呈继续上升的状态，2006年记录达惊人的90000次抗议-几乎每天都有2 50起！这是2003年5.8万起、2004年7.4万、2005年8.7万后又一次增加。尽管国民生产总值的数字令人眼花缭乱，这些数字指明了深刻的社会弊病。

南方都市报专栏作家文云超说“谁说今天的中国是和谐的，我将抽他 ”。 “随着社会不稳定的问题的增加示威数增长着。”

在蓬勃发展的城市厦门，上海和重庆，数千人参加了针对环境有害的建设项目的非法街头游行。2007年几千名退伍军人至少在三个城市暴乱以抗议待遇不公，非官方退伍军人网站上大量地报告这些事件。在过去，兵役意味这国有企业保证有工作，但现在不再适用，这是对工人和农民以前权益饿许多攻击之一。
仅在中国南部的珠江三角洲，罢工和工厂停工持续不断的，而且每天都在发生涉及1000个或更多的工人的停工。大多数的这些斗争因为新闻封锁而未见于报道。通常管理人员，政府官员和安全部队严厉地处理他们。中国目前有170万警察部队， 100多万武警（PAP）和2百万武装部队。在最近几年新开设了3 0000个新派出所。1989年群众运动后，由于正规军表现出不愿意出动镇压，PAP得到了增强。部署在西藏和新疆的'反恐'力量中，武警是该政权主要的镇压工具。
学生动乱也有所增加，一个仍困扰政权的1989年记忆的不祥预兆。89年运动是由全面地对通货膨胀，腐败的不满以及实现基本民主权利的愿望引起的-这些都是目前的局势的特征。政府在当前的五年计划（ 2006-2010年）的期限中设定的公共就业水平最高限度为650万，造成严重的大学毕业生失业。2007年413万毕业生中120万人没有找到工作，在2008年更有150万大学毕业生面临着同样的命运。
中国已经发生一系列重大灾害：四川地震（ 8.7万人死亡或失踪） ，中国许多地区出现极其寒冷的冬天的，随后是半世纪里最严重的夏季降雨。这些事件使一部分人口带有政治色彩并质疑政府的作用。经济学家的评论说：“四川地震造成了数以百万计的潜在的不满者 ”。

在对地震最初的反应中，国家处在震惊中，22日温家宝在国家电视台含泪的表现使他得到了广泛阶层的爱戴，并作为官方关怀的一个例子'。但是地震五个月之后，四川的省级政府抱怨它只收到承诺的用于重建四分之一的钱，需要更多的1800亿美元。全省将需要几年时间才能恢复到地震前国内生产总值达到的水平，意味着困难，失业和数以百万计人口只能住临时住房。‘豆腐渣学校’ 在世界各地传开。中国电影导演潘剑林一部“谁杀了我们的孩子？”的纪录片中反映了这个问题，导演说“这些建筑的质量槽糕透了 ”。
甚至由于地方服务的衰减、国有资产被盗，贪污腐败，滥用权力，镇压，以及一大堆其他罪行已成为家常，低级别的中共机器也遭到了群众越来越多指责，高层领导人基本上屏蔽于大众批评之外。

在2008年，民政的剧变成功地迫使中央政府纪律处分和牺牲一些地方大员 。贵州省“6.28” 瓮安事件就是一例，为期两天达50000名的观众围攻派出所和摧毁数十辆车辆。北京迅速解除当地警察局长和党委书记的职务。同样，在有毒牛奶丑闻中，负责全国产品质量和安全的局长和产生丑闻的中心城市的石家庄的党委书记的职务也被解除。在山西省，仅几周前，在一个非法煤矿场的泥石流导致271人死亡，省长孟学农辞职，毫无疑问，上面'说服'了他。孟立即被称为“中国最倒霉的官员” -在2 003年，他因为在处理SARS爆发事件的不当而被解除北京市市长的职务。
通过牺牲腐败或无能的官员，北京希望赢得时间和在危机扩大之前化解危机，但这是以鼓励其他人在将来走上斗争之路为代价的，并进一步削弱了党的国家机器。

在他的书《向农民道歉》中，山西省白蜀县（音译）前副党委书记马英卢（音译）正确地描述了作为保护中共政权内在核心的“防火墙”的中国政府的五个层次。在2003年他写道：“今天，中央领导仍安全， ” “但较低层次的防火墙[即村和乡镇的政府]已经完全瘫痪，中间层[即省级]防火墙处于危险之中。“
中国执政党的执政地位一直因它有能力保持不可阻挡的经济增长而得到护卫。但是，这北京政权的国内生产总值的'王牌' ，现在也受到来自全球资本主义的危机和其自身的内部矛盾威胁。由于消费市场的不足和非常过剩的生产能力，中国的经济模式是不可持续的。而在先进的资本主义经济体，私人债务的积累在一定时期里给这一资本主义的基本矛盾提供了一条出路，中国有限的国内市场被前所未有的资本投资和出口部门的快速扩张'克服'了。
随着美国次级债和房地产泡沫的破裂，作为常常具有浪费性的和高度投机性的巨额投资的结果的中国自身的危机才刚刚开始。在中国由于在经济领域巨大的国家支持的信用发挥着作用，这一过程很可能被拖延，但这只是一个时间和程度的问题而不是趋势的问题。
在全国范围内，2008年上半年，约67000家中小型企业倒闭，大约20万人因此失去工作。受害最严重的地区是最为融入全球经济的比较富裕的和更为工业化的沿海省份，例如根据香港工业联合会的消息，世界500强最大公司中有176家在那里有基地的广东正在经历“20年来最恶劣的状况 ”。 自2007年年底广东省一半以上的制鞋企业（超过2200家工厂）已经关闭或搬迁。现在纺织部门的利润正大大地减少至大约营业额的百分之一点五，而且广东省的政府报告说，与2007年同期相比，2008年上半年服装和配件的销售几乎下降了三分之一。
由于货币升值，原材料成本上升和因劳动力短缺而被迫放弃声名狼藉的他们低工资，出口商已经遭到挤压。较新的低工资竞争对手，如越南和孟加拉，以及中国的贫穷省份，甚至东欧和墨西哥，正在资本主义'恶性竞争'中获得优势。
作为珠江三角洲一个出口业大市的东莞市的市领导谈到了当地经济“萧条”。 2008年市政府发起了两项救助资金以支持受到出口衰退打击的中小型企业。在作为世界第四繁忙的港口的深圳港口，“出口危机”是显而易见的，该港口的货运量的增长已经放慢，只有去年水平的一半。业内分析人士预测严重依赖于中国的全球集装箱航运业将遭到 “普遍的下半年的损失”，这发生在世界经济和作为重要市场的美国，欧盟和日本正式进入衰退之前。
其他沿海出口省份，如浙江，江苏，山东和福建也苦不堪言。浙江省的外贸研究中心主任描述那里的局势是“灾难性的” 。省内公司五分之一-超过10000公司-2 0 08年的损失总额已达三百六十亿元（5 3 亿美元） 。省政府介入拯救由于其出口的缝纫机下降了百分之四十四，因而无力偿还其债权人近10亿元（一亿四千六百万美元）的债务而濒临破产的有5000名员工的飞跃集团）。正如在东莞和其他地区一样，政府下令延期来自当地银行的贷款以使公司继续生存下去。
目前的危机极不可能的只限于出口部门。2008年整个经济中投资速度已经放缓至5年来的最低水平。这是多种因素共同作用的结果，其中房地产泡沫的破裂和利润率的下降是最重要的因素。这种低迷也已开始影响到作为长达10年的建设热潮的支柱的钢铁行业，住宅建筑如饥似渴地吸收了约百分之二十的钢铁需求。该研究公司特钢宣布中国的钢铁工业自2008年中旬以来价格下降多达百分之二十而处在“衰退”中 。

在一项行业调查中，国家发展和改革委员会哀叹这样的事实，即“由地方政府启动的大多数钢铁项目未经中央的批准” 。该委员会过去在毛派斯大林计划经济时期是中国的计划机构。这份声明强调了时代已经大大地改变。评论家们很早就预测了中国的钢铁工业合并的破坏性时代的到来。
发电产业有着类似的情况。正如中国专家尼古拉斯拉迪（Nicholas Lardy）指出： “中国已建立这么多的发电厂以至于有些地区现在能力过剩。但是投入到将更有效地利用发电能力的国家电网的建设资金却已滞后。 “ [华尔街日报， 08年9月30日]
一个行业跟着一个行业中出现了同样的图景：没有规划，激烈的地区性竞争，长期过度投资和浪费。这也表现在最现代的电信行业。2008年8月国家审计署报告说2002年至2006年超过11200亿元（1640美元）用于建设电信公司的基本设施，但只有三分之一的电信电缆安装使用。前中国联通总裁杨贤足说“电信方面的投资性浪费可建几个三峡大坝” ，三峡大坝指建在长江上的世界上最大的水电工程。
中国的股市泡沫自2007年10月达峰值以来已经破裂。这是2008年世界上50家最大的证券交易所中表现的最差的。实际上，2005年当一系列重大的国有企业被推向市场以来所有的投机性收益已被抹去。1.36亿股民（ '投资者' ）被诱骗到股市中，百分之七十的股民的年收入低于10000美元，自2007年10月以来，在12个月里他们平均损失了三分之二的资金。
虽然他们不到人口总数的十分之一，因此股市下跌的“负财富效应” 比起在西方来说较为有限，对中国统治者来说，这些荡产的股民是重要的阶层。这是中共的主要社会基础-城市中产阶级-而且希望依赖这个阶层的消费来把出口导向型的经济转向内需拉动型经济。有能力购买所有那些汽车和平板电视这个阶层是完全破产了？
作者威利林评论道：“有迹象表明，党的领导层最担心的一场恶梦可能会比预期的更早发生：中产阶级成员加入'处于不利地位的阶层，如农民和工人举行抗议，甚至暴乱，以发泄他们的不满”。
婚姻破裂，自杀和心理疾病所有这些都是市场附带后果的表现。在一些地区，如陕西省，在2008年春季，投资者聚众闹事，并包围了当地的股票经纪处。官方的这种下降是“对市场经济来说是正常的” 声明已激怒了许多人。网民已经张贴愤怒的评论，如： “即使是资本主义美国也通过干预以挽救其市场，为什么中国政府不做同样的事呢？ ”

然而股市的崩溃正在迅速升级为更大和更严重的金融泡沫。虽然官方统计数字给予的印象是楼价总体而言仍在上升，而事实上看情况不是如此。在北京，上海，杭州，宁波，海口，而且在内陆城市如成都，武汉，南宁，西安，兰州，乌鲁木齐，房屋价格正在下降。所有这些城市在2007年经历了投机性增长。现在一些地区报告的价格下降了百分之十到四十之间而且房地产公司已经开始了价格战。
正如工业领域一样，许多地方的房地产市场遭受极端过剩之苦。深圳市土地和房管局的报告说，按目前的销售价格，深圳的开发商将花超过10年的时间才能出售完现有的所有房屋存量。中国现在拥有世界上最大的购物商场，准备靠消费猛增来赚钱，但并没有实现。东莞市南中国购物中心是世界最大的购物中心，但只租出不到百分之十的店面。三分之一的北京写字楼空置的。当然，在现实中，不是有“太多的”建筑，在中国为普通百姓的住房严重短缺。但是，利润制度是无法解决这一矛盾的。
在中国大多数人欢迎房价的下跌。目前百分之七十的城市居民买不起新的公寓。据北京师范大学金融研究中心的研究，在中国一所公寓的平均价格约平均每年家庭可支配收入的13倍，远远高于国际平均水平的3至6倍。当然，虽然1984年时在旧的国家控制制度下的住房的质量往往有许多有待改进之处，但中国的平均租金只是家庭收入的百分之一。
但是，当金融泡沫展开，他们往往趋向一个恶性循环，即价格下降，面临损失的投机者抛售资产以获得现金，随后空房的存量增加，造成价格进一步下跌。这对更广的经济可能产生的影响是大大降低随后的投资水平，信贷条件普遍收紧（ “信贷紧缩” ）以及坏帐急剧上升威胁到银行业的稳定。当然，银行面临倒闭的威胁，中国政权将尝试保尔森式救助。不同于美国政府的是，他们有相当的可支配的储备。中国的未偿债务水平相当于GDP的15.7%，是低的。它还拥有世界上最大的外汇储备，接近2万亿美元的价值，虽然这些储备有很大一部分有力地'植入'以支撑美元的价值，防止全球货币体系的崩溃。

中国的房地产业（即投机）已经占了最近几年所有固定资产投资的三分之一以上，可能多达一半。据一些调查，价格需要下跌百分之五十才能恢复中国的房地产市场。在此基础上，摆在面前的是不良贷款发生爆炸。据官方统计，今天中国银行系统的该级别的不良贷款达6000亿美元，但实际数字可能达到11000亿美元（相当于一半以上的中国的外汇储备） 。大约四分之一的国内生产总值，这高于日本在1990年代初的水平。
因此，中国可能会步入1990年日本'泡沫经济'破裂的相似地步。这十年中间，超过三分之二的日本公司没有利润，只能通过银行更多的信贷以维持生命的延续。这就是所谓的“僵尸经济” 。银行背后站着中央银行和政府，其公共债务比率由经合组织中最低水平国转变为最高水平的国家之一。然而，相反，在20世纪90年代，今天的美国，欧洲和亚洲新兴经济体持续增长给日本的资本主义提供了部分的出路。中国目前的问题发生在非常不利的全球危机关头。
未来的危机将迎来中国复杂的国内政治的一个新的时期。它标志着1989年时代的结束。较富裕的沿海区域是首先遭到危机打击的，并可能会遭到最严重的打击。这将是现在形势的一个逆转，以往这些省份的发展和经济实力的增长是以内陆省份为代价的。在资源上的权力斗争以形成国家政策将变得更加激烈。共产党两个主要派别之间的'上海帮' （它的主要基地是沿海省份）和胡锦涛的' 团派 '内很好的平衡将动摇。大幅经济衰退可能公开党内严重的分裂。正如中共早期阶段，对抗的派系可以通过走上街头扩大他们背后的舆论支持。经济冲突也将加剧。
“没有'中国市场'这么回事。在经济发展的不同阶段，中国是一个地区性市场的拼凑物，它作为一个民族结合在一起，但因治理上的差别、通讯的困难、区域竞争和落后的基础设施而分离。 “这是来自科技顾问组的一个准确的描述。 [中国的市场， Cambashi有限公司， 2005 ]

经济衰退对一些地区的打击远远超过其他地区的话，地区贸易保护主义的趋势将增强。
面对出口下降，沿海省份的比较现代的工厂的将把它们的市场目标转向其他省份，并要求中央政府出台政策以给予便利。较穷的省份的弱势产业将尽最大努力阻止这一点。结果可能出现高涨的地区主义和省际争夺，这将不可避免地通向北京。威利林使用术语“军阀”来形容省级领导人，说明多年来他们已就一系列重要问题成功地抗拒中央政府的政策。
今后一段时期将看到为抵制经济危机影响而爆发的大规模斗争和第一次独立的工人运动的'绿芽'。它也标志着出现如20世纪90年代危机期间在台湾、香港和其他东亚地区那样的大规模的民主运动。为了避免这样的发展，中共某些阶层想要重新启动陷入僵局的争取'政治改革'的进程。北京中央党校的研究人员报告认为这项工作是“当务之急” 。但是，本报告主张的改变是要加强法制和使媒体更自由，而不是独立组织，成立政党，还有选举的权利。
在中共高层中有一种对任何真正的对党的控制的开放或放松的病态的恐惧，担心这将打开大规模的不满闸门。相反，一些有限的地方实验已经付之实行。例如，深圳市已表示将在党的结构内推出多个候选人选举，这有可能扩大到市人民政治协商会议。然而，'民主'的问题，尤其以其模糊的形式，可以在一定条件下被集团、地区或个人所用作为斗争的一部分以获得让步或改变政府的政策的方向。这可能会在人民群众中产生共鸣并引发一场远远超出其发出者的设想的运动。
自1989年以来二十年内，国内生产总值的快速增长，所有大经济体中的最快的速度，一直是中共政权的重要的支柱。这种所谓的'奇迹'已经几乎成为保护统治集团的神奇的力量，给人经济永远不会衰退的感觉 。国内和国外资本家迎合这个政权并允许中共在城市中产阶级中创建一个新的社会基础。30年来国内生产总值的增长已达到年均百分之九点六的速度，使得40岁以下的中国人认为这是'常态' 。这至少是中共统治集团内具有相对凝聚力的基础-没有了1989年前所具有的很多不稳定的公开分裂的特征。因此在世界上很少政权会因正在展开的全球资本主义的危机而失去更多。在中国和全球范围内急迫的事是发起具有明确的社会主义纲领的新的战斗的劳工运动来应付危机。
Perspectives material 2008
Industrial slowdown and the implosion of the US capitalist model signal the onset of a deep crisis for China’s rulers
[This document should be read together with the previous document, Perspectives 2007 – China at the Crossroads. Important features of the coming social and political crisis are outlined in that document and are therefore not repeated in this material].
The debt crisis of US capitalism, which produced the Wall Street financial meltdown, represents a seminal moment in the history of capitalism, with huge effects for the whole world, not least China. Few people now speak about economic “decoupling” or doubt that China, and other major emerging economies such as India and Russia, will be drawn into the global economic maelstrom. The depth of the crisis, its timing, duration, these are the only unknowns at this stage.
In 2008, it became clear China was in the first stages of an industrial slowdown. All forecasts for economic growth are being revised downwards. After achieving GDP growth of 11.8% in 2006-07, predictions for 2008 range between 9 to 9.6%, and 8 to 9% for the following year.
“In a society where the number of new job-seekers each year exceeds the number of jobs created by 20 million, a decline in economic growth to even 8 percent would be tantamount to a recession,” warned Tao Dong, from Credit Suisse AG in Hong Kong. Anything “below 9 percent would make the authorities quite nervous,” he told Bloomberg News.
Within a few weeks of the closing ceremony, China’s great Olympic moment had faded into history. In place of the cheering crowds are growing numbers of angry farmers and students, embattled migrant workers and ruined stock market investors. The toxic milk scandal that hospitalised more than 13,000 babies, killing four, was a shocking ‘reality check’ for Chinese society. This scandal, involving more than 20 companies including the very largest in the food sector, was the result of almost complete deregulation. The government decided in 2005 to exempt more than 2,100 companies in the food and dairy industry from regulatory controls, judging their own standards to be adequate. In the absence of controls, dairy industry middlemen took to adding the industrial chemical melamine to boost the protein level of raw milk. Matters were not helped by the regime’s orders to the press that “all food safety issues are off-limits” for the duration of the Olympics. Provincial-level leaders (in Hebei) knew of the contamination problem six days before the Olympic Games opened. Action then could have saved lives and untold suffering. Several of the companies at the centre of the scandal are listed on the Chinese and foreign stock markets, and the dairy sector has exploded from almost nothing to a $20 billion industry in a few short years. Parents of contaminated children began to organise, posting their demands on the internet, contacting activist lawyers, and looking to sue the dairy companies.
On just one day, 4 September 2008, mass protests erupted in three provinces – Henan, Hunan and Zhejiang – drawing a combined 100,000 onto the streets, leading to clashes with security forces. “Social unrest is common in China, but rarely on this scale,” commented the BBC. These protests ranged from school students (Shenqiu county, Henan) protesting the seizure of their school sports fields by property developers, to 10,000 migrant workers and local citizens (Ningbo, Zhejiang province) besieging a factory after one 14-year old worker suffered a serious accident. The CCP journal Outlook published statistics showing that the curve of ‘mass incidents’ continues to rise, with a staggering 90,000 protests recorded in 2006 – almost 250 every day! This was an increase from 87,000 in 2005, 74,000 in 2004, and 58,000 in 2003. These figures point to a deep malaise in society despite the dazzling GDP figures.
“I will slap anyone who says today’s China is harmonious,” remarked Wen Yunchao, a columnist for the Southern Metropolis Daily. “The amount of demonstrations is growing as social issues of instability are increasing.”
In booming cities like Xiamen, Shanghai and Chongqing, thousands have taken part in illegal street marches against environmentally harmful construction projects. Several thousand demobilized soldiers rioted in at least three cities in 2007 against the terms of their discharge, giving rise to reports of vast unofficial networks of retired soldiers. In the past, military service led to a guaranteed job at a state-owned enterprise, but this no longer applies, one of many attacks on the former rights of workers and peasants.
In southern China’s Pearl River Delta alone, strikes and factory flare-ups are continual, with a stoppage involving 1,000 workers or more occurring every day. The majority of these struggles go unreported due to state censorship. Often, they are dealt with harshly by managers, officials and security forces. China currently has 1.7 million in its police force, 1 million paramilitary police (PAP) and 2 million in the armed forces. 30,000 new police stations have been opened in recent years. The PAP was beefed up after the mass movement of 1989, as the army showed a reluctance to be used. Deployed in Tibet and Xinjiang on ‘anti-terror’ missions, the PAP is the main repressive tool of the regime.
Student unrest is also on the rise, an ominous portent for a regime still haunted by the memory of 1989. That movement was fuelled by general discontent over inflation, corruption, and the desire for basic democratic rights – all features of the current situation. The government has capped civil service employment at the level of 6.5 million for the duration of the current (2006-10) Five Year Plan, resulting in serious unemployment among university graduates. In 2007, 1.2 million out of a total 4.13 million graduates failed to find jobs, and a further 1.5 million graduates face the same fate in 2008.
China has been hit by a series of major disasters: the Sichuan earthquake (87,000 people dead or missing), the coldest winter in many parts of China, and then the worst summer rains for half a century. These events have politicised a section of the population and raised major questions about the government’s role. “The Sichuan earthquake has created millions of potential malcontents,” commented The Economist.
During the initial earthquake response, with the nation in shock, Wen Jiabao’s tearful appearances on national television endeared him to a broad layer, as an example of a ‘caring official’. But five months after the quake, Sichuan’s provincial government was complaining it had only received one-quarter of the money promised for reconstruction, a further $180 billion is needed. The province will need several years to get back to the GDP levels achieved before the quake, spelling hardship, unemployment and makeshift housing for millions. The scandal of the ‘tofu schools’ is known throughout the world. Chinese film director, Pan Jianlin, has captured this issue in a documentary, Who Killed Our Children? “The quality of these buildings was terrible,” the director says.
Even as the lower echelons of the CCP apparatus are increasingly cursed by the masses as local services decay, state-owned property is stolen, corruption, abuse of power, repression, and a litany of other crimes have become the norm, the top leaders have largely been shielded from popular criticism.
In the course of 2008, popular upheavals succeeded in pressuring the central government into disciplining and sacrificing some local satraps. This was the case in the “6/28” incident in Weng’an, in Guizhou province, where for two days crowds of up to 50,000 laid siege to the police station and destroyed dozens of vehicles. Beijing swiftly sacked the town’s police chief and party boss. Likewise, during the toxic milk scandal, the national products quality and safety chief as well as the mayor and party boss in Shjiazhuang, the city at the centre of the scandal, were removed. In Shanxi province, just weeks earlier, a mudslide at an illegal coalmine dump killed 271 people and the provincial governor, Meng Xuenong, resigned, undoubtedly ‘persuaded’ from above. Meng instantly became known as the “unluckiest official in China” – in 2003 he was dismissed as Beijing’s mayor for mishandling the SARS outbreak.
By sacrificing corrupt or inept officials, Beijing hopes to win time and defuse crises before they grow, but this comes at the price of emboldening others to take the road of struggle in future, and of further undermining the party-state apparatus.
In his book, Apologise to the Peasantry, the former vice party secretary of Baishu County in Shanxi province, Ma Ying Lu, aptly described the five layers of government in China as “firewalls” protecting the inner core of the CCP regime. “Today the central leadership are still safe,” he wrote in 2003, “but the lower level firewalls [i.e. village and country governments] have totally collapsed, and middle layer [i.e. provincial] firewalls are in danger.”
China’s ruling party has been protected by its apparent ability to deliver unstoppable economic growth. But this too, the Beijing regime’s GDP ‘trump card’, is now threatened both from the global capitalist crisis and its own internal contradictions. The Chinese economic model, with an under-dimensioned consumer market and vastly over-dimensioned production base, is unsustainable. Whereas in the advanced capitalist economies, the accumulation of private debt offered a way out – for a period – from this basic capitalist contradiction, in China the limits of the domestic market have been ‘overcome’ by unprecedented levels of capital investment and rapid expansion of the export sector.
Following the collapse of the US ‘subprime’ model and housing bubble, China’s own crisis, the result of huge amounts of often wasteful and highly speculative investment, is just beginning. The process can be more protracted in China due the vast sums of state-backed credit at play in the economy, but this is a question of timescale and degree, not overall direction.
Nationally, in the first half of 2008, about 67,000 small and medium-sized enterprises collapsed, throwing roughly 20 million out of work. The worst hit areas are the wealthier, more industrialised coastal provinces, which are the most integrated into the global economy. Guangdong for example, where 176 of the world’s 500 largest companies have a base, is experiencing “the worst conditions for 20 years,” according to the Federation of Hong Kong Industry. Half of the shoe manufacturing industry in Guangdong (over 2,200 factories) has closed down or relocated since the end of 2007. Profits in the textile sector are now widely reduced to around 1.5 per cent of turnover, and Guangdong’s government reported that sales of garments and accessories fell by almost a third in the first half of 2008, over the same period in 2007.
Exporters have been squeezed by currency appreciation, rising raw material costs, and a labour shortage that forces them to lift notoriously low wages. Newer low-wage rivals such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, as well as poorer Chinese provinces and even Eastern Europe and Mexico, are gaining ground in the capitalist ‘race to the bottom’.
City leaders in Dongguan, an export industry behemoth in the Pearl River Delta, speak of a “depression” in the local economy. The city government launched two rescue funds in 2008 to support small and medium enterprises battered by the export downturn. The “export crisis” is evident at Shenzhen’s port, the world’s fourth busiest, where the growth of cargo volume has slowed to half last year’s level. Industry analysts predict “widespread second-half losses” in the global container shipping industry, which is heavily dependent on China. This is before the world economy, and the crucial markets of the US, EU, and Japan, have formally moved into recession.
Other coastal exporting provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong and Fujian are also suffering. The director of Zhejiang province’s foreign trade research centre described the situation there as “disastrous”. One-fifth of the province’s companies – over 10,000 firms – have booked losses in 2008 totalling 36 billion yuan ($5.3 bn). The provincial government stepped in to rescue Feiyue Group, with 5,000 employees, from bankruptcy after its exports of stitching machines fell 44 percent, leaving it unable to meet almost one billion yuan ($146m) in repayments to its creditors. As in Dongguan and other areas, the government ordered an extension facility from local banks to keep the company alive.
It is extremely unlikely that the current crisis can be contained within the export sector. The pace of investment in the whole economy has slowed in 2008, to its lowest level for five years. This is a result of several factors, of which the bursting of the property bubble and falling rate of profit are the most important. The downturn has also begun to impact on the steel industry, the backbone of the decade-long construction boom. Residential construction soaks up about 20 percent of steel demand. The research company, Mysteel, declared that China’s steel industry was in “recession”, with prices falling from mid-year 2008 by as much as 20 percent.
In a survey of the industry, the State Development and Reform Commission bemoaned the fact that, “the majority of the steel projects under construction were started up by local governments without the approval of the central authorities”. This commission used to be China’s planning agency, in the days of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. This statement underlines how times have changed. Commentators have long predicted a destructive phase of consolidation in China’s steel industry.
The situation is similar in the power generating industry. As China expert Nicholas Lardy points out: “China has built so many power plants that some regions now have excess capacity. But investments to create a national power grid, which would allow more efficient utilization of generating capacity, have lagged.” [Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2008]
In industry after industry the same picture emerges: no planning, ferocious regional rivalry, chronic over-investment and waste. This is shown in the telecom industry, one of the most modern. The National Audit Office reported in August 2008 that more than 1.12 trillion yuan ($164bn) was spent by telecom companies on the construction of basic facilities between 2002 and 2006, but only one-third of the installed telecom cables were used. “The wasted investment in telecommunications could have built several Three Gorges Dams,” said Yang Xianzu, the former head of China Unicom, referring to the world’s biggest hydro-power project on the Yangtze River.
China’s stock market bubble has imploded since its peak in October 2007. It was the worst performer among the world’s 50 largest bourses in 2008. Effectively, all the speculative gains after 2005, when a series of major state-owned companies were brought to market, have been erased. Of the 136 million gumin (‘investors’) lured into stocks, 70 percent earn less than $10,000 a year, and on average they have lost two-thirds of their capital in the twelve months since October 2007.
Although they constitute less than one-tenth of the total population, and so the “negative wealth effect” from falling stocks is more limited than in the West, these ruined gumin represent a crucial layer for China’s rulers. This is the CCP’s main social base – the urban middle-class – and moreover it is upon this layer that any hopes rest of ‘rebalancing’ the economy away from exports towards domestic consumption. Who will buy all those cars and flat-screen televisions if this layer is completely bankrupted?
“There are signs that the nightmare the party leadership fears most may come to pass sooner than anticipated: members of the middle-class joining ‘disadvantaged sectors’ such as peasants and migrant workers in staging protests and even riots to vent their grievances,” commented Willy Lam, the author.
Broken marriages, suicides and mental illness are all features of the market fallout. In some regions, such as Shanxi province in the spring of 2008, investors rioted and laid siege to a local stock brokerage. Official pronouncements that such falls are “normal for a market economy” have enraged many people. Netizens have posted angry comments such as: “Even the capitalist US is intervening to rescue its market, why isn’t the Chinese government doing the same?”
The crashing stock market is however being rapidly upstaged by the bursting of an even larger and more serious financial bubble. While official statistics give an impression of still rising property prices overall, things look different on the ground. Housing prices are falling in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Haikou, but also in interior cities such as Chengdu, Wuhan, Nanning, Xi’an, Lanzhou and Ürümqi. All these cities experienced spectacular growth in 2007. Several regions now report price falls of between 10-40 percent and property companies have embarked upon a price war.
As in industry, many parts of the property market suffer extreme levels of overcapacity. The Shenzhen Bureau of Land and Housing Management reports that, at the current rate of sales, it would take developers in Shenzhen more than a decade to sell all their existing stock of properties. China now boasts the world’s biggest shopping malls, built to cash in on a consumer explosion that has not materialised. Dongguan’s South China Mall is the biggest in the world, but less than ten percent of its store space has been leased. Fully one-third of Beijing’s offices space lies vacant. Of course, in reality, rather than ‘too much’ construction, there is an acute housing shortage in China – for ordinary people. But the profit system is incapable of solving this contradiction.
Most people in China will welcome falling property prices. Currently 70 percent of urban residents cannot afford to buy a new apartment. According to studies by Beijing Normal University Finance Research Centre, the average price of an apartment in China is about 13 times the average annual household disposable income, well above the international average of between three and six times. Although of course the standard of housing often left a lot to be desired, in 1984, under the old state-controlled system, average rents in China were just one percent of family income.
When financial bubbles unwind, however, they tend to move in a vicious cycle whereby prices fall, speculators facing losses dump assets to get their hands on cash, and the pool of empty property grows, causing prices to fall even more. The likely effects of this on the wider economy will be a much-reduced level of investment hereafter, a generalised tightening of credit terms (“credit crunch”) and a sharp rise in bad debts threatening the stability of the banking sector. Of course, faced with the threat of bank collapses, the Chinese regime will attempt a Paulson-style bailout. Unlike the US government, they have considerable reserves at their disposal. China’s level of outstanding debt, at 15.7 percent of GDP, is low. It also has the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, approaching $2 trillion worth, although a large part of these reserves are effectively ‘embedded’ in propping up the value of the dollar and preventing a collapse of the global money system.
China’s property sector (i.e. speculation) has accounted for more than a third of all fixed asset investment in recent years, possibly as much as half. According to some surveys, a 50 percent fall in prices will be needed to revive China’s real estate market. On this basis, an explosion of non-performing loans lies ahead. Officially, the level of non-performing loans in the Chinese banking system today is $600bn, but the real figure could be $1,100 (equal to more than half China’s forex reserves). At around a quarter of GDP, this is higher than the level in Japan at the start of the 1990s.
China could therefore arrive in a similar position to Japan when its ‘bubble economy’ burst in 1990. By the middle of that decade over two-thirds of Japanese companies were making no profits, kept alive by the banks extending more credit. This was called “the zombie economy”. Behind the banks stood the central bank and the government, whose public debt ratio shot from the lowest in the OECD to one of the highest. In contrast to today, however, the US, Europe and emerging Asian economies continued to grow in the 1990s, offering Japanese capitalism a partial escape route. China’s current problems occur during a far less favourable global conjuncture.
The coming crisis will usher in a new period in China’s complex internal politics. It marks the end of the post-1989 era. The wealthier coastal regions are being hit first by the crisis and will probably be hit hardest. This will be a reversal of the previous situation where these provinces have led development and increased their economic power at the expense of the inland provinces. The power struggle over resources, and to shape national policy will grow more intense. The fine balance inside the CCP, between the two dominant factions, the ‘Shanghai faction’ (which has its main base in the coastal provinces) and Hu Jintao’s ‘tuanpai’, will be shaken. A sharp economic downturn can open serious divisions within the party hierarchy. As in the old days of the CCP, rival factions can seek to mobilise opinion behind them by going to the streets. Economic conflicts too will intensify.
“There is no such a thing as ‘the Chinese market’. China is a patchwork of regional markets at various stages of economic development, bound together as a nation, but separated by differences in governance, communications challenges, regional rivalries and poor infrastructure.” This is an accurate description from a group of IT consultants. [The markets in China, Cambashi Ltd, 2005]
An economic downturn that hits some regions far harder than others will increase internal protectionist tensions. Faced with falling exports, the more modern factories of the coastal provinces will turn their aim inwards towards the markets of other provinces, demanding that the central government crafts policies to facilitate this. Poorer provinces with weaker industries will do their utmost to block this. The result can be an upsurge of regionalism and inter-provincial disputes that will inevitably feed their way upwards to Beijing. Willy Lam uses the term “warlords” to describe the provincial leaders, showing how for years they have successfully resisted central government policies on a range of important issues.
The coming period will see the eruption of mass struggle against the effects of economic crisis and the first ‘green shoots’ of an independent workers’ movement. It can also mark the emergence of a mass pro-democracy movement as in Taiwan, Hong Kong and in other parts of East Asia during the crisis of the 1990s. To avert such a development, some layers within the CCP want to restart the stalled process towards ‘political reform’. A report by researchers at the Central Communist Party School in Beijing argues this task is now “urgent”. But the changes advocated in this report are for a strengthened legal system and freer media, not for the right to organise independently, to form political parties and to stand in elections.
Among the CCP tops there is a morbid fear of any serious opening up or relaxation of the party’s control, a fear that this would open the floodgates of mass discontent. Instead, some limited local experiments have been floated. For example, Shenzhen has signalled it will introduce multi-candidate elections inside the CCP’s structures, possibly extending this to the city’s People’s Political Consultative Congress. However, the issue of ‘democracy’, especially in its vaguest forms, could under certain conditions be seized upon by a faction, region, or individual, as part of a struggle to wrest concessions or shift the direction of government policy. This could resonate with the masses and trigger a movement going well beyond what its authors envisaged.
Rapid GDP growth, the fastest of any large economy, has been the crucial pillar supporting the CCP regime in the two decades since 1989. This so-called ‘miracle’ has exercised an almost divine power of protection over the ruling group, conferring an aura of economic ‘invincibility’. It has ingratiated the regime with the capitalists at home and abroad and allowed the CCP to create a new social base among the urban middle-classes. GDP has grown by an annual average of 9.6 percent for 30 years, leading most Chinese under 40 years of age to believe this is ‘normal’. Not least, this has underpinned the relative cohesion of the CCP ruling group – the absence of the destabilising open splits that characterised much of its pre-1989 history. Few regimes in the world therefore have more to lose from the global capitalist crisis that is unfolding. What is urgent in China, and globally, is the building of a new fighting labour movement equipped with a clear socialist programme to meet the crisis.

我译自CWI的大爆炸

www.chinaworker.tk

08年9月26日
世界经济

大爆炸
资本主义金融体系接近崩溃

社论，当今社会主义， 2008年10月
最近几年，我们常常被人指责为“劫数难逃论者” 。这是因为我们预测由高利润，高风险金融资本主义所主导下的债务驱动的泡沫经济将在某个时刻崩溃，继而导致世界经济严重的衰退。回顾一下我们的文章，我们从来没有在任何之处宣布过一项'大灾难'，只是对发展的每一阶段作出认真的，均衡的分析。而目前的情势正在充分证明我们的分析的正确性。


不幸的是，左翼的一些人接受了如下观点，即在加速推进的全球经济一体化和超自由市场政策基础上，世界资本主义的繁荣可能会无限期地继续下去。美国房地产泡沫崩溃和次优抵押贷款危机产生严重后果之后的最近几个星期的事件完全改变了面貌。现在在严肃的资本主义新闻媒体的大字标题上显示出来的也是'劫数难逃论' 。金融时报（ 9月20日）的标题是“混乱的资本主义”。


政府资助解救并接管贝尔斯登，房利美、房地美以及美国保险集团等等后，约翰普伦德写道，布什试图用数十亿的美元来拯救金融系统是“以严重损害美国模式的自由市场资本主义为代价的” （金融时报， 9月20日）。这对于把金融机构“社会化”或“国有化”的诉求而言是老生常谈。在现实中，金融资本主义之具有掠夺性的和不计后果的巨大的债务正落在工人阶级的肩上。


当美国财政部长汉克·保尔森宣布他的7,000亿美元资产困境救援方案时，评论员保罗·克鲁格曼（自由民主党）评论说： “保尔森同志占领了制高点” 。作为一个自由市场论者的金融交易商比尔·帕金斯在纽约时报上做了一个广告，说布什、保尔森和美国联邦储备委员会主席伯南克是“新的共产党人，他们在‘私营企业'和‘资本主义'的坟墓前举起美国国旗。帕金斯认为经营失败的银行就应允许其倒闭，不能让纳税人来承受负担来使其出离困境。他说：“我认为这是一种社会主义或共产主义的滴入式版本” “你们比委内瑞拉国有化了更多的机构” （9月25日卫报）。


然而几天里布什，保尔森和伯南克正在面临的前景是新的1929年型崩溃的金融体系。如果他们象美联储和当时的政府于1929年做的那样允许这种情况发生，这将威胁到资本主义制度的生存。从资本主义的角度来看，他们别无选择，只能进行干预，以试图稳定金融体系。保尔森的整套方案能否成功，仍有待观察。一连串的危机还远远没有结束。


然而，救援的国有资金的累积和事实上的国有化，再加上现在的7,000亿美元拯救计划，这些都毁了美国资本主义和自由市场思想的声誉。


当然布什政府的国有化并不意味着真正的'社会主义' 。其目的是利用国家的资源，包括大量增加公共债务，以稳定资本主义以及为在以后的日子里的恢复作好基础性的准备。贡献给美国政府最大份额税款的工人阶级将为该救援计划买单。此外，数以百万计的工人阶级的家庭已被诱骗人的金融公司骗入抵押贷款陷阱，许多人现在正在失去家园。由于金融危机把美国经济推入更深地衰退，数百万人将面临失业和贫乏的工资。


真正的社会主义将意味着由工人阶级的政府接管金融部门和经济的制高点，并在创造财富的人的控制下民主地运行这些部门和经济。民主计划将取代市场的无政府状态。生产将用来满足社会的需要而不是为了少数人的利润。然而，正如马克思和恩格斯指出的那样，甚至资本主义国家为自己的目的而采取的国有化措施展现出了私人所有制的多余和具有替代性的更先进的经济体系的可能性。


金融资本的支配


许多人现在指责当前的危机是由金融市场上的银行家、对冲基金经理，交易商等等的'贪婪'和'恐惧'导致的。这些人无疑发挥了掠夺的和寄生的作用。他们的投机活动使得财富和利润集中到一小撮超级富裕的少数人手里。举例来说，去年，金融部门的首席执行官平均获得的收入是一个普通工人的275倍。然而，他们自私的动机只是该制度的一种症状而不是发展的原因。


在过去30年里，美国，英国和其他地方的资产阶级远离于生产活动的投资，既多数人所需要的商品和服务的生产。他们无论是在发达资本主义国家还是在中国和其他发展中经济体的金融部门寻求更高的盈利性。随着苏联和东欧斯大林主义的崩溃，20世纪80年代工人阶级的失败使得资产阶级得以加强剥削工人阶级，特别是在不发达世界的新殖民主义国家。资本主义制度作为一个整体变得越来越具有寄生性。


这是寄生的金融资本主义占支配地位的基础。这是全球化和超自由市场（新自由主义）的政策所允许的自由的范围。但是随着世界范围内工人阶级分配到的财富份额的减少，极端不平等的增长越来越限制资本主义的市场。资产阶级，特别是那些以盎格鲁-美国模式运作的资产阶级，在债务史无前例的增长的基础上维持着相对较高的增长水平。在1980年，全球债务大约相当于全球国内生产总值。但是，自此以后，全球债务已经膨胀到超过全球产量的3.5倍。与此同时，作为为利润而进行的债务交易的渠道的金融资本主义获得了资本主义利润的大约三分之一。


我们已经多次指出这种趋势是不可持续的。整个大厦倒塌只是一个时间问题。这就是现在正在发生的事。影子银行系统(shadow banking system)，不受管制的投资银行、对冲基金和银行自身帐外融资的网络已经爆炸。影子网络是为了绕开受管制的商业银行而发展出来的。但是，仍然构成金融体系的核心的各大银行都没有逃脱这场流动性和资本的可获得性的危机。如果不消除风险，衍生出来的一系列奇特的金融工具理所当然要蔓延，正如守旧的金融家巴菲特所警告的，这些衍生物已被证明是“具有大规模杀伤性的金融工具” 。


在美国和国际上，对资本主义危机和针对腐朽的金融资本的救援活动将产生深刻的反应。除了经济矛盾，这场危机无疑将产生一个比以前的安然丑闻更大规模的巨大的腐败行径如诈骗和盗窃的丑闻。工人将被迫组织起来并回击资本主义危机的影响。这些事件将创造出肥沃的土壤使得对真正的社会主义和马克思主义感兴趣的人大量的增加。


崩溃倒计时


9月里发生的这些事件标志着这场全球金融体系的危机进入一个新的关键阶段。世界被带到1929年型崩溃的边缘。

9月7日，美国财政部不得不进入并接管以直接经营两个巨大的政府赞助的抵押贷款提供商房利美、房地美。紧随着7月时的政府干预以担保它们的5万亿美元抵押贷款，得到的回报是获得这些机构的股份-实际上是部分国有化。即使如此也没有成功使这些巨头稳定下来。保尔森的“火箭炮”已被证明不能足够地使外国投资恢复信心，特别是亚洲各国的中央银行，它们已经售出了房利美和房地美的债券。政府的完全接管和有效地国有化这些机构，是唯一剩下的措施了。


然后（ 9月14日至15号）五大华尔街投资银行之二的雷曼兄弟公司和美林证券面临破产。在没有得到政府担保雷曼兄弟和美林不良资产的情况下，其他华尔街银行拒绝介入。保尔森和伯南克拒绝担保。他们已受到巨大的政治压力以避免把更多的纳税人的美元拿出来。此外，自由市场论者要求他们避免造成进一步的“道德风险” ，即发出自己的愚蠢的盲目投机将保证得到政府挽救的另一个信号。通过拒绝支持政府救援雷曼兄弟和美林证券，保尔森和伯南克希望发出一个信息，既除了贝尔斯登获得政府担保外，不会有更多的经营失败的银行会得到政府担保。雷曼兄弟公司申请破产，巴克莱国际和其他贪婪者开始逐食潜在的有利可图的雷曼兄弟的资产。另一方面，美林证券急忙把自己买给带有更大的资本储备的作为存款银行的美国银行（Bank of America）。


然而保尔森和伯南克犯了巨大的错误。他们以为他们可以划清界限，但他们拒绝支持拯救雷曼兄弟或美林引发了银行股的普遍不景气。这暗示大批银行要步雷曼兄弟和美林的后尘。其中受到最大威胁的是剩下的两个投资银行，摩根士丹利和高盛。整个“影子银行系统” ，不受管制的债务融资的高投机性的投资银行和对冲基金网络正在爆炸。由于它们和大银行的多重联系，这些银行也操作资产负债表外的投资工具，投资银行可能击到许多其他机构。如果保尔森和伯南克支持救援雷曼兄弟和美林，这不会停止它们的腐烂（正如其后的华盛顿互惠[Washington Mutual]银行的破产所昭示的） ，但站他们在雷曼兄弟和美林的沉没旁边不管不问却加快了银行业的危机。


在英国，作为一个主要的银行和抵押贷款供应商的HBOS（苏格兰的哈利法克斯银行）面临破产。在英格兰银行的推动下，它只是通过迅速地和劳埃德TSB的联姻而得到挽救。


经营失败的雷曼兄弟和美林对短期货币市场产生了直接的连锁效应。银行用来拆借的货币市场基金通常被视为几乎和现金一样安全。信贷紧缩的一个关键方面是由于银行囤积现金以避免给其他银行的任何潜在的风险贷款而导致的短期货币市场的失灵。尽管美国联邦储备大幅度削减利率，银行间拆借利率，通常是略微高于美联储的利率，已经上升到一个前所未有的水平。在雷曼和美林破产的影响下，严重的信贷紧缩转变成至关重要的货币市场的完全瘫痪。


美国联邦储备委员会被迫与其他主要央行合作注入全球银行系统1800亿美元（在此之际，货币掉期，美元对欧元，英镑等）。在随后的几天里，他们注入系统额外的1000亿美元，英国和日本的中央银行以及欧洲的中央银行也注入额外的流动资金。此外，美联储和其他中央银行同意接受更广泛的证券作为贷款的担保品，包括股票，公司债券等，换句话说，比他们曾坚持的政府债券具有更多的风险的资产。（自那时以来，中央银行注入以短期贷款形式存在的更多的流动资金。 ）


保尔森允许雷曼兄弟和美林证券的崩溃，但面临着大保险公司美国保险集团公司（ AIG ）的可能的崩溃，政府被迫介入.美国国际集团危机的起因是评级机构降低其安全状态。这可能触发抛售AIG的股票，从而进一步消耗其资本储备。这个问题和美国国际集团在美国，欧洲和亚洲的大规模保险业务无关。这场危机源于其通过其全球信贷违约掉期的业务参与影子银行系统，信贷违约掉期是用来担保广泛的证券（住房抵押贷款证券，公司债券，市政债券等）投资等级地位的保险的一种形式。美国国际集团发出了4470亿美元的这种保险（包括发向欧洲机构的3000亿美元）。


AIG的信用状况的下降自动意味着由AIG发行的信贷违约掉期担保的证券的降级。反过来这将造成任何用AIG金融保险证券作为担保品为自己贷款筹资购房的问题。换句话说，美国国际集团的崩溃将意味着全球金融体系里不良债务的大量的增加。损失将是绝对惊人的（有人估计对全球金融部门来说，这将意味着至少1800亿美元） 。与此同时，美国国际集团的崩溃也将意味着全球保险业的崩溃。为了避免灾难性垮台，保尔森不得不介入，用850亿美元来担保美国国际集团的资产以换取该保险公司的优先股。


在9月15-19日的关键的一周，世界证券交易所暴跌。政府挽救美国国际集团未能稳定股票市场。与此同时，最近几周已趋于下降的石油价格开始上升-可能因恐慌性购买石油期货。保尔森和伯南克显然意识到他们面临着一个严峻的1929年的情况。如果他们站在一旁，无疑将是全球金融体系的崩溃，这反过来会促使世界资本主义经济大萧条。在吸取了1929年崩溃的教训后，当时美联储和美国政府站在一旁，并允许金融多米诺骨牌的倒塌，保尔森和伯南克决定，他们别无选择只能介入挽救资本主义制度。


9月19日，保尔森宣布他的困境资产救济方案(Tarp) ，一个7,000亿美元的计划，在正在崩溃的金融机构下筑好基底和重新稳定美国和全球的金融体系。保尔森的声明至少在一段时间里避免了一场全球性崩溃。但是，这的确是治标不治本的措施，本身不能克服银行系统的信贷紧缩和瘫痪。


当我们把目光投向报刊，可以看到华盛顿互惠破产的消息，美国历史上最大的银行倒闭。 华盛顿互惠银行（WaMu）被管制者没收（ 9月25日） 并出售给摩根大通。


欧洲银行遭受了其不良抵押贷款证券带来的巨大损失的打击。受影响最严重的是瑞士银行，瑞银华宝（UBS）总减记约500亿美元（超过美林） 。金融时报评论说，许多欧洲银行现在不仅'太大而不能失败' ，而且“太大而无法挽救” 。 “举例来说，德意志银行负债总额（融资率超过50 ！ ）共约€ 2000亿欧元（超过房利美）或超过德国国内生产总值的80 ％。这对央行（Bundesbank）甚至德国整个国家来说简直是太多了... “ （苟延残喘的欧洲银行，金融时报， 9月24日）


保尔森的一揽子方案


雷曼兄弟公司和美林证券危机爆发和短期货币市场失灵（尽管由联邦储备委员会和其他中央银行持续，大规模注入流动资金）后，保尔森被迫宣布（ 9月18日）一揽子拯救计划，既TARP。没有提供任何细节，保尔森建议花费7,000亿美元纳税人的钱建立一个仍然在金融机构名册上的卖不掉的不良证券垃圾箱。


据报道5000亿美元的损失已被注销，但有人估计来自住房市场的剩余证券更多达1万亿美元。随着保尔森的声明，全球股市交易立即恢复。然而，国会领导人，无论民主党和共和党几乎立即开始抗议保尔森的救援计划之清场的性质和他作为一个财政部长的特别权力。


保尔森建议应给予财政部长（最初为两年）根据他的判断力以任何价格从任何人那里购买证券的无限的权力。此外，他还要求免受法院或政府行政机构的任何形式的起诉。起初，他提议只购买美国银行的证券，但很快扩大到包括外国银行的美国子公司。


如果美国国会接受这个建议，保尔森将是美国历史上最强大的财政部长。新闻周刊（Newsweek）的封面上称他为“国王亨利”。实际上，财政部长将成为美国资本主义的没有监督（仅仅是每年向国会报告两次）的经济主管人员，可以和总统本身的权力相匹敌。


如同布什9 / 11事件后一样，在伯南克支持下，保尔森正试图以全球金融崩溃的威胁来促使国会在没有彻底讨论其内容的情况下迅速批准他的建议。举例来说保尔森要求这一揽子方案应该是“干净利落”的，也就是说它不应该受制于任何建议，如政府获得股份以换取购买不良债务，或限制银行家的薪酬，或屋主免于面对丧失抵押品赎回权。热衷于挽救破产的银行家，保尔森残酷地拒绝购房人士的合法权益。


保尔森提议支付大约接近不良证券的票面价值，以美元计超过60美分，而不是其20或30美分的当前市场价值。此外，不同的银行，金融公司和其他公司正在游说以便扩大救援的范围。举例来说，要求把市政债券，信用卡债务和汽车购买债务包括进来。华尔街的公司已经期待从执行保尔森方案的业务中收费。


那么，金融公司的负责人对保尔森的建议很热心就不足为奇了。然而，一些自由市场主义的共和党强烈谴责该计划为“债务社会化”。 来自肯塔基州的共和党参议员吉姆·邦宁（Jim Bunning）宣称： “在美国，适合于所有意图和目的的自由市场死了。”他说，保尔森的计划将“把华尔街的痛苦带给纳税人...它是金融社会主义，它是非美国式的” 。


另一方面，民主党领袖要求采取措施帮助哀伤的业主。保尔森拒绝了这一要求，其理由是这批不良证券过于复杂以至于不能减少个体业主的付款额。 “银行和证券业... 正极其所能地和变化战斗，正如他们提出住房法案（7月份通过的）时所做的” （9月24日国际先驱论坛报）。


保尔森目前的建议完全不同于20世纪90年代初挽救储蓄和贷款银行（thrifts[储蓄]）时采取的措施。当时，美国政府有效地国有化了经营失败的thrifts[储蓄]，并在把thrifts[储蓄] 返回为私人所有之前的一段时期里出售了其剩余资产。1994年后强劲的经济增长恢复了抵押资产的价值，并使得政府可以收回部分救援的成本。


在1991-92年房地产泡沫破裂后瑞典政府采取了类似的措施。政府国有化了瑞典银行部门的一大部分，削减了这些经营失败的机构的股东，随后再次出售了所有可以售出的资产，后来，银行回到了私营部门。可是，救援成本约达瑞典的国内生产总值（虽然随着时间的推移捞回来了一些成本）的4 ％ 。毫无疑问美国资产阶级将坚决抵制大规模国有化美国银行业。


目前保尔森的救援建议，耗资约7,000亿美元，相当于GDP的5 ％ 。然而，保尔森无意接管经营失败的美国银行，只是通过全买他们的不良债务使他们脱困，从而使它们能够补充其资本和像往常一样运行下去。保尔森甚至不能要求获得银行股份以换取购买其坏帐。


保尔森的一揽子方案会得到国会的批准吗？鉴于国会反对的力量，有可能会有一些拖延以及保尔森可能会被迫接受一些修改，特别是他所主张的超常的不受制止的权力。但是，面临着金融市场进一步下跌的威胁和新的社会动乱的可能性，看来国会将在因11月的选举而分崩离析前以这种或那种的形式接受这一揽子方案。


社会主义替代


保尔森声称，人们不在乎谁拥有银行。但数以百万计的房主会在乎政府使用纳税人的金钱来使已把不良抵押贷款出售和证券化的银行摆脱困境，而数百万人面临违约利率和丧失抵押品赎回权的威胁。事实上，数以百万计的美国人已经被保尔森的计划激怒了。


社会团体，工会，以及所有那些捍卫劳动人民利益的人士应该要求国有化银行和金融机构（保险公司，对冲基金等）并在工人的控制和管理下以民主计划的方式运行，而不是国有化金融资本的不良资产和坏账。只在必要的基础上补偿小股东和存款人。


银行部门的运行应促进能提供大部分人口所需要的商品和服务的行业的利益，而不是为少数超级富裕的金融资本家的投机活动提供资金。银行应提供廉价的抵押贷款以供个人购房（有一个排除富人的豪宅的上限） 。它们还应向小企业和小农户提供廉价信贷以便他们能为当地社区的需要服务。


当然这些措施将令许多人面临对更广泛的经济部门的所有权和控制权的问题，并需要用民主的计划来取代市场的无政府状态和赤裸裸的惟利是图。例如，美国政府目前正在考虑给大汽车公司福特、克莱斯勒和通用汽车公司一揽子国家担保贷款。这些公司处在严重的危机中，应该把它们置于工人的民主控制和管理下来运行以便满足社会的需要。


工会和社会团体应完全反对所有丧失抵押品赎回权。应该取消凡通过欺诈行为或欺骗手段已售出的抵押贷款。没有能力按揭还款的购房者应有权以负担得起的社会的租金租借房屋。通过丧失抵押品赎回权和建设者和房地产公司的破产，产生了一些空房，州和市的政府应接管无人居住的房屋并且以负担得起的租金出租出去。关于抵押贷款违约，丧失抵押品赎回权和房屋所有者的权利的决定，一般不应由政府官员或破产法院来作出，而应由全民选举出来的将维护劳动人民的权利的委员会来作出。


一个新的时期


如果国会通过可能带有一些修改的保尔森的一揽子方案，金融崩溃或可避免。在付诸实施的具体措施上仍然会有严重的争吵。然而，营救计划本身不会恢复金融部门。美国住房危机，信贷紧缩之根本，还远远没有结束。即使政府接管不良资产，金融部门的巨额亏损意味着信贷紧缩将持续多年。


金融部门的拯救将不会使美国经济避免衰退，美国经济正在放缓。此外，美国经济放缓加上在许多其他经济体的金融危机正把世界推向经济衰退。现在欧洲的经济有一个急剧的衰退。日本，近年来开始有些微弱的恢复，但再次陷入零增长。中国，仍然被视为世界经济的动力，预计将放慢，从11-12 ％的增长降到2008年的约8 ％ 。虽然8 ％的比例相对较高，但是这将在中国产生严重的经济上和政治上的影响。


20世纪80年代以来通过在美国和其他国家助长债务为基础的消费开支（驱使在中国和其他低成本经济体生产廉价商品）的一系列的金融泡沫，资本主义生产和盈利能力的潜在的危机已被推迟数次 。但是，现在得到清算的时候了。极度的债务之山的崩溃几乎肯定意味着长时间的世界资本主义经济增长疲软。毫无疑问，仍然有一个经济周期，但很可能不会返回到2001-07之间经历的那种全球繁荣了。

加速全球化和不受约束的新自由主义政策的最近阶段即将结束并且将打开一个全新的发展时期。针对金融部门的大规模的国家干预对贸易，国际货币流通和产业政策将具有广泛的影响。主要资本主义势力之间的关系将更紧张。长期的停滞、断断续续的微弱复苏和再次的衰退将引起社会危机和激烈的政治斗争。资本主义的经济危机同时也是意识形态和政治的危机，这不可避免地会重新把马克思主义提到政治议程上来。
World Economy
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The great implosion
Capitalist finance system nears meltdown

Editorial, Socialism Today, October 2008
Over recent years, we have often been accused of being ‘catastrophists’. This is because we predicted that the debt-driven bubble economy, dominated by high-profit, high-risk finance capitalism, would at a certain point collapse, resulting in a serious downturn in the world economy. As a review of our articles will show (see box), we have never proclaimed a ‘catastrophe’ at every point, but have presented a careful, balanced analysis of each stage of development. And our analysis is now being amply borne out.

Unfortunately, some on the left succumbed to the idea that the world capitalist boom, based on accelerated globalisation and ultra-free-market policies, could continue indefinitely. The events of recent weeks, following the collapse of the US housing bubble and the severe repercussions of the subprime mortgage crisis, have completely changed the picture. Now the headlines in the serious capitalist press are ‘catastrophist’. “Capitalism in convulsion”, read a headline in the Financial Times (20 September).

George Bush’s attempted multi-billion dollar rescue of the financial system, wrote John Plender, is “at the cost of inflicting severe damage on the US model of free-market capitalism”. (Financial Times, 20 September) After the government-financed bail-outs and takeovers of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American Insurance Group, etc, it has become commonplace to refer to the ‘socialisation’ or ‘nationalisation’ of financial institutions. In reality, the colossal debts of reckless, predatory finance capitalism are being offloaded onto the shoulders of the working class.

When US treasury secretary, Hank Paulson, announced his $700 billion Troubled Asset Rescue Programme, the commentator, Paul Krugman (a liberal Democrat), commented: “Comrade Paulson is taking over the commanding heights”. One financial trader, Bill Perkins, a free-marketeer, placed an advert in the New York Times. It shows Bush, Paulson and Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, the ‘new communists’, raising an American flag on the grave of ‘private enterprise’ and ‘capitalism’. Perkins believes that failed banks should be allowed to collapse, and not be bailed out at the taxpayers’ expense. “I think it’s a kind of trickle down version of socialism or communism”, he said. “You have the government nationalising more institutions than Venezuela”. (Guardian, 25 September)

For a few days, however, Bush, Paulson and Bernanke were facing the prospect of a new 1929-type crash of the financial system. If they allowed it to happen, as the Federal Reserve and the government did in 1929, it would threaten the survival of the capitalist system. From a capitalist standpoint, they had no choice but to intervene to try to stabilise the financial system. Whether Paulson’s package succeeds remains to be seen. There is a chain of crisis that is far from played out.

Nevertheless, the accumulation of state-finance bail-outs and de facto nationalisation, and now the $700 billion rescue plan, is a shattering blow to the prestige of US capitalism and the ideology of the free market.

Nationalisation by the Bush regime, of course, does not mean real ‘socialism’. Their aim is to use the state’s resources, including a massive increase in public debt, to stabilise capitalism and prepare the ground for a recovery at a later date. The bill for the bail-outs will be handed to the working class, who contribute the biggest share of taxes to the US government. Moreover, millions of working-class families have been ensnared by crooked finance companies into the subprime mortgage trap, and many are now losing their homes. Millions will face unemployment and poverty wages as the financial crisis pushes the US economy deeper into recession.

Real socialism would mean the taking over of the finance sector and the commanding heights of the economy by a government of the working class, to be run democratically under the control of those who produce the wealth. Democratic planning would replace the anarchy of the market. Production would be to meet the needs of society, not the profits of the few. Nevertheless, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels pointed out, even nationalisation measures carried out by the capitalist state for its own ends demonstrate the redundancy of private ownership and the possibility of an alternative, more advanced economic system.

Domination of finance capital
Many are now blaming the current crisis on the ‘greed’ and ‘fear’ of bankers, hedge fund managers, traders on financial markets, and so on. These people have undoubtedly played a predatory, parasitic role. Their speculative activities have concentrated wealth and profits into the hands of a tiny, super-rich minority. Last year, for instance, the average chief executive in the finance sector gained an income 275 times that of an average worker. Their egotistical motives, however, are a symptom of the system, not the cause of developments.

Over the last 30 years, the capitalist class in the US, Britain and elsewhere moved away from investing in productive activity, the production of goods and services required by the majority of people. They sought higher levels of profitability in the finance sector, both in the advanced capitalist countries and in China and other developing economies. The defeats of the working class in the 1980s, followed by the collapse of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, allowed the capitalist class to intensify the exploitation of the working class, especially in the neo-colonial countries of the underdeveloped world. The capitalist system as a whole became increasingly parasitic.

That was the basis on which the parasitic finance capitalism became dominant. It was allowed free scope by globalisation and ultra-free-market (neo-liberal) policies. But the growth of grotesque inequality, with the worldwide reduction in the share of wealth taken by the working class, increasingly restricted the market for capitalism. The capitalist class, especially those operating on the Anglo-US model, have sustained relatively high levels of growth on the basis of ever growing volumes of debt. In 1980, global debt was approximately equal to global GDP. Since then, however, global debt has ballooned to over 3.5 times global output. At the same time, finance capitalism, the channel through which this debt is traded for profit, took around a third of capitalist profits.

This trend, as we have pointed out many times, was unsustainable. It was only a matter of time before the whole edifice collapsed. That is what is happening now. The shadow banking system, the network of unregulated investment banks, hedge funds, and the banks’ own off-balance sheet vehicles, has imploded. The shadow network was developed to bypass the regulated commercial banks. But the major banks, which still form the core of the finance system, have not escaped the crisis of liquidity and capital availability. Derivatives, a whole array of exotic financial instruments that were supposed to spread if not abolish risk, have indeed turned out to be “financial instruments of mass destruction”, as the old-fashioned financier, Warren Buffett, warned.

There will be a profound reaction in the US and internationally to the capitalist crisis and the state bail-out of rotten finance capital. Apart from the economic contradictions, the crisis will undoubtedly produce a monumental scandal of corrupt practices, fraud and theft on an even bigger scale than the earlier Enron scandals. Workers will be forced to organise and fight against the effects of capitalist crisis. These events will create fertile ground for the growth of interest in genuine socialism and Marxism.

Countdown to meltdown
Events in September marked a new, critical stage of the crisis in the global finance system. The world was brought to the brink of a 1929-type collapse.

On 7 September, the US treasury was forced to step in and take over the direct running of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant government-sponsored mortgage providers. This followed the government intervention in July, when it guaranteed their $5 trillion mortgage debt in return for shares in these institutions – in effect, a partial nationalisation. Even that failed to stabilise these giants. Paulson’s ‘bazooka’ had not proved enough to reassure foreign investors, particularly Asian central banks, which have been selling off Fannie and Freddie bonds. A complete takeover by the government, effectively nationalising the institutions, was the only measure left.

Then (14-15 September) Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, two of the five giant Wall Street investment banks, faced bankruptcy. Other Wall Street banks refused to intervene without a government undertaking to guarantee Lehman and Merrill toxic assets. Paulson and Bernanke refused. They had come under tremendous political pressure to avoid handing out any more taxpayers’ dollars. Moreover, free marketers were demanding that they avoid creating further ‘moral hazard’, that is, sending out another signal that reckless speculators would be protected from their own folly by the assurance of a government bail-out. By refusing to back a government rescue of Lehman and Merrill, Paulson and Bernanke hoped to send a message that there would be no more Bear Stearns-type government-sponsored bail-outs for failing banks. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and Barclays International and other vultures began to cherry-pick the potentially profitable Lehman assets. Merrill Lynch, on the other hand, rushed to sell itself to the Bank of America, a deposit bank with much greater capital reserves.

Paulson and Bernanke, however, made a monumental miscalculation. They thought they could draw a line, but their refusal to back a rescue of Lehman or Merrill triggered a general slump in bank shares. This signalled that a whole swathe of banks were about to follow Lehman and Merrill into the dust. Among the most threatened were the two remaining investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. The whole ‘shadow banking system’, the unregulated, debt-financed, highly speculative network of investment banks and hedge funds, was imploding. Because of their multiple links with the major banks, which also operated off-balance sheet investment vehicles, the investment banks threatened to bring down many other institutions. If Paulson and Bernanke had backed a rescue of Lehman and Merrill, it would not have stopped the rot (as the subsequent bankruptcy of Washington Mutual shows), but by standing back as Lehman and Merrill sank, they accelerated the pace of the banking crisis.

In Britain, HBOS (Halifax-Bank of Scotland), a major bank and mortgage provider, faced bankruptcy. It was only saved by a rapid marriage of convenience, pushed by the Bank of England, with Lloyds TSB.

The failure of Lehman and Merrill had an immediate knock-on effect on the short-term money market. Money market funds, used by the banks to finance their short-term borrowing, have usually been regarded as almost as safe as cash. A key aspect of the credit crunch was the seizing up of this short-term money market, as banks hoarded cash and avoided making any potentially risky loans to other banks. Despite the Federal Reserve’s drastic interest rates cuts, the inter-bank lending rate, usually fractionally higher than the Fed’s rate, has soared to an unprecedented level. Reeling under the impact of the Lehman and Merrill bankruptcies, the severe credit crunch turned into a complete paralysis of this vital money market.

The Federal Reserve, cooperating with other major central banks, was forced to pump $180 billion into the global banking system (on this occasion, currency swaps, dollars for euros, pounds, etc). In the following few days, they pumped in another $100 billion into the system, and the central banks of Britain and Japan, and the European Central Bank also pumped in additional liquidity. Moreover, the Fed and other central banks agreed to accept a wider range of securities as collateral for the loans, including shares, company bonds, etc, in other words, much more risky assets than the government bonds they had previously insisted on. (Since then, more liquidity in the form of short-term loans have been pumped in by central banks.)

Paulson had allowed Lehman and Merrill to collapse, but faced with the possible collapse of a giant insurance company, American Insurance Group (AIG), the government was forced to step in. The AIG crisis was triggered by the downgrading of its security status by a rating agency. This threatened to trigger a run on AIG’s shares, thus further depleting its capital reserves. The problem was not with AIG’s massive insurance business in the US, Europe and Asia. The crisis arose from its involvement in the shadow banking system through its worldwide business in credit default swaps, a form of insurance used to guarantee the investment grade status of a wide range of securities (mortgage-backed securities, company bonds, municipal bonds, etc). AIG had issued $447 billion of such insurance (including $300bn to European institutions).

The downgrading of AIG’s credit status automatically meant a downgrading of securities insured by AIG-issued credit default swaps. This would, in turn, create problems for any finance house using AIG-insured securities as collateral for their own borrowing. In other words, a collapse of AIG would mean a huge increase in the quantity of toxic debt in the global finance system. The losses would be absolutely staggering (one estimate is that it would mean at least $180bn for the global financial sector). At the same time, AIG’s collapse would also mean the collapse of its worldwide insurance business. To avoid a catastrophic crash, Paulson was forced to step in by guaranteeing $85 billion of AIG assets in return for preference shares in the insurance company.

During the critical week, 15-19 September, world stock exchanges plunged. The government bail-out of AIG failed to stabilise share markets. At the same time, the price of oil, which had been tending to fall over recent weeks, began to rise – probably due to a panicky buying of oil futures. Paulson and Bernanke evidently realised that they were faced with a stark 1929 situation. If they stood aside, there would undoubtedly be a collapse of the global finance system which, in turn, would provoke a major slump in the world capitalist economy. Having learned the lessons of the 1929 crash, when the Federal Reserve and the US government stood aside and allowed the financial dominoes to collapse, Paulson and Bernanke decided that they had no choice but to step in to save the capitalist system.

On 19 September, Paulson announced his Troubled Asset Relief Programme (Tarp), a $700 billion ‘plan’ to place a floor under collapsing financial institutions and re-stabilise the US and world banking system. Paulson’s announcement averted a global crash, at least for the time being. But it is really a palliative measure that will not in itself overcome the credit crunch and the paralysis of the banking system.

As we go to press, there is news of the bankruptcy of Washington Mutual, the biggest bank failure in US history. WaMu was seized by the regulator (25 September) and sold to JP Morgan Chase.

European banks have also been hammered by their huge losses from toxic subprime mortgage securities. The hardest hit is the Swiss bank, UBS, which has made total write-downs of around $50 billion (more than Merrill Lynch). The Financial Times has commented that many European banks are now not only ‘too big to fail’, but “too big to save”. “For example, the total liabilities of Deutsche Bank (leverage ratio over 50!) amount to about €2000 billion (more than Fannie Mae) or more than 80% of the gross domestic product of Germany. This is simply too much for the Bundesbank or even the German state…” (European Banking Lives on Borrowed Time, Financial Times, 24 September)

Paulson’s package
After the crisis with Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, and the seizing up of the short-term money market (despite continuing, massive injections of liquidity by the Federal Reserve and other central banks) Paulson was forced to announce (18 September) a rescue package, the Tarp. Without giving any details, Paulson proposed to spend $700 billion of taxpayers’ money to establish a toxic waste dump for the unsellable securities still on the books of financial institutions.

A reported $500 billion of losses have already been written off, but some estimates put remaining securities from the housing market at a further $1,000 billion. Global stock exchanges immediately revived following Paulson’s announcement. Almost immediately, however, congressional leaders, both Democrat and Republican, began to protest at the sweeping character of Paulson’s rescue plan and the extraordinary powers that he was claiming as treasury secretary.

Paulson proposed that the treasury secretary should be given (initially for two years) unlimited powers to buy securities from anyone at any price according to his discretion. Moreover, he was claiming immunity from any kind of action by courts or administrative agencies of the government. Initially, he proposed buying the securities from US banks only, but soon widened this to include the US subsidiaries of foreign banks.

If this were accepted by Congress, Paulson would be the most powerful treasury secretary in US history. On its cover, Newsweek dubbed him ‘King Henry’. In effect, the treasury secretary would become the economic executive of US capitalism, with no oversight (merely reporting to Congress twice a year), a rival source of power to the presidency itself.

Like Bush after 9/11, Paulson, backed by Bernanke, is attempting to use the threat of global financial collapse to get rapid congressional approval of his proposals without a thorough discussion of their content. Paulson, for instance, is demanding the package should be ‘clean’, meaning that it should not be encumbered by any proposals such as the government acquisition of shares in exchange for buying toxic debt, or limits on the remuneration of bankers, or relief to homeowners facing foreclosure. Keen to bail out bankrupt bankers, Paulson brutally rejects the legitimate claims of home-buyers.

Paulson is proposing to pay something near the face value of toxic securities, over 60 cents in the dollar, as opposed to their current market value of 20 or 30 cents. Moreover, a variety of banks, finance houses and other companies are lobbying to widen the scope of the rescue. For instance, there are demands for municipal bonds, credit card debt and car-purchase debt to be included. Wall Street firms are already looking forward to the fees they hope to collect from being drawn in to administer the operations of Paulson’s programme.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the heads of finance companies are enthusiastic about Paulson’s proposals. However, some free-market Republicans have vehemently denounced the plan as the ‘socialisation of debt’. Senator Jim Bunning, a Republican from Kentucky, proclaimed: “The free market for all intents and purposes is dead in America”. He said that Paulson’s plan would “take Wall Street’s pain and spread it to the taxpayers… It’s financial socialism, and it’s un-American”.

Democrat leaders, on the other hand, are demanding measures to help distressed homeowners. Paulson has rejected this demand on the grounds that the bundles of toxic securities are too complex to allow the reduction of individual homeowners’ payments. “The banking and securities industries… are fighting the change with all their might, as they did when it came up with the housing bill that was adopted in July”. (International Herald Tribune, 24 September)

Paulson’s current proposal is completely different from the measure used to rescue the savings and loans banks (thrifts) in the early 1990s. At that time, the US government effectively nationalised the failing thrifts, and sold off their remaining assets over a period, before returning the thrifts to private ownership. The robust growth of the economy after 1994 restored the value of mortgaged property and allowed the government to recover part of the cost of the rescue.

A similar measure was taken by the Swedish government after the collapse of the housing bubble in 1991-92. The government nationalised a large section of the Swedish banking sector, cutting out the shareholders of these failed institutions and, subsequently again, any sellable assets were sold off and the banks were later returned to the private sector. The rescue, however, cost about 4% of Sweden’s gross domestic product (though some of this was recovered over time). The US capitalist class, however, would undoubtedly strongly resist full-scale nationalisation of the US banking sector.

The current Paulson rescue proposal, costing around $700 billion, is the equivalent of about 5% of GDP. However, Paulson has no intention of taking over the failed US banks, merely bailing them out by buying up their toxic debts, thus allowing them to replenish their capital and carry on as usual. Paulson is not even demanding shares in the banks in return for buying their bad debt.

Will Paulson get congressional approval for his package? Given the strength of congressional opposition, there is likely to be some delay, and Paulson may be forced to accept some modifications, particularly to the extraordinary, unchecked powers he is claiming. However, faced with the threat of further falls in financial markets and the possibility of new convulsions, it seems likely that Congress will accept the package in one form or another before dispersing for the November elections.

A socialist alternative
Paulson claims that people do not care who owns the banks. Millions of homeowners, however, will care that the government is using taxpayers’ money to bail out the banks which have sold and securitised toxic mortgages while millions are facing penal interest rates and the threat of foreclosure. In fact, millions of Americans are already incensed at Paulson’s plan.

Community organisations, unions, and all those who defend the interests of working people should demand that, instead of the nationalisation of finance capital’s toxic assets and bad debts, the banks and financial institutions (insurance companies, hedge funds, etc) should be nationalised and run in a democratically planned way under workers’ control and management. Compensation for small shareholders and depositors should be on the basis of need only.

The banking sector should be run to promote the interests of industries providing goods and services needed by the majority of the population, not funding the speculative activities of a hyper-rich minority of financiers. The banks should provide cheap mortgages for personal home buyers (with a ceiling to exclude luxury houses for the wealthy). They should also provide cheap credit to small businesses and small farmers serving the needs of local communities.

Such measures, of course, would for many raise the question of ownership and control of wider sectors of the economy, and the need for democratic planning to replace the anarchy of the market and the naked pursuit of personal profit. The US government, for instance, is currently considering a package of state-guaranteed loans to the big auto companies, Ford, Chrysler and GM. These corporations are in deep crisis and should also be taken over and run under democratic workers’ control and management to meet the needs of society.

Unions and community groups should totally oppose all foreclosures. Where dodgy mortgages have been sold through fraud or deception, they should be cancelled. Home buyers who cannot meet their mortgage repayments should have the right to rent the property at an affordable, social rent. Where, through foreclosures and the bankruptcy of builders and property companies, there are empty houses, state and municipal government should take over unoccupied homes and rent them out at affordable rents. Decisions regarding mortgage defaults, foreclosures, and home owners’ rights in general, should be taken not by government officials or bankruptcy courts, but by popular, elected committees which will safeguard the rights of working people.

A new period
If passed by Congress, Paulson’s package, probably with some modifications, may avert a financial crash. There will still be serious wrangles over the detailed measures to be implemented. However, the rescue plan will not in itself revive the finance sector. The US housing crisis, the root of the credit crunch, is far from over. Huge losses in the financial sector mean that the credit crunch will continue for years, even if the toxic waste is taken over by the government.

The rescue of the finance sector will not avert a recession in the US economy, which is already gathering pace. Moreover, the US slowdown, combined with financial crisis in many other economies, is pushing the world towards an economic downturn. There is now a sharp recession in the European economies. Japan, after a weak recovery in recent years, has once again lapsed into zero growth. China, still seen as a dynamo of the world economy, is expected to slow down from 11-12% growth to around 8% during 2008. Though 8% is relatively high, this would have serious effects within China, economically and politically.

The underlying crisis of capitalist production and profitability has been postponed several times since the 1980s through a series of financial bubbles that have fuelled debt-based consumer spending in the US and elsewhere (driving the production of cheap goods in China and other low-cost economies). But now is the time of reckoning. The collapse of the extreme debt mountain almost certainly means a prolonged period of weak growth in the world capitalist economy. Undoubtedly, there will still be an economic cycle, but it is not likely that there will be a return to the kind of global boom that was experienced between 2001-07.

The recent phase of accelerated globalisation and unfettered neo-liberal policies is drawing to a close and an entirely new period of developments is opening. Massive state intervention in the finance sector has wider implications for trade, international currency flows and industrial policy. There will be even deeper tensions between the major capitalist powers. Prolonged stagnation, punctuated by weak recoveries and renewed recession, will provoke social crisis and mighty political struggles. The economic crisis of capitalism is also an ideological and political crisis, and this unavoidably places Marxism back on the political agenda.