我们之间的分歧(中国国家性质）

Our differences
我们之间的分歧
SO, WHAT ARE our differences with Vincent’s approach? Essentially, our criticism is that Vincent (to use Trotsky’s phrase) is giving “a finished definition to an unfinished process”. We agree that there is a counter-revolutionary transition towards capitalism, but we do not accept that, as Vincent argues, the process is complete and that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. He refers, for instance, to Trotsky’s comment that a restoration of capitalism may occur either along “the path of an abrupt counter-revolutionary overturn” or “the path of successive shift ings”, culminating in “a Thermidorian shift”. (Thermidor refers to the defeat in 1794 of the Jacobins, the most advanced party in the French revolution, a term used by Trotsky to denote a victory of the counter-revolution.) Vincent says: “This ‘path of successive shiftings’ is an excellent description of what has happened in China. Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”. It “has happened”, capitalism “has been restored”. In other words, the “Thermidorian shift” has taken place. In our view, however, there will be further “shiftings” and the process is not yet complete.
那么我们与文森特的方法之间的分歧是什么呢？从本质上讲，我们的批评是，文森特（使用托洛茨基的用词）是给“一个未完成的进程一个完成的定义” 。我们同意，有一个复辟到资本主义的反革命过渡，但我们不接受文森特认为的这一过程已经完成，既中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。比如，他提到托洛茨基的评论，即资本主义的复辟可能发生或者沿“突然反革命颠覆的道路”或“连续的蜕变的道路 ” ，最终以“ 热月政变”结束 。 （ 热月指的是在1794年法国革命中最先进的政党雅各宾派的失败，托洛茨基用这个词指反革命的胜利。 ）文森特说： “这'连续蜕变的道路'出色的描述了在中国发生了什么事。中国特色的资本主义类型已复辟“ 。 ”换言之， “ 热月政变”已经发生。然而，在我们看来，将进一步“ 蜕变”的过程尚未完成。
Vincent, in our view, puts forward a simplistic analysis of the complex process of transition, basing his categorical conclusion on a one-sided approach. For instance, on the role of the state, he rightly refers to the power of the “repressive one-party state of the CCP”. He also says, “This edifice of super-exploitation is built around the repressive one-party state of the CCP…” But he underestimates the role played by the powerful, ex-Stalinist state (the CCP and the state apparatus) in directing the transition. The regime has promoted the development of capitalist forces and the intervention of foreign, trans-national corporations, but it has also been determined to safeguard its monopoly of political power and overall control of the economy.
在我们看来，文森特对复杂的转型过程进行了简单化的分析，他的绝对的结论是片面的做法。举例来说，在国家的作用上，他正确地提到了“具有镇压性的共产党一党制国家”的力量 。他还表示， “这超级剥削的大厦是建立在具有镇压性饿共产党的一党制国家上的 ”但他低估了强大的前斯大林主义（中共及其国家机器）在指导过渡中所发挥的作用。该政权促进了资本主义力量的发展和外国跨国公司干预，但它也被确定为维护其政治权力的垄断和对经济的前面控制。
“[T]he state’s economic power”, writes Vincent, “has been seriously degraded”. True, the state no longer has the economic power that it had on the basis of the planned economy. Moreover, the development of capitalist forces has produced powerful centrifugal forces, which will tend to become stronger if the present course continues. But it is a mistake to imply (as Vincent does) that the Chinese state is now completely subservient to capitalist forces, within China and internationally.

文森特写道，“ 国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”诚然，国家不再拥有它在计划经济体制的基础上的经济力量。此外，资本主义势力的发展产生了强大的离心力，如果目前的路线继续下去，该离心力将趋于变得更加强大。但是，认为中国国家现在在中国和国际上已完全屈从于资本主义势力是错误的（如文森特所做的）。
The present Chinese state is not simply the equivalent of the state in Japan, Korea or Taiwan during their accelerated growth in the 1960s and 1970s, when (on the basis of the ‘Asian development model’) the state intervened in the economy to a much greater extent than in the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America. The surviving state-owned and state-controlled industries in China today are the product of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. They are not merely the equivalent of Japan’s keiretsu or South Korea’s chaebol, industrial-financial conglomerates that developed from big family-capitalist trusts.
当前的中国国家不是简单地等同于日本，韩国或台湾在其60年代和70年代的加速增长，根据“亚洲发展模式” ，那时国家比先进的资本主义经济的西欧和北美更大程度上干预经济。在今天的中国幸存的国有及国家控制的工业是斯大林主义计划经济产物。他们不仅仅是相当于作为从大家族资本主义的信托基金发展而来的工业金融集团的日本的keiretsu或韩国的财阀。

There is still a legacy of Maoism-Stalinism in China. Though fostering capitalist development, the state still controls powerful levers of economic influence. As we show in a separate section (China’s hybrid economy, pp27-30), the regime, through a cluster of huge state-owned enterprises (SOEs), effectively controls several key industrial sectors: telecoms, transport, energy, and defence production, etc. Though state-sector employment has been drastically reduced, the state sector still accounts for 38% (2004) of industrial output. It is true, as Vincent says, that most of the remaining SOEs have been ‘corporatized’: they no longer operate under a plan of production but, according to government policy, on the basis of market criteria. But it is an exaggeration to say: “The state industrial and commercial sector consist of completely autonomous and in most cases semi-privatised units”. In reality, many SOEs are run by ex-CCP bureaucrats or bosses currently nominated by the CCP, who (often on the basis of ‘soft loans’ – where there is no expectation of repayment – from state banks) aim at maximising investment and growth, rather than maximising enterprise profits.
在中国还有毛泽东斯大林主义遗产。虽然促进了资本主义发展，国家仍控制着强大的具有经济影响力的杠杆。正如我们在一个单独的章节（中国的混合经济，序言段27 - 30 ）显示的，该政权，通过一组庞大的国有企业（SOEs） ，有效地控制一些关键工业部门：电信，交通，能源和国防生产，虽然国家部门的就业已急剧减少，国家部门仍然占38 ％ （ 2004年）的工业产值。这是事实，正如文森特说的，这其余大部分国有企业已经'公司化' ：他们不再在生产计划下运作的，而是根据政府的政策和根据市场的标准运转。但说： “国家的工业和商业部门是完全自主的并在大多数情况下是半私有化的单位是有些夸大其词的。在现实中，许多国有企业是由前中共官僚或中共当前所提名的老板经营的，（通常在从国有商业银行获得'软贷款'的基础上，没有还款的预期）其目的是最大限度地投资和增长，而不是企业利润最大化。

As Vincent says, “The banking sector is majority state-owned…” and the big four state banks are responsible for over 70% of all loans. Loans are provided, moreover, not according to strictly market criteria but, in many cases, in order to further the regime’s policy objectives. Indeed, soft loans are regarded (both in China and by foreign, free-market critics) as a supplementary form of public spending.
正如文森特说的， “银行业是大多数国有的... ”而且四大国有商业银行负责70 ％以上的全部贷款。此外，它们没有严格按照市场标准提供贷款，在许多情况下，是为了推进该政权的政策目标。事实上，软贷款被看作（在中国和外国都遭到自由市场的批评）一种公共开支的补充形式。
The state, moreover, through central and provincial governments, is responsible for most infrastructure spending – and this investment is a major factor in driving China’s high growth rate. At the same time, sales of formerly state-owned land (combined with soft loans from state-controlled banks) have been a big element in China’s massive, speculative property boom.

此外，从中央到省级政府，国家主要负责基础设施开支-这种投资是推动中国的高增长率的一个主要因素。与此同时，销售原来的国有土地（结合从国家控制的银行获得软贷款）已成为中国巨大的投机性房地产热中的一大要素。
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The enforcement of macroeconomic policy also gives the central government considerable power to determine the direction and priorities of economic growth. There are undoubtedly provincial governments and both SOE and private bosses who defy central government policies. Nevertheless, both the CCP and the state apparatus are used to enforce policy.
宏观经济政策的执行给予中央政府相当大的权力以确定经济增长的方向和优先事项。毫无疑问这里有无视中央政府的政策的省政府以及国有企业和私人老板。然而，无论是中共还是其国家机器都被用来执行政策。