中国的国家性质
当今社会主义关于中国性质的争论通过林恩•沃尔什（LYNN WALSH）对文森特•卡洛（Vincent Kolo）的文章《中国的资本主义反革命（114号当今社会主义）》的答辩继续着。在那篇文章中，文森特认为，从所有意图和目的看，中国现在是一个完全成熟的资本主义经济。这是不是确定无疑的呢？
对各处的社会主义者而言，中国的演变是至关重要的。中国经济现在是全球经济的一个重要组成部分。随着它的经济和战略性力量的增长，中国现在在世界主要大国关系之间扮演着一个关键的角色。中国的政治演变-政权的命运和中国工人阶级和贫困农民的大规模斗争-在国际上具有重大意义。与此同时，对于从毛泽东斯大林主义的计划经济到具有当前特色的中国的复杂转变产生争论也并不奇怪了。
在他的文章（ www.socialismtoday.org/114/china ）中 ，文森特说，在本质上，中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。 “中国现在的高层已完全融入全球的资本主义制度中” 。在我们看来-工人国际委员会（CWI）的领导们的观点-文森特的描述是过于绝对的。中国国家的走向是很清晰的，由基于国有所有制上的前毛派斯大林主义计划经济体制转向资本主义经济。但是，无论火车头有多么有力，火车还没有到达目的地。宣布“中国特色的资本主义已经复辟” 是有些太早了 。
在中国虽然有强大的和迅速发展的资本主义势力，中国这个国家仍然是一个混合物，混合着具有“国家资本主义”企业（在或多或少的市场的基础上运行的国有企业）性质的剩余的国有工业和私人资本主义（从数以百万计的私营企业到大型的中国和外国公司）性质的新成分。在我们看来，转型还没有完成，也不会直线地发展演变。可能会出现曲折的局势。在世界经济危机的今后一段时期里，不能排除国家将再次接管私人拥有的公司和一些濒临崩溃的曾经私有化的公司。
我们认为这场辩论是重要的，我们欢迎文森特提出自己的看法。但是，可能会向文森特和我们问到如下的问题：双方是否会同意在中国不可能重新出现国家计划经济和中国正在走向资本主义有一个真正的区别吗？我们认为在本次辩论中涉及一些重要的问题。
首先是方法的问题。马克思主义者应该努力以科学方式全面地分析社会现象（在这里是，中国国家的改变）而不是试图把新的发展状况纳入陈旧观念中。
第二个问题，与方法有关，是在一个强有力的波拿巴国家（特别是前毛派斯大林主义国家）的特定条件下在自上而下地领导社会变革中国家发挥作用的独立的角色问题。
第三，是一些展望的问题。在我们看来，立足于单一的角度认为中国将确立纯粹的资本主义路线而不会被其政权的转向而干扰将是错误的。在我们看来，中国工人的先进阶层，在政治上必须为几种不同的发展可能性做好准备。他们特别需要为如下可能性做好准备，面临着一个深刻的经济危机和对该政权生存产生威胁的大规模斗争的升级，该政权将转向更大的对经济的干预，包括接管经营失败的公司来化解潜在的革命形势。
方法
在我们看来，中国政权在加速推进资本主义发展和增加国家干预以稳定经济之间的摇摆表明它可能具有内在固有的矛盾，既中国国家的混合的性质。这就是为什么我们的分析方法是很重要的。 1936年，托洛茨基在《被背叛的革命》（第9章：苏联的社会关系）中分析了苏联的性质。这种情况显然不同于今日的中国。但是，从马克思主义的方法的角度来看，，托洛茨基对那个期间苏联的分析，把苏联看作一个过渡或中间的社会形态，相应地，这个方法也是我们对当代中国的分析方法。
托洛茨基写道，不得不放弃完美的社会范畴，如资本主义和社会主义，这样有利于“更完整的解说” ，但这必然更加“复杂和笨重” 。托洛茨基在对苏联的分析中总结出了9点，总结了苏联国家和社会的主要特点并提到了作为苏联命运的几种可能性。
“ 教条主义者无疑对这一假设的定义不会感到满意。他们喜欢绝对的公式：是就是是，非就是非。如果社会现象总是具有最终的性质，那么社会学的问题肯定会更简单。没有什么比脱离现实更危险的了，为了合乎逻辑的完整性，今天和您的计划不一致的东西可能明天完全相反。在我们的分析中，我们首先要避免对没有先例和没有相似物的动态的社会形态做出武断分析的作法。科学的任务，以及政治不能对一个未完成的过程给出完成的定义，而是循着其所有的阶段，把它的进步之处和它的反动倾向分离开，揭示其相互关系并预见到各种可能的演变以及在深谋远虑中找到行动根据。 “
1930年代写的一本笔记本中，托洛茨基作出了进一步的一般性评论，该评论与对今天中国性质的任何讨论是非常有关的： “按照逻辑分类，有些对象[现象]边界清晰易于界定，其他却给我们带来困难：他们可以这样也可以那样，但处在一个严格的关系中-到处都无。虽然激起系统主义者的愤慨，这种过渡形式对辨证家来说是非常有趣的，他们打破分类的边界限制，揭示了活生生的过程的真实的联系和连续性 “ 。（1933年至1935年托洛茨基的笔记：关于列宁的著作，辩证法和进化论，Philip Pomper编辑 ，美国纽约哥伦比亚大学出版社， 1986年）
我们相信中国的变化也是没有先例的过程，我们必须追踪所有阶段。我们的分析可能会显得比简单地断言中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家更为'复杂和笨重'。然而，我们认为，考虑到过渡的矛盾的特点和“预见到演变的多种可能性并在深谋远虑中找到行动的根据是必要的。”
波拿巴国家的作用
与方法的问题联系在一起的是国家作用的问题，特别是由强大的国家机器和军队以及一个强大的执政党组成的波拿巴国家-在特定条件下，在一定的时间内-可发挥的自发的作用。在我们看来，就中国而言，文森特没有充分考虑到中国前斯大林主义者波拿巴国家在指导国家过渡上所发挥的作用。
文森特写道“任何社会有机体，政权，或政党的阶级性质是由它所服务的阶级利益决定的” 。一般来说，这是正确的。但它在分析中国的情况上是不够的。中国政权已放弃捍卫具有历史进步性的生产关系的国有财产和计划经济而促进发展资本主义的关系。但中国的情况是以过去1949年之后毛泽东斯大林主义制度的发展为条件的。虽然当时的国家捍卫计划经济，但国家是相对独立的，不受制于由工人阶级民主监督。现在，该政权已转向有利于资本主义的，反革命的路线。这无疑有利于新兴的中国资产阶级和国际资本。但是，如果在这一阶段说该政权完全是镇压的代理人或中国资产阶级的仆人就过于简单化了。中国这个国家是毛泽东斯大林主义的产物，在促进和指导资本主义发展的同时努力维护自己的权力上有很大程度的自发性。
卡尔•马克思和恩格斯的著作对这种演变有类似的分析，他们在那里表明，在特定情况下，平衡社会各阶层的国家权力（波拿巴国家）可以发挥作用以帮助资本主义工业的发展和促进资产阶级的发展。德国在19世纪70年代，例如，奥托•冯•俾斯麦-基于普鲁士君主国家、军队精英和容克地主-促进了资本主义力量的发展并使该发展成为德国帝国主义增加其军事和经济力量的必要基础。
另一个例子是19世纪下半叶的沙俄国家。基于陈旧的封建地主所有制 ，一些沙皇领导人认识到，为了作为军事大国而存在，他们必须发展工业（特别是铁路和军备） 。恩格斯写道，克里米亚战争（ 1853至1856年）后 ，俄罗斯政府着手“培育俄罗斯资产阶级” 。 （沙俄的对外政策， 1890年，马克思恩格斯全集第27卷）沙皇国家在俄罗斯社会保留着强大的力量直到第一次世界大战的危机而在1917年十月革命下被推翻。和俾斯麦一样，培育资本家阶级的沙皇国家也孕育了规模不大但强有力的工人阶级。
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的权力'培育了'中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家（党，军队和国家机器）适应向资本主义的过渡。但是，国家保留了相当大的权力，而在这一阶段新的资本主义势力作为一个新兴的社会阶层处在形成过程中。
新兴的资本主义的要素是非常多样的，从小型家族企业到大公司的业主。在这个阶段，他们缺乏社会凝聚力，迄今为止，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。许多资本家是前官员或国有部门的老板，并与中国共产党（CCP）和国家机器保持着密切联系。他们大多相当地满意于用国家的力量来为资本主义企业的生长创造条件并提供'社会稳定'的环境 ，也就是保护他们免受工人和农民的大规模的抗议活动的影响。在这个阶段，没有来自这个新兴资产阶级的对该政权的绝对的政治权力的威胁。
展望
文森特写道：“今天的国有部门是一个发展资本主义经济的杠杆” ，它为基础工业和基础设施提供了一个框架。这显然是正确的。该政权在当代国际条件下正在执行作为资本主义增长历史性基础性需要的'原始积累'的野蛮任务。这里有一个强迫城市化的残酷的过程，贫穷的农民正在被赶出土地，被迫在血汗工厂和大城市的建筑工地的恶劣的工作条件下寻求低工资的工作。从长远来看，如果这种发展以一个不间断的方式继续下去，这将产生一个'完全'的资本主义社会。但是，这有待观察。
如果世界资本主义经济有一个漫长的快速增长的时期（例如，2002-07年连续的以创记录的5 ％的年增长率增长），伴随着中国经济以每年10 ％增长率增长，那么中国理论上可能稳步迈向'完全的'资本主义经济。在某个时刻，在此基础上，巩固了的中国资产阶级将与前斯大林主义波拿巴国家发生冲突并试图直接控制中国的资本主义社会（虽然资产阶级将越来越受到强大了的工人阶级的挑战） 。鉴于目前全球资本主义金融体系的爆裂，并开始出现世界经济的衰退，这似乎不是最有可能的前景。
另一方面，如果世界经济危机长期化，这将不可避免地造成中国经济的严重衰退，该政权可能会被迫干预经济，防止经济和社会崩溃，并制止来自中国的工人和农民的一种革命性的挑战。中国领导人已经注意到美国政府突然由自由市场原教旨主义回转到对经营不善的金融机构进行国家干预和国有化。面对经营失败的产业崩溃的前景，中国国家很可能将进行干预并接管它们。鉴于中国国家的历史和国家所有制的现有程度，这可能以比主要资本主义国家更大的规模进行。
中国政权（和俾斯麦、沙皇独裁政府以及过去的其他波拿巴政权一样）面临的问题是在中国“培育”一个新的资产阶级的同时也培育了一个新的工人阶级。在中国已经出现了高水平的社会抗议和罢工，这些往往被该政权残酷镇压。在未来几年里，中国工人将越来越多地形成独立工会和自己的政党。工人的先进阶层将在斗争过程中准备推翻该政权和扫除中国和外国的资本家。
我们无法预测这类事件的时间表。但是，我们不应想当然地认为中国将自动成为一个'完全'的资本主义社会。在今后几年内，发生的事件和马克思主义思想的影响力将产生旨在推翻该政权和扫除资本主义以便重新确立国有财产关系和计划生产的革命性的行动-这次是在工人阶级的民主控制下并与世界社会主义经济的国际前景连接起来的。
我们的一致之处.
在更详细地就他的观点争论之前以及为了避免任何误解，我们将努力勾画出哪里是我们认同文森特的地方和哪里是我们不同意文森特的地方。毛派斯大林主义计划经济（由国有工业主导的，但却由处于统治地位的官僚进行非民主管理的）在20世纪70年代开始崩溃并且已不复存在。无论是否存在国家干预，也不会再恢复到斯大林主义计划经济体制了，这个计划经济体制是建立在过去时代的国际阶级关系的基础上的。最近几年里，建立在计划经济基础上的群众取得的社会成果的丧失-国有企业和乡村公社所提供的'铁饭碗' （就业保障）和教育，卫生和福利的丧失-是一个反革命性的演变，对工人和农民产生了破坏性的影响。中国国家领导层-中共及其国家机器-从邓小平到胡锦涛都在促进资本主义势力的发展并设法将中国融入世界经济。该领导层承认官僚计划经济的失败并寻求发展它的统治的一种新的社会经济基础。
资本主义市场的增长一直伴随着对大多数工人和农民（在私营和国有企业）强化的超剥削和不平等的异常地扩大。市场关系的增长导致出现了很小的作为亿万富翁的资本家阶层和更大的富裕的资本家阶层。中国政权是世界上最为具有镇压性的政权之一而且使用其庞大的国家机器来禁止一切形式的反对派组织，活动和讨论。对计划经济的社会成果的反革命破坏事实上已完成而且中国正在朝着完全的'资本主义经济方向而去。
我们反对该政权（或其辩护士）的任何主张认为即使在捍卫国家计划经济的有限的意义上，他们正在发展的市场-资本主义的关系-是为了'加强社会主义'。毫无疑问该政权担心越来越强烈的针对腐败、底工资、不平等的增长和环境的破坏的抗议。但是，这些社会现象是由于他们正在推行的政策导致的。我们通过他们的行为而不是骗人的'社会主义'的语言来判断中国领导人，他们使用这样的语言是企图合法化其反革命的措施。我们赞成中国工人和农民对毁弃1949年革命取得的成果而促进最掠夺性的资本主义因素的反革命表现出来的愤怒。
在与中国有关的方面马克思主义者应采用的纲要上。我们和文森特也有着广泛的一致的地方。我们呼吁国有企业（SOEs）在工人的控制和管理下经营，以及将国有企业纳入在工人政府的指导下的计划生产并由选举出来的民主的计划经济机构来管理。大型民营企业应当国有化-或重新国有化-并作为计划经济的一部分由工人民主地运行。作为国际主义者，我们还提出怀着在国际水平上发展经济计划的目的，中国工人和其他国家工人之间的国际合作的问题。
我们认为， （如文森特所说） ， “政治上的——'反官僚' ——革命不足以再使工人阶级获取权力”。但我们不接受他如下的说法， “说一场新的革命将结合政治和社会革命的任务是不正确地... ”无可争辩在中国，工业和银行业的重要部分仍处于国家所有和控制下，而且一个革命性的颠覆将需要对其进行工人的控制和管理。无产阶级革命，当然包括推翻目前的国家和中国和外国的资本家的剥削。但由于残余的毛泽东斯大林主义，在某些方面，将来的中国革命面临的任务要比先进的资本主义国家复杂得多，我们的革命纲要必须反映这一现实。
我们之间的分歧
那么我们与文森特的方法之间的分歧是什么呢？从本质上讲，我们的批评是，文森特（使用托洛茨基的用词）是给“一个未完成的进程一个完成的定义” 。我们同意，有一个复辟到资本主义的反革命过渡，但我们不接受文森特认为的这一过程已经完成的观点，既中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。比如，他提到托洛茨基的评论，即资本主义的复辟可能沿“突然反革命颠覆的道路”或“连续的蜕变的道路 ” 发生 ，最终以“ 热月政变”结束 。 （ 热月指的是在1794年法国革命中最先进的政党雅各宾派的失败，托洛茨基用这个词指反革命的胜利。 ）文森特说： “这'连续蜕变的道路'出色的描述了在中国发生了的事情。中国特色的资本主义类型已复辟“ 。 ”换言之， “ 热月政变”已经发生。然而，在我们看来，将进一步“ 蜕变”的过程尚未完成。
在我们看来，文森特对复杂的转型过程进行了简单化的分析，他的绝对的结论是片面的做法。举例来说，在国家的作用上，他正确地提到了“具有镇压性的共产党一党制国家”的力量 。他还表示， “这超级剥削的大厦是建立在具有镇压性的共产党的一党制国家上的 ”但他低估了强大的前斯大林主义（中共及其国家机器）在指导过渡中所发挥的作用。该政权促进了资本主义力量的发展和外国跨国公司进入，但确定无疑它也维护其政治权力的垄断和对经济的全面控制。
文森特写道，“ 国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”诚然，国家不再拥有它在计划经济体制的基础上的经济力量。此外，资本主义势力的发展产生了强大的离心力，如果目前的路线继续下去，该离心力将趋于变得更加强大。但是，认为中国国家现在在中国和国际上已完全屈从于资本主义势力是错误的（如文森特所做的）。
当前的中国国家不是简单地等同于日本，韩国或台湾在其60年代和70年代的加速增长，根据“亚洲发展模式” ，那时国家比先进的资本主义经济的西欧和北美更大程度上干预经济。在今天的中国幸存的国有及国家控制的工业是斯大林主义计划经济产物。他们不仅仅是相当于作为从大家族资本主义的信托基金发展而来的工业金融集团的日本的keiretsu（译者注：keiretsu是一个日语词汇，形容松散的工商企业为了相互的利益围绕着一个单独的银行结聚成集团）或韩国的财阀。
在中国还有毛泽东斯大林主义遗产。虽然促进了资本主义发展，国家仍控制着强大的具有经济影响力的杠杆。正如我们在一个单独的章节（中国的混合经济，序言段27 - 30 ）显示的，通过一组庞大的国有企业（SOEs） ，该政权有效地控制一些关键工业部门：电信，交通，能源和国防生产，虽然国家部门的就业已急剧减少，国家部门仍然占38 ％ （ 2004年）的工业产值。这是事实，正如文森特说的，大部分国有企业已经'公司化' ：他们不再在生产计划下运作，而是根据政府的政策和根据市场的标准运转。但说 “国家的工业和商业部门是完全自主的并在大多数情况下是半私有化的单位是有些夸大其词的。在现实中，许多国有企业是由前中共官僚或中共当前所提名的老板经营的，（通常在从国有商业银行获得'软贷款'的基础上，没有还款的预期）其目的是最大限度地投资和增长，而不是企业利润最大化。
正如文森特说的， “银行业大多数是国有的... ”而且四大国有商业银行负责70 ％以上的全部贷款。此外，它们没有严格按照市场标准提供贷款，在许多情况下，是为了推进该政权的政策目标。事实上，软贷款被看作（在中国和外国都遭到自由市场的批评）一种公共开支的补充形式。
此外，从中央到省级政府，国家主要负责基础设施开支-这种投资是推动中国的高增长率的一个主要因素。与此同时，销售原来的国有土地（结合从国家控制的银行获得软贷款）已成为中国巨大的投机性房地产热中的一大要素。
宏观经济政策的执行给予中央政府相当大的权力以确定经济增长的方向和优先事项。毫无疑问这里有无视中央政府的政策的省政府以及国有企业和私人老板。然而，无论是中共还是其国家机器都被用来执行政策。
中国与全球资本主义
文森特说，中国与全球资本主义经济的联系确证了中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。然而，通过与其他资本主义经济体的贸易和投资参与世界资本主义市场本身并不能确定一个国家的阶级性质。在新生苏维埃的情况下，列宁和托洛茨基主张利用资本主义的势力之间的对抗以发展必要的贸易联系来发展苏维埃经济。其限制条件是必须有一个国家垄断的外贸以确保贸易为苏维埃的计划经济的需要服务。显然，在中国已不再有外贸的垄断。尽管一些中国领导人要求打开大门，但是中国也没有完全'打开大门' 。正如中国有一个“混合的”国内经济，中国与全球资本主义的关系也有一个混合的性质。
文森特写道，“中国国家的高层，包括在北京的中央政府，现在已经充分融入全球的资本主义制度-通过胡锦涛形容之为中国经济发展的'基石'的开放政策 “ 。在我们看来，这是夸大其词。中国鼓励外国跨国公司的大量投资，但基本上控制了它们经营的条件。此外，该政权还严格规范中国经济和全球经济之间的关系。
最近，在应对全球金融危机上，该政权已再次向美国和欧盟表明它不急于放松政府控制资本在中国的进出。它继续保持人民币的低汇率（其加强了中国出口的竞争优势）和通过大规模干预外汇市场来维持其目前的汇率-不顾国际货币基金组织的规则和违背允许人民币大幅度升值的对美国的承诺。在较早的阶段，中国领导人利用世贸组织的问题来帮助推动国内的市场化，最近，他们越来越多地转向双边的贸易协议。中国政府对最近多哈回合的世贸组织谈判的破裂没有伤心落泪， 印度和巴西在该谈判中拒绝接受美国或欧盟的一揽子提议。
我们认为，在世界经济中发生旷日持久的危机的情况下，不能排除中国将采取更加强大的保护主义措施，一方面涉及到贸易和投资，试图缓和经济危机对中国经济的影响。
国家的角色
文森特并没有真正的分析过自1978年邓小平发起他的支持市场的改革以来的过渡的进程。特别是，对国家的角色的评论是不适当的。反过来，这意味着文森特对正在展开的反革命进程给出了一个过分简单化的图景。
国家的角色在确定过渡性政权的性质上是一个关键因素。文森特仅仅把中国政权看作为已从计划经济转向资本主义的一个'镇压机器。随着放弃中央计划经济，工人阶级不再是“经济的统治阶级” 。中国国家在资本主义下“已经抛弃很多” 。毛主义官僚阶层已经通过“改革”进程转变为“有产阶级” 。 “虽然以特殊的'儒家'的形式，今天资产阶级反革命的胜利是极其清晰的”
所有这一切中都包含有事实，但是文森特的分析没有充分考虑到毛派斯大林主义政权创建的强大的波拿巴国家的决定性的作用。官僚国家远远不只是镇压机器，它促进了资本主义势力的发展，其目的是为其继续统治创建一个新的社会基础。它使用共产党和国家机器的所有资源从上面来指导变化的进程并连同其垄断的政治权力保留对经济运行发挥关键的作用。与中央计划经济的情况相比，它的经济力量无疑是减小的。但是，中国国家比在资本主义国家如日本和韩国在经济中保留了一个更为重要的角色。
这不是一个中国国家的问题，中共和国家机器本身是“1949年的革命创造的社会进步的核心力量” 。国家已明确放弃了比较进步的计划经济。然而，为了了解在中国发生的过程，我们必须考虑前毛泽东斯大林主义国家在过渡中所发挥的作用。既没有被工人阶级控制也没有被新兴的资产阶级所控制的国家自发的权力，连同国有工业和国有银行这些重要组成部分，确定了在今日中国存在着社会过渡的混合或杂交的性质。
暂时撇开已经达到什么阶段的问题，中国的反革命进程不仅是由一个统治阶级（工人阶级）转移到另一个统治阶级（资产阶级） 。第二次世界大战之后，中国农民和工人的宏伟的革命群众运动扫除了封建主义 、资本主义和它们的帝国主义支持者。但是，1949年的转变是直接由农民红军和官僚化的（ 斯大林化 ）共产党的毛主义领导者从上面领导达成的。在运行在斯大林路线上的计划经济下，（如文森特指出的）工人和农民获得了现在已经基本上被取消的重要的社会福利。
可是，工人阶级和农民，被排除在任何民主参与国家或经济的运行外。不允许他们拥有任何独立的，民主的工会或政治组织。与资本主义相比，中央计划经济是具有历史进步性的，因此也是符合工人阶级利益的。在这个意义上说，工人阶级可以说是'经济的统治阶级。但是，在政治上，工人阶级从来没有成为统治阶级。这需要工人阶级推翻官僚作风，并建立工人民主——政治革命。官僚阶级通过由中共和国家机器本身组成的巨大的工具统治着中国（如斯大林治下的前苏联）。没有工人民主的监督，国家成为一个可怕的庞然大物在社会的各个领域掌控着巨大的力量。
近30年里，毛主义官僚精英捍卫着作为其权力和特权基础的计划经济。然而，在1970年代，在官僚管理不善的重压下，计划经济（如苏联和东欧）开始困难重重。邓小平提出“改革”， 引进市场经济要素（不可避免地刺激产生资本主义的关系）的最初目的是为了刺激增长和支撑计划经济。然而，在随着柏林墙的倒塌苏联和其他斯大林主义国家迅速瓦解后，邓小平和其他领导人得出结论计划经济体制已不再可行，他们只有通过向市场经济过渡来维护他们的权力。在现实中，这不可避免地意味着走向资本主义经济。当然，该政权试图通过提出叫“市场社会主义”的新的理论来掩盖这一点。
对中共领导人来说极为重要的是需要保持他们的政权。该政权被最终导致血腥的天安门事件的大规模的抗议活动深深震撼了。这一事件以及苏联和东欧的事件发生后，中国领导人得出结论认为，他们无法容忍任何政治自由化：走向市场过程中就不会相应地进行民主改革。
与此同时，中国政权得出结论，它应该不惜一切代价避免苏联经济转型中发生的'休克疗法'。国有企业彻底的私有化不仅挑起了一场经济灾难，而且（正是由美国倡导的'休克疗法' 希望看到的）打破了斯大林主义国家机器和共产党官僚政治。这样的话就不会出现中国的叶利钦。
与苏联相反，中国的政权实施小步走向资本主义市场。它在农村推进了市场力量并在经济开发区向外国跨国公司敞开了大门。在城市地区，在国有企业外允许民营企业的发展。该政权担心社会和政治动乱的爆发，一直在谨慎和逐步实现国有企业的私有化或'公司化'。毫无疑问，这敞开了对工人超级的无情剥削的大门。与此同时，它在放开价格和削减或取消燃料和食品的补贴上一直持谨慎态度。
到目前为止，作为这种渐进的方式的结果-由于缺乏针对该政权的一个有组织的群众反对派-中国领导层保持了政权并且国家官僚机构基本上完好无损。显然，它不再是中央计划经济全权领导。但它继续控制着指导经济改革方向的强大的杠杆。文森特说： “国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”但它保留了远远高于那些资本主义已巩固为社会经济制度的主导的经济体的更多的权力。此外，该政权一直试图使前毛泽东斯大林主义国家机器和中共（超过7000万成员）适应引导经济走上市场为主导的任务。
在他最近的书，《中国共产党：萎缩和适应（ 2008年）》 ，David Shambaugh写道： “ ... 随着时间的推移中共已萎缩而且它的列宁主义[毛泽东斯大林主义] 控制工具并不象过去一样具有锋芒，但其统治的工具远远没有钝化-他们正在重新加强。党仍然是一个具有相当权威和权力的全国性的组织。它是城里的唯一的政治游戏。通过其对人事管理的垄断（通过nomenklatura[党管干部]和bianzhi [选择性任命]的制度） ，党不仅有效地控制了各级政府而且控制了各种各样的专业机构、公司企业、大学和研究机构，以及服务组织。它还控制着军队和所有强制性机构（人民武装警察部队，民兵，国家安全部和公安部） 。另外，它还控制大部分的媒体和社会中的信息流转渠道。党当然不打算放弃这些控制工具-恰恰相反，它一直在加强它们。它也不容反对派，并迅速抑制任何组织政治活动的迹象。”
一个新兴资产阶级
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的政权'培育'一个中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家适应向资本主义的过渡。虽然国家保留了相当大的权力，在这一阶段，新的资本主义势力是一个处在形成过程中的新兴的社会阶层。中国资产阶级是由从小型家族企业的业主到大公司的多种类型构成的。它缺乏社会凝聚力，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。
在1978年邓小平推出市场措施之前，民营企业是非法的，那时几乎没有任何资本家，除了黑市商人 。接着邓小平推出支持市场的措施，江泽民，胡锦涛更广泛地向资本主义势力的增长敞开大门，这不可避免地鼓励新的资本家阶层的出现。
第一批资本家来自在邓小平于农村地区推出支持市场的改革的基础上使自己富裕起来的农民阶层。随着市场机会的扩大，许多个体户和专业人士开始了商业活动。有相当部分的资本家是前中共官员和前国有企业的老板，他们利用他们的权力和影响力（从国家掠夺资源）来创业。许多人和党和国家的官僚保持密切的联系。
此外，新兴资产阶级的组成仍然相当不稳定。有迹象表明，第一阶段的许多小型企业正在被越来越多地统治经济的更大的企业挤出去。
许多大企业都与国有企业，海外中国大企业和跨国公司有联系。其中最突出的大商界精英是'太子党' （高官的儿女）。一些最富有，最贪婪的资本家是在国有土地升值和狂热的房地产投机的基础上积累无法想象的财富的房地产开发商。去年，胡润富豪榜记录了百名中国亿万富翁（相比而言，日本是24名） 。另据报道， 90 ％的富豪是中共高级国家官员的儿女。
许多调查报告了来自资本家尤其是小企业主的对该政权的抱怨：他们的财产权利没有得到保障;他们发现他们也很难向银行贷款（贷款往往有利于国有企业和大企业） ;他们遭到过度征税;以及他们的利润受到腐败的损害等等，少数人想摆脱当前政权的限制并希望引入一个大企业的政府。然而，绝大多数人对该政权在中国引入可以发展资本主义的社会的框架而感恩戴德。首先，它们依靠该政权来保持政治稳定，保护他们免受日益增长的被超级剥削的工人阶级的反抗。许多资本家嘴上支付民主的想法，但又认为'中国民主化为时尚早'
许多资本家加入了共产党或共产党主办的'民主党派'作为一种途径来为他们的利益游说。据官方调查， 30 ％以上的民营企业家现在是中共的成员。 “中共已有286万来自民营企业的雇主和雇员成为其成员以及80万独立的企业家，而且私营和个体企业所有老板中的40 ％成为了中共党员” 。 （Jean-Louis Rocca，一个中产阶级的党，Le Monde Diplomatique的英文版， 2008年8月）现在，中共试图招募60万家在中国运营的外国公司中的员工成为其党员。这不是一个资本家接管中共的过程，而是中共领导层努力增选资本家以便对这一新兴阶级施加政治控制。与此同时，中共还努力保持对最近几年发展起来的各种行业协会的政治控制。
在我们看来，这里的分析表明中国是一个'混合的'国家，仍处于走向资本主义的转型过程中，而不是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。正如作为一个支持资本主义的经济学家的巴里诺顿（Barry Naughton）所说的： “尽管已经越过了很长的路，中国在建立起一个高效运作的市场经济之路上仍然有几步要走” 。 （《中国经济：转变与成长》， 2007 ， p326 ）
2008年11月18日星期二
一个新兴资产阶级(中国国家性质）
An emergent capitalist class
一个新兴资产阶级
IN CHINA, THE former Maoist-Stalinist state has used its massive power to ‘breed’ a Chinese capitalist class. The regime has adapted the state to the transition to capitalism. While the state retains considerable power, the new capitalist forces are, at this stage, an emergent social class in the process of formation. The Chinese capitalist class is made up of diverse elements, from small family businesses to the owners of giant corporations. It lacks social cohesion and as yet has not developed any independent political representation.
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的政权'培育'一个中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家适应向资本主义的过渡。虽然国家保留了相当大的权力，在这一阶段，新的资本主义势力是一个处在形成过程中的新兴的社会阶层。中国资产阶级是由从小型家族企业的业主到大公司的多种类型构成的。它缺乏社会凝聚力，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。
Before Deng’s market measures in 1978, private enterprise was officially illegal and there were hardly any capitalists, apart from black-marketeers. Successive pro-market measures under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao opened the doors wider and wider to the growth of capitalist forces, inevitably encouraging the emergence of new strata of capitalists.
在1978年邓小平推出市场措施之前，民营企业是非法的，那时几乎没有任何资本家，除了黑市商人 。接着邓小平推出支持市场的措施，江泽民，胡锦涛更广泛地向资本主义势力的增长敞开大门，这不可避免地鼓励新的资本家阶层的出现。
The first large contingent of capitalists came from the layer of peasants who enriched themselves on the basis of Deng’s pro-market reforms in the countryside. As market opportunities widened, many small family traders and professionals developed businesses. A substantial section of the capitalists are former CCP officials and ex-bosses of SOEs, who have used their power and influence (and resources plundered from the state) to set themselves up in business. Many retain close links with party and state bureaucrats.
第一批资本家来自在邓小平于农村地区推出支持市场的改革的基础上使自己富裕起来的农民阶层。随着市场机会的扩大，许多个体户和专业人士开始了商业活动。有相当部分的资本家是前中共官员和前国有企业的老板，谁利用他们的权力和影响力（从国家掠夺资源）来创业。许多人和党和国家的官僚保持密切的联系。
Moreover, the composition of the emergent capitalist class is still quite fluid. There are signs that many of the small businesses of the first phase are now being squeezed out by much bigger businesses that are increasingly dominating the economy.
此外，新兴资产阶级的组成仍然相当不稳定。有迹象表明，第一阶段的许多小型企业正在被越来越多地统治经济的更大的企业挤出去。
Many big businesses have links with state-owned firms, overseas Chinese big business and transnational corporations. Prominent among the big-business elite are the ‘princelings’, the children of top party officials. Some of the wealthiest and most rapacious capitalists are the property developers, who have already accumulated unimaginable wealth on the basis of appropriating state land and feverish property speculation. Last year, the Hurun Report recorded over 100 US dollar billionaires in China (compared to 24 in Japan). According to another report, 90% of the billionaires are the children of senior CCP-state officials.
许多大企业都与国有企业，海外中国大企业和跨国公司有联系。其中最突出的大商界精英是'太子党' ，高官的儿女。一些最富有，最贪婪的资本家是在国有土地升值和狂热的房地产投机的基础上积累无法想象的财富的房地产开发商。去年，胡润富豪榜记录了百中国名亿万富翁（相比而言，日本是24名） 。另据报道， 90 ％的富豪是中共高级国家官员的儿女。
Surveys report many complaints against the regime from the capitalists, especially small business-people: their property rights are not secure; they find it too hard to get loans from the banks (which favour SOEs and big business); they are over-taxed; and their profits are undermined by corruption; etc. A few would like to throw off the constraints imposed by the present regime and see the introduction of a big-business government. The great majority, however, are grateful to the regime for introducing a social framework in which capitalism can develop. Above all, they rely on the regime to maintain ‘political stability’, to protect them from the growing, super-exploited working class. Many capitalists pay lip service to the idea of democracy, but consider that it is ‘too early for China to become democratic’.
许多调查报告了来自资本家尤其是小企主的对该政权的抱怨：他们的财产权利没有得到保障;他们发现他们也很难向银行贷款（贷款往往有利于国有企业和大企业） ;他们遭到过度征税;以及他们的利润受到腐败的损害等等，少数人想摆脱当前政权的限制并希望引入一个大企业的政府。然而，绝大多数人对该政权在中国引入可以发展资本主义的社会的框架而感恩戴德。首先，它们依靠该政权来保持政治稳定，保护他们免受日益增长的被超级剥削的工人阶级的反抗。许多资本家嘴上支付民主的想法，而又认为这是'中国民主化为时尚早'
Many capitalists have joined the CCP or the CCP-sponsored ‘democratic parties’ as a way of lobbying for their interests. According to official surveys, over 30% of private entrepreneurs are now members of the CCP. “The CCP already counts 2.86 million employers and employees from private enterprise in its ranks and 800,000 independent entrepreneurs, as well as 40% of all heads of private and individual enterprises”. (Jean-Louis Rocca, A Middle Class Party, Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition, August 2008) Now the CCP is trying to recruit among the employees of the 600,000 foreign companies operating in China. This is not a takeover of the CCP by capitalists, but rather an effort by the CCP leadership to co-opt capitalists in order to exert political control over this emergent class. At the same time, the CCP also strives to maintain political control of the various business associations that have developed over recent years.
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许多资本家加入了共产党或共产党主办的'民主党派'作为一种途径来为他们的利益游说。据官方调查， 30 ％以上的民营企业家现在是中共的成员。 “中共已有286万来自民营企业的雇主和雇员成为其成员以及80万独立的企业家，而且私营和个体企业所有老板的40 ％成为了中共党员” 。 （Jean-Louis Rocca，一个中产阶级的党，Le Monde Diplomatique的英文版， 2008年8月）现在，中共试图招募60万在中国运营的外国公司中的员工成为其党员。这不是一个资本家接管中共的过程，而是中共领导层努力增选资本家以便对这一新兴阶级的施加政治控制。与此同时，中共还努力保持对最近几年发展起来的各种行业协会的政治控制。
In our view, the analysis presented here shows that China is a ‘hybrid’ state, still in the process of transition towards capitalism, not a ‘fully’ capitalist state. As Barry Naughton, a pro-capitalist economist, puts it: “Despite the enormous distance already traversed, China still has several steps to go in the creation of a high-functioning market economy”. (The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, 2007, p326)
在我们看来，这里的分析表明中国是一个'混合的'国家，仍处于走向资本主义的转型过程中，而不是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。正如作为一个支持资本主义的经济学家的巴里诺顿（Barry Naughton）所说的： “尽管已经越过了很长的路，中国在建立起一个高效运作的市场经济之路上仍然有几步要走” 。 （《中国经济：转变与成长》， 2007 ， p326 ）
一个新兴资产阶级
IN CHINA, THE former Maoist-Stalinist state has used its massive power to ‘breed’ a Chinese capitalist class. The regime has adapted the state to the transition to capitalism. While the state retains considerable power, the new capitalist forces are, at this stage, an emergent social class in the process of formation. The Chinese capitalist class is made up of diverse elements, from small family businesses to the owners of giant corporations. It lacks social cohesion and as yet has not developed any independent political representation.
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的政权'培育'一个中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家适应向资本主义的过渡。虽然国家保留了相当大的权力，在这一阶段，新的资本主义势力是一个处在形成过程中的新兴的社会阶层。中国资产阶级是由从小型家族企业的业主到大公司的多种类型构成的。它缺乏社会凝聚力，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。
Before Deng’s market measures in 1978, private enterprise was officially illegal and there were hardly any capitalists, apart from black-marketeers. Successive pro-market measures under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao opened the doors wider and wider to the growth of capitalist forces, inevitably encouraging the emergence of new strata of capitalists.
在1978年邓小平推出市场措施之前，民营企业是非法的，那时几乎没有任何资本家，除了黑市商人 。接着邓小平推出支持市场的措施，江泽民，胡锦涛更广泛地向资本主义势力的增长敞开大门，这不可避免地鼓励新的资本家阶层的出现。
The first large contingent of capitalists came from the layer of peasants who enriched themselves on the basis of Deng’s pro-market reforms in the countryside. As market opportunities widened, many small family traders and professionals developed businesses. A substantial section of the capitalists are former CCP officials and ex-bosses of SOEs, who have used their power and influence (and resources plundered from the state) to set themselves up in business. Many retain close links with party and state bureaucrats.
第一批资本家来自在邓小平于农村地区推出支持市场的改革的基础上使自己富裕起来的农民阶层。随着市场机会的扩大，许多个体户和专业人士开始了商业活动。有相当部分的资本家是前中共官员和前国有企业的老板，谁利用他们的权力和影响力（从国家掠夺资源）来创业。许多人和党和国家的官僚保持密切的联系。
Moreover, the composition of the emergent capitalist class is still quite fluid. There are signs that many of the small businesses of the first phase are now being squeezed out by much bigger businesses that are increasingly dominating the economy.
此外，新兴资产阶级的组成仍然相当不稳定。有迹象表明，第一阶段的许多小型企业正在被越来越多地统治经济的更大的企业挤出去。
Many big businesses have links with state-owned firms, overseas Chinese big business and transnational corporations. Prominent among the big-business elite are the ‘princelings’, the children of top party officials. Some of the wealthiest and most rapacious capitalists are the property developers, who have already accumulated unimaginable wealth on the basis of appropriating state land and feverish property speculation. Last year, the Hurun Report recorded over 100 US dollar billionaires in China (compared to 24 in Japan). According to another report, 90% of the billionaires are the children of senior CCP-state officials.
许多大企业都与国有企业，海外中国大企业和跨国公司有联系。其中最突出的大商界精英是'太子党' ，高官的儿女。一些最富有，最贪婪的资本家是在国有土地升值和狂热的房地产投机的基础上积累无法想象的财富的房地产开发商。去年，胡润富豪榜记录了百中国名亿万富翁（相比而言，日本是24名） 。另据报道， 90 ％的富豪是中共高级国家官员的儿女。
Surveys report many complaints against the regime from the capitalists, especially small business-people: their property rights are not secure; they find it too hard to get loans from the banks (which favour SOEs and big business); they are over-taxed; and their profits are undermined by corruption; etc. A few would like to throw off the constraints imposed by the present regime and see the introduction of a big-business government. The great majority, however, are grateful to the regime for introducing a social framework in which capitalism can develop. Above all, they rely on the regime to maintain ‘political stability’, to protect them from the growing, super-exploited working class. Many capitalists pay lip service to the idea of democracy, but consider that it is ‘too early for China to become democratic’.
许多调查报告了来自资本家尤其是小企主的对该政权的抱怨：他们的财产权利没有得到保障;他们发现他们也很难向银行贷款（贷款往往有利于国有企业和大企业） ;他们遭到过度征税;以及他们的利润受到腐败的损害等等，少数人想摆脱当前政权的限制并希望引入一个大企业的政府。然而，绝大多数人对该政权在中国引入可以发展资本主义的社会的框架而感恩戴德。首先，它们依靠该政权来保持政治稳定，保护他们免受日益增长的被超级剥削的工人阶级的反抗。许多资本家嘴上支付民主的想法，而又认为这是'中国民主化为时尚早'
Many capitalists have joined the CCP or the CCP-sponsored ‘democratic parties’ as a way of lobbying for their interests. According to official surveys, over 30% of private entrepreneurs are now members of the CCP. “The CCP already counts 2.86 million employers and employees from private enterprise in its ranks and 800,000 independent entrepreneurs, as well as 40% of all heads of private and individual enterprises”. (Jean-Louis Rocca, A Middle Class Party, Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition, August 2008) Now the CCP is trying to recruit among the employees of the 600,000 foreign companies operating in China. This is not a takeover of the CCP by capitalists, but rather an effort by the CCP leadership to co-opt capitalists in order to exert political control over this emergent class. At the same time, the CCP also strives to maintain political control of the various business associations that have developed over recent years.
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许多资本家加入了共产党或共产党主办的'民主党派'作为一种途径来为他们的利益游说。据官方调查， 30 ％以上的民营企业家现在是中共的成员。 “中共已有286万来自民营企业的雇主和雇员成为其成员以及80万独立的企业家，而且私营和个体企业所有老板的40 ％成为了中共党员” 。 （Jean-Louis Rocca，一个中产阶级的党，Le Monde Diplomatique的英文版， 2008年8月）现在，中共试图招募60万在中国运营的外国公司中的员工成为其党员。这不是一个资本家接管中共的过程，而是中共领导层努力增选资本家以便对这一新兴阶级的施加政治控制。与此同时，中共还努力保持对最近几年发展起来的各种行业协会的政治控制。
In our view, the analysis presented here shows that China is a ‘hybrid’ state, still in the process of transition towards capitalism, not a ‘fully’ capitalist state. As Barry Naughton, a pro-capitalist economist, puts it: “Despite the enormous distance already traversed, China still has several steps to go in the creation of a high-functioning market economy”. (The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, 2007, p326)
在我们看来，这里的分析表明中国是一个'混合的'国家，仍处于走向资本主义的转型过程中，而不是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。正如作为一个支持资本主义的经济学家的巴里诺顿（Barry Naughton）所说的： “尽管已经越过了很长的路，中国在建立起一个高效运作的市场经济之路上仍然有几步要走” 。 （《中国经济：转变与成长》， 2007 ， p326 ）
2008年11月16日星期日
国家的角色（中国国家性质）
国家的角色
VINCENT GIVES NO real analysis of the process of transition since Deng Xiaoping launched his pro-market reforms in 1978. In particular, the comments on the role of the state are inadequate. This means, in turn, that Vincent draws a simplistic picture of the unfolding counter-revolutionary processes.
文森特并没有真正的分析过自1978年邓小平发起他的支持市场的改革以来的过渡的进程。特别是，对国家的角色的评论是不适当的。反过来，这意味着文森特对正在展开的反革命进程给出了一个过分简单化的图片。
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The role of the state is a key factor in determining the character of the transitional regime. Vincent presents it simply as a ‘repressive apparatus’ that has shifted from the planned economy to capitalism. With the abandonment of central planning, the working class is no longer the “ruling economic class”. The Chinese state “has thrown in its lot with capitalism”. A section of the Maoist bureaucracy has converted itself through the “reform” process into “a property owning class”. “The victory of bourgeois counter-revolution, albeit in a peculiar ‘Confucian’ form, is today brutally clear”.
国家的角色在确定过渡性政权的性质上是一个关键因素。文森特仅仅把中国政权看作为已从计划经济转向资本主义的一个'镇压机器。随着放弃中央计划经济，工人阶级不再是“经济的统治阶级” 。中国国家在资本主义下“已经抛弃很多” 。毛主义官僚阶层已经通过“改革”进程转变为“有产阶级” 。 “虽然以特殊的'儒家'的形式，今天资产阶级反革命的胜利是极其清晰的”
There is truth in all of this, but Vincent’s analysis does not take sufficient account of the decisive role of the powerful Bonapartist state created by the Maoist-Stalinist regime. Far more than a repressive apparatus, the bureaucratic state has fostered the development of capitalist forces, with the aim of creating a new social base for its continued rule. It has used all the resources of the CCP and the state apparatus to direct the process of change from above and to retain, together with its monopoly of political power, a key role in the running of the economy. Its economic power is undoubtedly diminished compared with the situation under the centrally planned economy. But the state retains a far greater role in the economy than in capitalist countries like Japan and South Korea.
所有这一切中都包含有事实，但是文森特的分析没有充分考虑到毛派斯大林主义政权创建的强大的波拿巴国家的决定性的作用。远远不只是镇压仪机器，官僚国家促进了资本主义势力的发展，其目的是为其继续统治创建一个新的社会基础。它使用共产党和国家机器的所有资源从上面来指导变化的进程并连同其垄断的政治权力保留对经济运行发挥关键的作用。与中央计划经济的情况下相比，它的经济力量无疑是减小的。但是，中国国家比在资本主义国家如日本和韩国在经济中保留了一个更为重要的角色。
It is not a question of the Chinese state, the CCP and the state apparatus itself, being “the repository of the socially progressive features created by the 1949 revolution”. The state has clearly abandoned the relatively progressive planned economy. Nevertheless, to understand the processes taking place in China, we have to take account of the role played by the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state in the transition. The autonomous power of the state, neither controlled by the working class nor by the emergent capitalist class, together with significant elements of state industry and banking, determines the mixed or hybrid character of the transitional society that exists in China today.
这不是一个中国国家的问题，中共和国家机器本身是“1949年的革命创造的社会进步的核心力量” 。国家已明确放弃了比较进步的计划经济。然而，为了了解在中国发生的过程，我们必须考虑前毛泽东斯大林主义国家在过渡中所发挥的作用。既没有被工人阶级控制也没有被新兴的资产阶级所控制的国家自发的权力，连同国有工业和国有银行这些重要组成部分，确定了在今日中国存在着社会过渡的混合或杂交的性质。
Leaving aside for a moment the question of what stage has been reached, the counter-revolutionary process in China is not simply a transfer from one ruling class (the working class) to another (the bourgeoisie). In the aftermath of the second world war, the magnificent revolutionary mass movement of the Chinese peasants and workers swept away landlordism, capitalism and their imperialist patrons. The transformation of 1949, however, was directed from above by the Maoist leadership of the peasant Red Army and the bureaucratised (Stalinised) Communist Party. Under the planned economy, which was run on Stalinist lines, there were (as Vincent points out) important social gains for the workers and peasants that have now been largely wiped out.
暂时撇开已经达到什么阶段的问题，中国的反革命进程不仅是由一个统治阶级（工人阶级）转移到另一个统治阶级（资产阶级） 。第二次世界大战之后，中国农民和工人的宏伟的革命群众运动扫除了封建主义 、资本主义和它们的帝国主义支持者。但是，1949年的转变是直接由农民红军和官僚化的（ 斯大林化 ）共产党的毛主义领导者从上面领导达成的。在运行在斯大林路线上的计划经济下，（如文森特指出的）工人和农民获得了现在已经基本上被取消的重要的社会福利。
The working class and peasantry, however, were excluded from any democratic participation in the running of the state or the economy. They were denied any independent, democratic trade unions or political organisations. The centrally planned economy was historically progressive compared to capitalism and was therefore in the interests of the working class. In this sense, the working class could be described as the ‘ruling economic class’. But, politically, the working class never became the ruling class. That would have required the working class to overthrow the bureaucracy and establish workers’ democracy – a political revolution. China (like the Soviet Union under Stalin) was ruled by a bureaucratic caste through a monstrous apparatus consisting of the CCP and the state machine itself. Unchecked by workers’ democracy, the state became a monstrous behemoth wielding enormous power over every area of society.
可是，工人阶级和农民，被排除在任何民主参与国家或经济的运行。他们被拒绝拥有任何独立的，民主的工会或政治组织。与资本主义相比，中央计划经济是具有历史进步性的，因此也是符合工人阶级利益的。在这个意义上说，工人阶级可以说是'经济的统治阶级。但是，在政治上，工人阶级从来没有成为统治阶级。这需要工人阶级推翻官僚作风，并建立工人民主——政治革命。官僚阶级通过由中共和国家机器本身组成的巨大的工具统治着中国（如斯大林治下的前苏联）。没有工人民主的监督，国家成为一个可怕的庞然大物在社会的各个领域掌控着巨大的力量。
For nearly three decades the bureaucratic Maoist elite defended the planned economy as the basis of its power and privileges. In the 1970s, however, the planned economy (as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) began to flounder under the weight of bureaucratic mismanagement. Deng Xiaoping introduced ‘reforms’, elements of the market economy (inevitably stimulating the emergence of capitalist relations), initially with the aim of stimulating growth and shoring up the planned economy. However, after the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the other Stalinist states following the fall of the Berlin wall, Deng and other leaders concluded that the planned economy was no longer viable and they could preserve their power only through a transition to a market economy. In reality, this inevitably meant moving towards a capitalist economy. Of course, the regime tried to disguise this by presenting the new course as ‘market socialism’.
近30年里，毛主义官僚精英捍卫着作为其权力和特权基础的计划经济。然而，在1970年代，在官僚管理不善的重压下，计划经济（如苏联和东欧）开始困难重重。邓小平提出“改革”， 引进市场经济要素（不可避免地刺激产生资本主义的关系）的最初目的是为了刺激增长和支撑计划经济。然而，在随着柏林墙的倒塌苏联和其他斯大林主义国家迅速瓦解后，邓小平和其他领导人得出结论计划经济体制已不再可行，他们只有通过向市场经济过渡来维护他们的权力。在现实中，这不可避免地意味着走向资本主义经济。当然，该政权试图通过提出叫“市场社会主义”的新的理论来掩盖这一点。
Paramount for the CCP leaders was the need to retain the power of their regime. The regime was profoundly shaken by the mass protest movement that culminated in the bloody Tiananmen Square events. From that and the events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Chinese leaders concluded that they could not tolerate any political liberalisation: there would be no democratic reforms accompanying the moves towards the market.
对中共领导人来说极为重要的是需要保持他们的政权。该政权被最终导致血腥的天安门事件的大规模的抗议活动深深震撼了。从这一事件以及苏联和东欧的事件发生后，中国领导人得出结论认为，他们无法容忍任何政治自由化：走向市场过程中就不会相应地进行民主改革。
At the same time, the Chinese regime concluded that it should at all costs avoid the kind of ‘big bang’ economic transition that had taken place in the Soviet Union. Sweeping privatisation of the state industries had not only provoked an economic disaster but had (as was intended by US advocates of the ‘big bang’) shattered the bureaucratic, Stalinist state apparatus and the Communist Party. There would be no Chinese Yeltsin.
与此同时，中国政权得出结论，它应该不惜一切代价避免苏联经济转型中发生的'休克疗法'。国有企业彻底的私有化不仅挑起了一场经济灾难，而且（正是由美国倡导的'休克疗法' 希望看到的）打破了斯大林主义国家机器和共产党官僚政治。就不会有中国的叶利钦。
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Chinese regime proceeded incrementally towards the capitalist market. It promoted market forces in the countryside and opened the door to foreign trans-national corporations in the economic development zones. Private enterprises were allowed to develop in urban areas alongside the state-owned enterprises. The regime, fearing a surge of social and political unrest, has moved cautiously and incrementally towards the privatisation or ‘corporatisation’ of SOEs. It has undoubtedly opened the door to the ruthless, super-exploitation of workers. At the same time, it has been cautious about the freeing of prices and the cutting or abolition of subsidies for fuel and food.
与苏联相反，中国的政权实施小步走向资本主义市场。它在农村推进了市场力量并在经济开发区向外国跨国公司敞开了大门。与城市地区，在国有企业外允许民营企业的发展。该政权担心社会和政治动乱的爆发，一直在谨慎和逐步实现国有企业的私有化或'公司化'。毫无疑问，敞开了对工人超级的无情剥削的大门。与此同时，在放开价格和削减或取消燃料和食品的补贴上一直持谨慎态度。
So far, as a result of this incremental approach – and given the absence of an organised mass opposition to the regime – the Chinese leadership has preserved the regime and the state bureaucracy largely intact. Clearly, it is no longer in complete command of a centrally planned economy. But it retains powerful levers for steering the direction of economic change. Vincent says that “the state’s economic power has been seriously degraded”. But it retains far more power than in economies where capitalism has been consolidated as the dominant socio-economic system. Moreover, the regime has attempted to adapt the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state machine and the CCP (with over 70 million members) to the tasks of directing a market-dominated economy.
到目前为止，作为这种渐进的方式的结果-由于缺乏针对该政权的一个有组织的群众反对派-中国领导层保持了政权并且国家官僚机构基本上完好无损。显然，它不再是中央计划经济全权领导。但它继续控制着指导经济改革方向的强大的杠杆。文森特说： “国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”但它保留了远远高于那些资本主义已巩固为社会经济制度的主导的经济体的更多的权力。此外，该政权一直试图使前毛泽东斯大林主义国家机器和中共（超过70万会员）适应引导经济走上市场为主导的任务。
In his recent book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (2008), David Shambaugh writes: “… the CCP has atrophied over time and its Leninist [Maoist-Stalinist] instruments of control are not as sharp as in the past, but its tools of rule are far from blunt – and they are being re-strengthened. The party remains a nationwide organisation of considerable authority and power. It is the only political game in town. Through its monopoly on personnel management (through the nomenklatura and bianzhi [selective appointment] systems), the party effectively controls not only the government at all levels but also a wide variety of professional institutions, corporations and enterprises, universities and research institutions, and service organisations. It also controls the military and all coercive institutions (People’s Armed Police, People’s Militia, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Public Security). It also controls much of the media and flow of information to and within society. The party certainly does not intend to relinquish these instruments of control – quite to the contrary, it has been doing much to strengthen them. It also brooks no opposition, and it quickly suppresses any sign of organised political activity”.
在他最近的书，《中国共产党：萎缩和适应（ 2008年）》 ，David Shambaugh写道： “ ... 随着时间的推移中共已萎缩及其列宁主义[毛泽东斯大林主义] 控制工具并不象过去一样具有锋芒，但其统治的工具远远没有钝化-他们正在重新加强。党仍然是一个具有相当权威和权力的全国性的组织。这是城里的唯一的政治游戏。通过其对人事管理的垄断（通过nomenklatura[党管干部]和bianzhi [选择性任命]的制度） ，党不仅有效地控制了各级政府而且控制了各种各样的专业机构、公司企业、大学和研究机构，以及服务组织。它还控制着军队和所有强制性机构（人民武装警察部队，民兵，国家安全部和公安部） 。另外，它还控制大部分的媒体和社会中的信息流转。党当然不打算放弃这些控制工具-恰恰相反，它一直在加强它们。它也不容反对派，并迅速抑制任何组织政治活动的迹象。”
VINCENT GIVES NO real analysis of the process of transition since Deng Xiaoping launched his pro-market reforms in 1978. In particular, the comments on the role of the state are inadequate. This means, in turn, that Vincent draws a simplistic picture of the unfolding counter-revolutionary processes.
文森特并没有真正的分析过自1978年邓小平发起他的支持市场的改革以来的过渡的进程。特别是，对国家的角色的评论是不适当的。反过来，这意味着文森特对正在展开的反革命进程给出了一个过分简单化的图片。
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The role of the state is a key factor in determining the character of the transitional regime. Vincent presents it simply as a ‘repressive apparatus’ that has shifted from the planned economy to capitalism. With the abandonment of central planning, the working class is no longer the “ruling economic class”. The Chinese state “has thrown in its lot with capitalism”. A section of the Maoist bureaucracy has converted itself through the “reform” process into “a property owning class”. “The victory of bourgeois counter-revolution, albeit in a peculiar ‘Confucian’ form, is today brutally clear”.
国家的角色在确定过渡性政权的性质上是一个关键因素。文森特仅仅把中国政权看作为已从计划经济转向资本主义的一个'镇压机器。随着放弃中央计划经济，工人阶级不再是“经济的统治阶级” 。中国国家在资本主义下“已经抛弃很多” 。毛主义官僚阶层已经通过“改革”进程转变为“有产阶级” 。 “虽然以特殊的'儒家'的形式，今天资产阶级反革命的胜利是极其清晰的”
There is truth in all of this, but Vincent’s analysis does not take sufficient account of the decisive role of the powerful Bonapartist state created by the Maoist-Stalinist regime. Far more than a repressive apparatus, the bureaucratic state has fostered the development of capitalist forces, with the aim of creating a new social base for its continued rule. It has used all the resources of the CCP and the state apparatus to direct the process of change from above and to retain, together with its monopoly of political power, a key role in the running of the economy. Its economic power is undoubtedly diminished compared with the situation under the centrally planned economy. But the state retains a far greater role in the economy than in capitalist countries like Japan and South Korea.
所有这一切中都包含有事实，但是文森特的分析没有充分考虑到毛派斯大林主义政权创建的强大的波拿巴国家的决定性的作用。远远不只是镇压仪机器，官僚国家促进了资本主义势力的发展，其目的是为其继续统治创建一个新的社会基础。它使用共产党和国家机器的所有资源从上面来指导变化的进程并连同其垄断的政治权力保留对经济运行发挥关键的作用。与中央计划经济的情况下相比，它的经济力量无疑是减小的。但是，中国国家比在资本主义国家如日本和韩国在经济中保留了一个更为重要的角色。
It is not a question of the Chinese state, the CCP and the state apparatus itself, being “the repository of the socially progressive features created by the 1949 revolution”. The state has clearly abandoned the relatively progressive planned economy. Nevertheless, to understand the processes taking place in China, we have to take account of the role played by the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state in the transition. The autonomous power of the state, neither controlled by the working class nor by the emergent capitalist class, together with significant elements of state industry and banking, determines the mixed or hybrid character of the transitional society that exists in China today.
这不是一个中国国家的问题，中共和国家机器本身是“1949年的革命创造的社会进步的核心力量” 。国家已明确放弃了比较进步的计划经济。然而，为了了解在中国发生的过程，我们必须考虑前毛泽东斯大林主义国家在过渡中所发挥的作用。既没有被工人阶级控制也没有被新兴的资产阶级所控制的国家自发的权力，连同国有工业和国有银行这些重要组成部分，确定了在今日中国存在着社会过渡的混合或杂交的性质。
Leaving aside for a moment the question of what stage has been reached, the counter-revolutionary process in China is not simply a transfer from one ruling class (the working class) to another (the bourgeoisie). In the aftermath of the second world war, the magnificent revolutionary mass movement of the Chinese peasants and workers swept away landlordism, capitalism and their imperialist patrons. The transformation of 1949, however, was directed from above by the Maoist leadership of the peasant Red Army and the bureaucratised (Stalinised) Communist Party. Under the planned economy, which was run on Stalinist lines, there were (as Vincent points out) important social gains for the workers and peasants that have now been largely wiped out.
暂时撇开已经达到什么阶段的问题，中国的反革命进程不仅是由一个统治阶级（工人阶级）转移到另一个统治阶级（资产阶级） 。第二次世界大战之后，中国农民和工人的宏伟的革命群众运动扫除了封建主义 、资本主义和它们的帝国主义支持者。但是，1949年的转变是直接由农民红军和官僚化的（ 斯大林化 ）共产党的毛主义领导者从上面领导达成的。在运行在斯大林路线上的计划经济下，（如文森特指出的）工人和农民获得了现在已经基本上被取消的重要的社会福利。
The working class and peasantry, however, were excluded from any democratic participation in the running of the state or the economy. They were denied any independent, democratic trade unions or political organisations. The centrally planned economy was historically progressive compared to capitalism and was therefore in the interests of the working class. In this sense, the working class could be described as the ‘ruling economic class’. But, politically, the working class never became the ruling class. That would have required the working class to overthrow the bureaucracy and establish workers’ democracy – a political revolution. China (like the Soviet Union under Stalin) was ruled by a bureaucratic caste through a monstrous apparatus consisting of the CCP and the state machine itself. Unchecked by workers’ democracy, the state became a monstrous behemoth wielding enormous power over every area of society.
可是，工人阶级和农民，被排除在任何民主参与国家或经济的运行。他们被拒绝拥有任何独立的，民主的工会或政治组织。与资本主义相比，中央计划经济是具有历史进步性的，因此也是符合工人阶级利益的。在这个意义上说，工人阶级可以说是'经济的统治阶级。但是，在政治上，工人阶级从来没有成为统治阶级。这需要工人阶级推翻官僚作风，并建立工人民主——政治革命。官僚阶级通过由中共和国家机器本身组成的巨大的工具统治着中国（如斯大林治下的前苏联）。没有工人民主的监督，国家成为一个可怕的庞然大物在社会的各个领域掌控着巨大的力量。
For nearly three decades the bureaucratic Maoist elite defended the planned economy as the basis of its power and privileges. In the 1970s, however, the planned economy (as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) began to flounder under the weight of bureaucratic mismanagement. Deng Xiaoping introduced ‘reforms’, elements of the market economy (inevitably stimulating the emergence of capitalist relations), initially with the aim of stimulating growth and shoring up the planned economy. However, after the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the other Stalinist states following the fall of the Berlin wall, Deng and other leaders concluded that the planned economy was no longer viable and they could preserve their power only through a transition to a market economy. In reality, this inevitably meant moving towards a capitalist economy. Of course, the regime tried to disguise this by presenting the new course as ‘market socialism’.
近30年里，毛主义官僚精英捍卫着作为其权力和特权基础的计划经济。然而，在1970年代，在官僚管理不善的重压下，计划经济（如苏联和东欧）开始困难重重。邓小平提出“改革”， 引进市场经济要素（不可避免地刺激产生资本主义的关系）的最初目的是为了刺激增长和支撑计划经济。然而，在随着柏林墙的倒塌苏联和其他斯大林主义国家迅速瓦解后，邓小平和其他领导人得出结论计划经济体制已不再可行，他们只有通过向市场经济过渡来维护他们的权力。在现实中，这不可避免地意味着走向资本主义经济。当然，该政权试图通过提出叫“市场社会主义”的新的理论来掩盖这一点。
Paramount for the CCP leaders was the need to retain the power of their regime. The regime was profoundly shaken by the mass protest movement that culminated in the bloody Tiananmen Square events. From that and the events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Chinese leaders concluded that they could not tolerate any political liberalisation: there would be no democratic reforms accompanying the moves towards the market.
对中共领导人来说极为重要的是需要保持他们的政权。该政权被最终导致血腥的天安门事件的大规模的抗议活动深深震撼了。从这一事件以及苏联和东欧的事件发生后，中国领导人得出结论认为，他们无法容忍任何政治自由化：走向市场过程中就不会相应地进行民主改革。
At the same time, the Chinese regime concluded that it should at all costs avoid the kind of ‘big bang’ economic transition that had taken place in the Soviet Union. Sweeping privatisation of the state industries had not only provoked an economic disaster but had (as was intended by US advocates of the ‘big bang’) shattered the bureaucratic, Stalinist state apparatus and the Communist Party. There would be no Chinese Yeltsin.
与此同时，中国政权得出结论，它应该不惜一切代价避免苏联经济转型中发生的'休克疗法'。国有企业彻底的私有化不仅挑起了一场经济灾难，而且（正是由美国倡导的'休克疗法' 希望看到的）打破了斯大林主义国家机器和共产党官僚政治。就不会有中国的叶利钦。
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Chinese regime proceeded incrementally towards the capitalist market. It promoted market forces in the countryside and opened the door to foreign trans-national corporations in the economic development zones. Private enterprises were allowed to develop in urban areas alongside the state-owned enterprises. The regime, fearing a surge of social and political unrest, has moved cautiously and incrementally towards the privatisation or ‘corporatisation’ of SOEs. It has undoubtedly opened the door to the ruthless, super-exploitation of workers. At the same time, it has been cautious about the freeing of prices and the cutting or abolition of subsidies for fuel and food.
与苏联相反，中国的政权实施小步走向资本主义市场。它在农村推进了市场力量并在经济开发区向外国跨国公司敞开了大门。与城市地区，在国有企业外允许民营企业的发展。该政权担心社会和政治动乱的爆发，一直在谨慎和逐步实现国有企业的私有化或'公司化'。毫无疑问，敞开了对工人超级的无情剥削的大门。与此同时，在放开价格和削减或取消燃料和食品的补贴上一直持谨慎态度。
So far, as a result of this incremental approach – and given the absence of an organised mass opposition to the regime – the Chinese leadership has preserved the regime and the state bureaucracy largely intact. Clearly, it is no longer in complete command of a centrally planned economy. But it retains powerful levers for steering the direction of economic change. Vincent says that “the state’s economic power has been seriously degraded”. But it retains far more power than in economies where capitalism has been consolidated as the dominant socio-economic system. Moreover, the regime has attempted to adapt the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state machine and the CCP (with over 70 million members) to the tasks of directing a market-dominated economy.
到目前为止，作为这种渐进的方式的结果-由于缺乏针对该政权的一个有组织的群众反对派-中国领导层保持了政权并且国家官僚机构基本上完好无损。显然，它不再是中央计划经济全权领导。但它继续控制着指导经济改革方向的强大的杠杆。文森特说： “国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”但它保留了远远高于那些资本主义已巩固为社会经济制度的主导的经济体的更多的权力。此外，该政权一直试图使前毛泽东斯大林主义国家机器和中共（超过70万会员）适应引导经济走上市场为主导的任务。
In his recent book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (2008), David Shambaugh writes: “… the CCP has atrophied over time and its Leninist [Maoist-Stalinist] instruments of control are not as sharp as in the past, but its tools of rule are far from blunt – and they are being re-strengthened. The party remains a nationwide organisation of considerable authority and power. It is the only political game in town. Through its monopoly on personnel management (through the nomenklatura and bianzhi [selective appointment] systems), the party effectively controls not only the government at all levels but also a wide variety of professional institutions, corporations and enterprises, universities and research institutions, and service organisations. It also controls the military and all coercive institutions (People’s Armed Police, People’s Militia, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Public Security). It also controls much of the media and flow of information to and within society. The party certainly does not intend to relinquish these instruments of control – quite to the contrary, it has been doing much to strengthen them. It also brooks no opposition, and it quickly suppresses any sign of organised political activity”.
在他最近的书，《中国共产党：萎缩和适应（ 2008年）》 ，David Shambaugh写道： “ ... 随着时间的推移中共已萎缩及其列宁主义[毛泽东斯大林主义] 控制工具并不象过去一样具有锋芒，但其统治的工具远远没有钝化-他们正在重新加强。党仍然是一个具有相当权威和权力的全国性的组织。这是城里的唯一的政治游戏。通过其对人事管理的垄断（通过nomenklatura[党管干部]和bianzhi [选择性任命]的制度） ，党不仅有效地控制了各级政府而且控制了各种各样的专业机构、公司企业、大学和研究机构，以及服务组织。它还控制着军队和所有强制性机构（人民武装警察部队，民兵，国家安全部和公安部） 。另外，它还控制大部分的媒体和社会中的信息流转。党当然不打算放弃这些控制工具-恰恰相反，它一直在加强它们。它也不容反对派，并迅速抑制任何组织政治活动的迹象。”
中国与全球资本主义(中国国家性质）
China & global capitalism
中国与全球资本主义
VINCENT KOLO ARGUES that China’s links with the global capitalist economy confirm that China is now a fully capitalist country. However, involvement in the world capitalist market, through trade and investment with other capitalist economies, does not in itself determine the class character of a state. In the case of the newborn Soviet state, Lenin and Trotsky advocated exploiting rivalry between the capitalist powers to develop trade links necessary for the growth of the Soviet economy. Their proviso was that there must be a state monopoly of foreign trade to ensure trade served the needs of the Soviet planned economy. Clearly, there is no longer a monopoly of foreign trade in China. But neither is there a completely ‘open door’, despite some of the Chinese leaders’ claims. Just as there is a ‘hybrid’ domestic economy, China’s relations with global capitalism have a mixed character.
文森特说，中国与全球资本主义经济的联系确证了中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。然而，通过与其他资本主义经济体的贸易和投资参与世界资本主义市场本身并不能确定一个国家的阶级性质。在新生苏维埃的情况下，列宁和托洛茨基主张利用资本主义的势力之间的对抗以发展必要的贸易联系来发展苏维埃经济。其限制条件是必须有一个国家垄断的外贸以确保贸易苏维埃的计划经济的需要服务。显然，在中国已不再有外贸的垄断。但是，也没有完全'打开大门' ，尽管一些中国领导人的要求打开。正如中国有一个“混合的”国内经济，中国与全球资本主义的关系也有一个混合的性质。
“The top echelons of the Chinese state, including the central government in Beijing”, writes Vincent, “are now fully integrated in the global capitalist system – through the open door policy that Hu Jintao describes as the ‘cornerstone’ of China’s economic development”. This, in our view, is an exaggeration. China has encouraged massive investment by foreign trans-national corporations, but largely controls the terms on which they operate. The regime, moreover, still tightly regulates relations between the Chinese economy and the global economy.
文森特写道，“中国国家的高层，包括在北京的中央政府，现在已经充分融入全球的资本主义制度-通过胡锦涛形容之为中国经济发展的'基石'的开放政策 “ 。在我们看来，这是夸大其词。中国鼓励外国跨国公司的大量投资，但基本上控制了它们经营的条件。此外，该政权还严格规范中国经济和全球经济之间的关系。
Recently, in response to the global financial crisis, the regime has again signalled to the US and the EU that it is in no hurry to relax government controls on capital flows in and out of China. It continues to maintain the low exchange rate of the renminbi (which gives China’s exports a strong competitive advantage) and defends its current rate through massive interventions in currency markets – in defiance of IMF rules and contrary to promises to the US to allow a substantial appreciation of the renminbi. At an earlier stage, the Chinese leaders used the issue of WTO compliance to help push through marketisation at home but, more recently, they have turned increasingly to bilateral trade deals. The Chinese government shed no tears at the recent breakdown of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, in which (together with India and Brazil) it refused to accept the packages proposed by either the US or the EU.
最近，在应对全球金融危机上，该政权已再次向美国和欧盟表明它不急于放松政府控制资本在中国进出。它继续保持人民币的低汇率（其加强了中国出口的竞争优势）和通过大规模干预外汇市场来捍卫其目前的汇率-不顾国际货币基金组织的规则和违背对美国承诺的允许人民币大幅度升值。在较早的阶段，中国领导人利用世贸组织的问题来帮助推动国内的市场化，最近，他们越来越多地转向双边的贸易协议。中国政府最近多哈回合的世贸组织谈判的破裂没有流出眼泪， 印度和巴西在该谈判中拒绝接受美国或欧盟的一揽子提议。
In the event of a prolonged crisis in the world economy, it cannot be ruled out, in our view, that China will resort to much stronger protectionist measures, both in relation to trade and investment, in an attempt to cushion the impact on the Chinese economy.
我们认为，在世界经济中发生旷日持久的危机的情况下，不能排除中国将采取更加强大的保护主义措施，一方面涉及到贸易和投资，试图缓和经济危机对中国经济的影响。
Role of the state
中国与全球资本主义
VINCENT KOLO ARGUES that China’s links with the global capitalist economy confirm that China is now a fully capitalist country. However, involvement in the world capitalist market, through trade and investment with other capitalist economies, does not in itself determine the class character of a state. In the case of the newborn Soviet state, Lenin and Trotsky advocated exploiting rivalry between the capitalist powers to develop trade links necessary for the growth of the Soviet economy. Their proviso was that there must be a state monopoly of foreign trade to ensure trade served the needs of the Soviet planned economy. Clearly, there is no longer a monopoly of foreign trade in China. But neither is there a completely ‘open door’, despite some of the Chinese leaders’ claims. Just as there is a ‘hybrid’ domestic economy, China’s relations with global capitalism have a mixed character.
文森特说，中国与全球资本主义经济的联系确证了中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。然而，通过与其他资本主义经济体的贸易和投资参与世界资本主义市场本身并不能确定一个国家的阶级性质。在新生苏维埃的情况下，列宁和托洛茨基主张利用资本主义的势力之间的对抗以发展必要的贸易联系来发展苏维埃经济。其限制条件是必须有一个国家垄断的外贸以确保贸易苏维埃的计划经济的需要服务。显然，在中国已不再有外贸的垄断。但是，也没有完全'打开大门' ，尽管一些中国领导人的要求打开。正如中国有一个“混合的”国内经济，中国与全球资本主义的关系也有一个混合的性质。
“The top echelons of the Chinese state, including the central government in Beijing”, writes Vincent, “are now fully integrated in the global capitalist system – through the open door policy that Hu Jintao describes as the ‘cornerstone’ of China’s economic development”. This, in our view, is an exaggeration. China has encouraged massive investment by foreign trans-national corporations, but largely controls the terms on which they operate. The regime, moreover, still tightly regulates relations between the Chinese economy and the global economy.
文森特写道，“中国国家的高层，包括在北京的中央政府，现在已经充分融入全球的资本主义制度-通过胡锦涛形容之为中国经济发展的'基石'的开放政策 “ 。在我们看来，这是夸大其词。中国鼓励外国跨国公司的大量投资，但基本上控制了它们经营的条件。此外，该政权还严格规范中国经济和全球经济之间的关系。
Recently, in response to the global financial crisis, the regime has again signalled to the US and the EU that it is in no hurry to relax government controls on capital flows in and out of China. It continues to maintain the low exchange rate of the renminbi (which gives China’s exports a strong competitive advantage) and defends its current rate through massive interventions in currency markets – in defiance of IMF rules and contrary to promises to the US to allow a substantial appreciation of the renminbi. At an earlier stage, the Chinese leaders used the issue of WTO compliance to help push through marketisation at home but, more recently, they have turned increasingly to bilateral trade deals. The Chinese government shed no tears at the recent breakdown of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, in which (together with India and Brazil) it refused to accept the packages proposed by either the US or the EU.
最近，在应对全球金融危机上，该政权已再次向美国和欧盟表明它不急于放松政府控制资本在中国进出。它继续保持人民币的低汇率（其加强了中国出口的竞争优势）和通过大规模干预外汇市场来捍卫其目前的汇率-不顾国际货币基金组织的规则和违背对美国承诺的允许人民币大幅度升值。在较早的阶段，中国领导人利用世贸组织的问题来帮助推动国内的市场化，最近，他们越来越多地转向双边的贸易协议。中国政府最近多哈回合的世贸组织谈判的破裂没有流出眼泪， 印度和巴西在该谈判中拒绝接受美国或欧盟的一揽子提议。
In the event of a prolonged crisis in the world economy, it cannot be ruled out, in our view, that China will resort to much stronger protectionist measures, both in relation to trade and investment, in an attempt to cushion the impact on the Chinese economy.
我们认为，在世界经济中发生旷日持久的危机的情况下，不能排除中国将采取更加强大的保护主义措施，一方面涉及到贸易和投资，试图缓和经济危机对中国经济的影响。
Role of the state
2008年11月14日星期五
我们之间的分歧(中国国家性质）
Our differences
我们之间的分歧
SO, WHAT ARE our differences with Vincent’s approach? Essentially, our criticism is that Vincent (to use Trotsky’s phrase) is giving “a finished definition to an unfinished process”. We agree that there is a counter-revolutionary transition towards capitalism, but we do not accept that, as Vincent argues, the process is complete and that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. He refers, for instance, to Trotsky’s comment that a restoration of capitalism may occur either along “the path of an abrupt counter-revolutionary overturn” or “the path of successive shift ings”, culminating in “a Thermidorian shift”. (Thermidor refers to the defeat in 1794 of the Jacobins, the most advanced party in the French revolution, a term used by Trotsky to denote a victory of the counter-revolution.) Vincent says: “This ‘path of successive shiftings’ is an excellent description of what has happened in China. Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”. It “has happened”, capitalism “has been restored”. In other words, the “Thermidorian shift” has taken place. In our view, however, there will be further “shiftings” and the process is not yet complete.
那么我们与文森特的方法之间的分歧是什么呢？从本质上讲，我们的批评是，文森特（使用托洛茨基的用词）是给“一个未完成的进程一个完成的定义” 。我们同意，有一个复辟到资本主义的反革命过渡，但我们不接受文森特认为的这一过程已经完成，既中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。比如，他提到托洛茨基的评论，即资本主义的复辟可能发生或者沿“突然反革命颠覆的道路”或“连续的蜕变的道路 ” ，最终以“ 热月政变”结束 。 （ 热月指的是在1794年法国革命中最先进的政党雅各宾派的失败，托洛茨基用这个词指反革命的胜利。 ）文森特说： “这'连续蜕变的道路'出色的描述了在中国发生了什么事。中国特色的资本主义类型已复辟“ 。 ”换言之， “ 热月政变”已经发生。然而，在我们看来，将进一步“ 蜕变”的过程尚未完成。
Vincent, in our view, puts forward a simplistic analysis of the complex process of transition, basing his categorical conclusion on a one-sided approach. For instance, on the role of the state, he rightly refers to the power of the “repressive one-party state of the CCP”. He also says, “This edifice of super-exploitation is built around the repressive one-party state of the CCP…” But he underestimates the role played by the powerful, ex-Stalinist state (the CCP and the state apparatus) in directing the transition. The regime has promoted the development of capitalist forces and the intervention of foreign, trans-national corporations, but it has also been determined to safeguard its monopoly of political power and overall control of the economy.
在我们看来，文森特对复杂的转型过程进行了简单化的分析，他的绝对的结论是片面的做法。举例来说，在国家的作用上，他正确地提到了“具有镇压性的共产党一党制国家”的力量 。他还表示， “这超级剥削的大厦是建立在具有镇压性饿共产党的一党制国家上的 ”但他低估了强大的前斯大林主义（中共及其国家机器）在指导过渡中所发挥的作用。该政权促进了资本主义力量的发展和外国跨国公司干预，但它也被确定为维护其政治权力的垄断和对经济的前面控制。
“[T]he state’s economic power”, writes Vincent, “has been seriously degraded”. True, the state no longer has the economic power that it had on the basis of the planned economy. Moreover, the development of capitalist forces has produced powerful centrifugal forces, which will tend to become stronger if the present course continues. But it is a mistake to imply (as Vincent does) that the Chinese state is now completely subservient to capitalist forces, within China and internationally.
文森特写道，“ 国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”诚然，国家不再拥有它在计划经济体制的基础上的经济力量。此外，资本主义势力的发展产生了强大的离心力，如果目前的路线继续下去，该离心力将趋于变得更加强大。但是，认为中国国家现在在中国和国际上已完全屈从于资本主义势力是错误的（如文森特所做的）。
The present Chinese state is not simply the equivalent of the state in Japan, Korea or Taiwan during their accelerated growth in the 1960s and 1970s, when (on the basis of the ‘Asian development model’) the state intervened in the economy to a much greater extent than in the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America. The surviving state-owned and state-controlled industries in China today are the product of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. They are not merely the equivalent of Japan’s keiretsu or South Korea’s chaebol, industrial-financial conglomerates that developed from big family-capitalist trusts.
当前的中国国家不是简单地等同于日本，韩国或台湾在其60年代和70年代的加速增长，根据“亚洲发展模式” ，那时国家比先进的资本主义经济的西欧和北美更大程度上干预经济。在今天的中国幸存的国有及国家控制的工业是斯大林主义计划经济产物。他们不仅仅是相当于作为从大家族资本主义的信托基金发展而来的工业金融集团的日本的keiretsu或韩国的财阀。
There is still a legacy of Maoism-Stalinism in China. Though fostering capitalist development, the state still controls powerful levers of economic influence. As we show in a separate section (China’s hybrid economy, pp27-30), the regime, through a cluster of huge state-owned enterprises (SOEs), effectively controls several key industrial sectors: telecoms, transport, energy, and defence production, etc. Though state-sector employment has been drastically reduced, the state sector still accounts for 38% (2004) of industrial output. It is true, as Vincent says, that most of the remaining SOEs have been ‘corporatized’: they no longer operate under a plan of production but, according to government policy, on the basis of market criteria. But it is an exaggeration to say: “The state industrial and commercial sector consist of completely autonomous and in most cases semi-privatised units”. In reality, many SOEs are run by ex-CCP bureaucrats or bosses currently nominated by the CCP, who (often on the basis of ‘soft loans’ – where there is no expectation of repayment – from state banks) aim at maximising investment and growth, rather than maximising enterprise profits.
在中国还有毛泽东斯大林主义遗产。虽然促进了资本主义发展，国家仍控制着强大的具有经济影响力的杠杆。正如我们在一个单独的章节（中国的混合经济，序言段27 - 30 ）显示的，该政权，通过一组庞大的国有企业（SOEs） ，有效地控制一些关键工业部门：电信，交通，能源和国防生产，虽然国家部门的就业已急剧减少，国家部门仍然占38 ％ （ 2004年）的工业产值。这是事实，正如文森特说的，这其余大部分国有企业已经'公司化' ：他们不再在生产计划下运作的，而是根据政府的政策和根据市场的标准运转。但说： “国家的工业和商业部门是完全自主的并在大多数情况下是半私有化的单位是有些夸大其词的。在现实中，许多国有企业是由前中共官僚或中共当前所提名的老板经营的，（通常在从国有商业银行获得'软贷款'的基础上，没有还款的预期）其目的是最大限度地投资和增长，而不是企业利润最大化。
As Vincent says, “The banking sector is majority state-owned…” and the big four state banks are responsible for over 70% of all loans. Loans are provided, moreover, not according to strictly market criteria but, in many cases, in order to further the regime’s policy objectives. Indeed, soft loans are regarded (both in China and by foreign, free-market critics) as a supplementary form of public spending.
正如文森特说的， “银行业是大多数国有的... ”而且四大国有商业银行负责70 ％以上的全部贷款。此外，它们没有严格按照市场标准提供贷款，在许多情况下，是为了推进该政权的政策目标。事实上，软贷款被看作（在中国和外国都遭到自由市场的批评）一种公共开支的补充形式。
The state, moreover, through central and provincial governments, is responsible for most infrastructure spending – and this investment is a major factor in driving China’s high growth rate. At the same time, sales of formerly state-owned land (combined with soft loans from state-controlled banks) have been a big element in China’s massive, speculative property boom.
此外，从中央到省级政府，国家主要负责基础设施开支-这种投资是推动中国的高增长率的一个主要因素。与此同时，销售原来的国有土地（结合从国家控制的银行获得软贷款）已成为中国巨大的投机性房地产热中的一大要素。
。
The enforcement of macroeconomic policy also gives the central government considerable power to determine the direction and priorities of economic growth. There are undoubtedly provincial governments and both SOE and private bosses who defy central government policies. Nevertheless, both the CCP and the state apparatus are used to enforce policy.
宏观经济政策的执行给予中央政府相当大的权力以确定经济增长的方向和优先事项。毫无疑问这里有无视中央政府的政策的省政府以及国有企业和私人老板。然而，无论是中共还是其国家机器都被用来执行政策。
我们之间的分歧
SO, WHAT ARE our differences with Vincent’s approach? Essentially, our criticism is that Vincent (to use Trotsky’s phrase) is giving “a finished definition to an unfinished process”. We agree that there is a counter-revolutionary transition towards capitalism, but we do not accept that, as Vincent argues, the process is complete and that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. He refers, for instance, to Trotsky’s comment that a restoration of capitalism may occur either along “the path of an abrupt counter-revolutionary overturn” or “the path of successive shift ings”, culminating in “a Thermidorian shift”. (Thermidor refers to the defeat in 1794 of the Jacobins, the most advanced party in the French revolution, a term used by Trotsky to denote a victory of the counter-revolution.) Vincent says: “This ‘path of successive shiftings’ is an excellent description of what has happened in China. Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”. It “has happened”, capitalism “has been restored”. In other words, the “Thermidorian shift” has taken place. In our view, however, there will be further “shiftings” and the process is not yet complete.
那么我们与文森特的方法之间的分歧是什么呢？从本质上讲，我们的批评是，文森特（使用托洛茨基的用词）是给“一个未完成的进程一个完成的定义” 。我们同意，有一个复辟到资本主义的反革命过渡，但我们不接受文森特认为的这一过程已经完成，既中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家。比如，他提到托洛茨基的评论，即资本主义的复辟可能发生或者沿“突然反革命颠覆的道路”或“连续的蜕变的道路 ” ，最终以“ 热月政变”结束 。 （ 热月指的是在1794年法国革命中最先进的政党雅各宾派的失败，托洛茨基用这个词指反革命的胜利。 ）文森特说： “这'连续蜕变的道路'出色的描述了在中国发生了什么事。中国特色的资本主义类型已复辟“ 。 ”换言之， “ 热月政变”已经发生。然而，在我们看来，将进一步“ 蜕变”的过程尚未完成。
Vincent, in our view, puts forward a simplistic analysis of the complex process of transition, basing his categorical conclusion on a one-sided approach. For instance, on the role of the state, he rightly refers to the power of the “repressive one-party state of the CCP”. He also says, “This edifice of super-exploitation is built around the repressive one-party state of the CCP…” But he underestimates the role played by the powerful, ex-Stalinist state (the CCP and the state apparatus) in directing the transition. The regime has promoted the development of capitalist forces and the intervention of foreign, trans-national corporations, but it has also been determined to safeguard its monopoly of political power and overall control of the economy.
在我们看来，文森特对复杂的转型过程进行了简单化的分析，他的绝对的结论是片面的做法。举例来说，在国家的作用上，他正确地提到了“具有镇压性的共产党一党制国家”的力量 。他还表示， “这超级剥削的大厦是建立在具有镇压性饿共产党的一党制国家上的 ”但他低估了强大的前斯大林主义（中共及其国家机器）在指导过渡中所发挥的作用。该政权促进了资本主义力量的发展和外国跨国公司干预，但它也被确定为维护其政治权力的垄断和对经济的前面控制。
“[T]he state’s economic power”, writes Vincent, “has been seriously degraded”. True, the state no longer has the economic power that it had on the basis of the planned economy. Moreover, the development of capitalist forces has produced powerful centrifugal forces, which will tend to become stronger if the present course continues. But it is a mistake to imply (as Vincent does) that the Chinese state is now completely subservient to capitalist forces, within China and internationally.
文森特写道，“ 国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”诚然，国家不再拥有它在计划经济体制的基础上的经济力量。此外，资本主义势力的发展产生了强大的离心力，如果目前的路线继续下去，该离心力将趋于变得更加强大。但是，认为中国国家现在在中国和国际上已完全屈从于资本主义势力是错误的（如文森特所做的）。
The present Chinese state is not simply the equivalent of the state in Japan, Korea or Taiwan during their accelerated growth in the 1960s and 1970s, when (on the basis of the ‘Asian development model’) the state intervened in the economy to a much greater extent than in the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America. The surviving state-owned and state-controlled industries in China today are the product of the Maoist-Stalinist planned economy. They are not merely the equivalent of Japan’s keiretsu or South Korea’s chaebol, industrial-financial conglomerates that developed from big family-capitalist trusts.
当前的中国国家不是简单地等同于日本，韩国或台湾在其60年代和70年代的加速增长，根据“亚洲发展模式” ，那时国家比先进的资本主义经济的西欧和北美更大程度上干预经济。在今天的中国幸存的国有及国家控制的工业是斯大林主义计划经济产物。他们不仅仅是相当于作为从大家族资本主义的信托基金发展而来的工业金融集团的日本的keiretsu或韩国的财阀。
There is still a legacy of Maoism-Stalinism in China. Though fostering capitalist development, the state still controls powerful levers of economic influence. As we show in a separate section (China’s hybrid economy, pp27-30), the regime, through a cluster of huge state-owned enterprises (SOEs), effectively controls several key industrial sectors: telecoms, transport, energy, and defence production, etc. Though state-sector employment has been drastically reduced, the state sector still accounts for 38% (2004) of industrial output. It is true, as Vincent says, that most of the remaining SOEs have been ‘corporatized’: they no longer operate under a plan of production but, according to government policy, on the basis of market criteria. But it is an exaggeration to say: “The state industrial and commercial sector consist of completely autonomous and in most cases semi-privatised units”. In reality, many SOEs are run by ex-CCP bureaucrats or bosses currently nominated by the CCP, who (often on the basis of ‘soft loans’ – where there is no expectation of repayment – from state banks) aim at maximising investment and growth, rather than maximising enterprise profits.
在中国还有毛泽东斯大林主义遗产。虽然促进了资本主义发展，国家仍控制着强大的具有经济影响力的杠杆。正如我们在一个单独的章节（中国的混合经济，序言段27 - 30 ）显示的，该政权，通过一组庞大的国有企业（SOEs） ，有效地控制一些关键工业部门：电信，交通，能源和国防生产，虽然国家部门的就业已急剧减少，国家部门仍然占38 ％ （ 2004年）的工业产值。这是事实，正如文森特说的，这其余大部分国有企业已经'公司化' ：他们不再在生产计划下运作的，而是根据政府的政策和根据市场的标准运转。但说： “国家的工业和商业部门是完全自主的并在大多数情况下是半私有化的单位是有些夸大其词的。在现实中，许多国有企业是由前中共官僚或中共当前所提名的老板经营的，（通常在从国有商业银行获得'软贷款'的基础上，没有还款的预期）其目的是最大限度地投资和增长，而不是企业利润最大化。
As Vincent says, “The banking sector is majority state-owned…” and the big four state banks are responsible for over 70% of all loans. Loans are provided, moreover, not according to strictly market criteria but, in many cases, in order to further the regime’s policy objectives. Indeed, soft loans are regarded (both in China and by foreign, free-market critics) as a supplementary form of public spending.
正如文森特说的， “银行业是大多数国有的... ”而且四大国有商业银行负责70 ％以上的全部贷款。此外，它们没有严格按照市场标准提供贷款，在许多情况下，是为了推进该政权的政策目标。事实上，软贷款被看作（在中国和外国都遭到自由市场的批评）一种公共开支的补充形式。
The state, moreover, through central and provincial governments, is responsible for most infrastructure spending – and this investment is a major factor in driving China’s high growth rate. At the same time, sales of formerly state-owned land (combined with soft loans from state-controlled banks) have been a big element in China’s massive, speculative property boom.
此外，从中央到省级政府，国家主要负责基础设施开支-这种投资是推动中国的高增长率的一个主要因素。与此同时，销售原来的国有土地（结合从国家控制的银行获得软贷款）已成为中国巨大的投机性房地产热中的一大要素。
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The enforcement of macroeconomic policy also gives the central government considerable power to determine the direction and priorities of economic growth. There are undoubtedly provincial governments and both SOE and private bosses who defy central government policies. Nevertheless, both the CCP and the state apparatus are used to enforce policy.
宏观经济政策的执行给予中央政府相当大的权力以确定经济增长的方向和优先事项。毫无疑问这里有无视中央政府的政策的省政府以及国有企业和私人老板。然而，无论是中共还是其国家机器都被用来执行政策。
2008年11月13日星期四
我们的一致之处(中国国家性质）
我们的一致之处
BEFORE TAKING UP his arguments in more detail, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we will try to sketch out where we agree and where we disagree with Vincent Kolo. The Maoist-Stalinist planned economy (dominated by state-owned industry but undemocratically managed by a ruling bureaucracy), which began to crumble in the 1970s, no longer exists. Whatever state intervention there is, there will be no return to the Stalinist planned economy, which developed on the basis of the international class relations of a past era. The destruction in recent years of the social gains of the masses based on the planned economy – the ‘iron rice bowl’ (security of employment) and education, health and welfare provisions provided by state-owned enterprises and village communes – is a counter-revolutionary development that has had a devastating effect on workers and peasants. The leadership of the Chinese state – the CCP and the state apparatus – from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao has fostered the development of capitalist forces and sought to integrate China into the global economy. The leadership, recognising the failure of bureaucratic planning, has sought to develop a new social-economic base for its rule.
在更详细地就他的观点争论之前以及为了避免任何误解，我们将努力勾画出那里是我们认同文森特的和那里是我们不同意文森特的。毛派斯大林主义计划经济（由国有工业主导的，但却由处于统治地位的官僚进行非民主管理的）在20世纪70年代开始崩溃，已不复存在。无论是否存在国家干预，也不会再恢复到斯大林主义计划经济体制了，这个计划经济体制是建立在过去时代的国际阶级关系的基础上的。最近几年里，建立在计划经济基础上的群众取得的社会成果的丧失-国有企业和村镇公社所提供的'铁饭碗' （就业保障）和教育，卫生和福利的丧失-是一个反革命性的演变，对工人和农民产生了破坏性的影响。中国国家领导层-中共及其国家机器-从邓小平到胡锦涛促进资本主义势力的发展并设法将中国融入世界经济。该领导层承认官僚计划经济的失败，寻求发展它的统治的一种新的社会经济基础。
The growth of the capitalist market has been accompanied by the intensified, super-exploitation of the majority of workers and peasants (in both private and state-owned companies) and a grotesque widening of inequality. The growth of market relations has led to the emergence of a tiny stratum of capitalist billionaires and a wider layer of wealthy capitalists. The Chinese regime is one of the most repressive in the world and uses its massive apparatus to suppress all forms of opposition organisation, activity and discussion. The counter-revolutionary destruction of the social gains of the planned economy is virtually complete and China is heading in the direction of a ‘full’ capitalist economy.
资本主义市场的增长一直伴随着对大多数工人和农民（在私营和国有企业）强化的超剥削和不平等的异常地扩大。市场关系的增长导致出现了很小的作为亿万富翁的资本家阶层和更大的富裕的资本家阶层。中国政权是世界上最为具有镇压性的政权之一而且使用其庞大的国家机器来禁止一切形式的反对派组织，活动和讨论。对计划经济的社会成果的反革命破坏事实上已完成而且中国正在朝着完全的'资本主义经济方向而去。
We reject any claim by the regime (or its apologists) that they are developing the market – capitalist relations – in order to ‘strengthen socialism’, even in the limited sense of defending a state-planned economy. The regime no doubt fears a growing backlash against corruption, poverty wages, the growth of inequality and environmental destruction. But these social phenomena are the result of the policies they are pursuing. We judge the Chinese leaders by their deeds, not by the deceitful ‘socialist’ language they use in an attempt to legitimize their counter-revolutionary measures. We share the anger of Chinese workers and peasants at the squanderring of the gains of the 1949 revolution and the promotion of the most predatory elements of capitalism.
我们反对该政权（或其辩护士）的任何主张认为即使在捍卫国家计划经济的有限的意义上，他们正在发展的市场-资本主义的关系-是为了'加强社会主义'。毫无疑问该政权担心越来越强烈的反对腐败、底工资、不平等的增长和对环境的破坏。但是，这些社会现象是由于他们正在推行政策导致的。我们通过他们的行为而不是骗人的'社会主义'的语言来判断中国领导人，他们使用的这样的语言是企图合法化其反革命的措施。我们赞成中国工人和农民对毁弃1949年革命取得的成果而促进最掠夺性的资本主义因素的反革命表现出来的的愤怒。
There is also broad agreement with Vincent Kolo on the programme that should be adopted by Marxists in relation to China. We call for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be run under workers’ control and management, and for SOEs to be integrated in a plan of production under the direction of a workers’ government and managed by elected, democratic planning bodies. Large privately-owned firms should be nationalised – or re-nationalised – and also run democratically by workers as part of a planned economy. As internationalists, we also raise the issue of international collaboration between Chinese workers and workers in other countries with the aim of developing economic planning on an international level.
在与中国有关的方面马克思主义者应采用的纲要上。我们和文森特也有着广泛的一致的地方。我们呼吁国有企业（SOEs）在工人的控制和管理下经营，以及将国有企业纳入在工人政府的指导下的计划生产并由选举出来的民主的计划经济机构来管理。大型民营企业应当国有化-或重新国有化-并作为计划经济的一部分由工人民主地运行。作为国际主义者，我们还提出带着在国际水平上发展经济计划的目的，中国工人和其他国家工人之间的国际合作的问题。
We agree that (as Vincent says), “A political – ‘anti-bureaucratic’ – revolution is no longer enough to raise the working class to power”. But we do not accept his assertion that, “Nor is it correct to say a new revolution will combine tasks of the political and social revolution…” There are indisputably important sections of industry and banking remaining under state ownership and control, and a revolutionary overturn would entail placing them under workers’ control and management. A proletarian revolution would, of course, involve the overthrow of the present state and the expropriation of the Chinese and foreign capitalists. But the tasks facing the coming Chinese revolution, because of the remnants of Maoism-Stalinism, are in some ways more complex than in the advanced capitalist countries, and our revolutionary programme must reflect this reality.
我们认为， （如文森特所说） ， “政治上的-'反官僚' -革命不足以再使工人阶级获取权力”。但我们不接受他如下的说法， “说一场新的革命将结合政治和社会革命的任务是不正确地... ”无可争辩在中国，工业和银行业的重要部分仍处于国家所有和控制下，而且一个革命性的颠覆将需要对其进行工人的控制和管理。无产阶级革命，当然包括推翻目前的国家和中国和外国的资本家的剥削。但由于残余的毛泽东斯大林主义，在某些方面，将来的中国革命面临的任务要比先进的资本主义国家复杂得多，我们的革命纲要必须反映这一现实。
BEFORE TAKING UP his arguments in more detail, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we will try to sketch out where we agree and where we disagree with Vincent Kolo. The Maoist-Stalinist planned economy (dominated by state-owned industry but undemocratically managed by a ruling bureaucracy), which began to crumble in the 1970s, no longer exists. Whatever state intervention there is, there will be no return to the Stalinist planned economy, which developed on the basis of the international class relations of a past era. The destruction in recent years of the social gains of the masses based on the planned economy – the ‘iron rice bowl’ (security of employment) and education, health and welfare provisions provided by state-owned enterprises and village communes – is a counter-revolutionary development that has had a devastating effect on workers and peasants. The leadership of the Chinese state – the CCP and the state apparatus – from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao has fostered the development of capitalist forces and sought to integrate China into the global economy. The leadership, recognising the failure of bureaucratic planning, has sought to develop a new social-economic base for its rule.
在更详细地就他的观点争论之前以及为了避免任何误解，我们将努力勾画出那里是我们认同文森特的和那里是我们不同意文森特的。毛派斯大林主义计划经济（由国有工业主导的，但却由处于统治地位的官僚进行非民主管理的）在20世纪70年代开始崩溃，已不复存在。无论是否存在国家干预，也不会再恢复到斯大林主义计划经济体制了，这个计划经济体制是建立在过去时代的国际阶级关系的基础上的。最近几年里，建立在计划经济基础上的群众取得的社会成果的丧失-国有企业和村镇公社所提供的'铁饭碗' （就业保障）和教育，卫生和福利的丧失-是一个反革命性的演变，对工人和农民产生了破坏性的影响。中国国家领导层-中共及其国家机器-从邓小平到胡锦涛促进资本主义势力的发展并设法将中国融入世界经济。该领导层承认官僚计划经济的失败，寻求发展它的统治的一种新的社会经济基础。
The growth of the capitalist market has been accompanied by the intensified, super-exploitation of the majority of workers and peasants (in both private and state-owned companies) and a grotesque widening of inequality. The growth of market relations has led to the emergence of a tiny stratum of capitalist billionaires and a wider layer of wealthy capitalists. The Chinese regime is one of the most repressive in the world and uses its massive apparatus to suppress all forms of opposition organisation, activity and discussion. The counter-revolutionary destruction of the social gains of the planned economy is virtually complete and China is heading in the direction of a ‘full’ capitalist economy.
资本主义市场的增长一直伴随着对大多数工人和农民（在私营和国有企业）强化的超剥削和不平等的异常地扩大。市场关系的增长导致出现了很小的作为亿万富翁的资本家阶层和更大的富裕的资本家阶层。中国政权是世界上最为具有镇压性的政权之一而且使用其庞大的国家机器来禁止一切形式的反对派组织，活动和讨论。对计划经济的社会成果的反革命破坏事实上已完成而且中国正在朝着完全的'资本主义经济方向而去。
We reject any claim by the regime (or its apologists) that they are developing the market – capitalist relations – in order to ‘strengthen socialism’, even in the limited sense of defending a state-planned economy. The regime no doubt fears a growing backlash against corruption, poverty wages, the growth of inequality and environmental destruction. But these social phenomena are the result of the policies they are pursuing. We judge the Chinese leaders by their deeds, not by the deceitful ‘socialist’ language they use in an attempt to legitimize their counter-revolutionary measures. We share the anger of Chinese workers and peasants at the squanderring of the gains of the 1949 revolution and the promotion of the most predatory elements of capitalism.
我们反对该政权（或其辩护士）的任何主张认为即使在捍卫国家计划经济的有限的意义上，他们正在发展的市场-资本主义的关系-是为了'加强社会主义'。毫无疑问该政权担心越来越强烈的反对腐败、底工资、不平等的增长和对环境的破坏。但是，这些社会现象是由于他们正在推行政策导致的。我们通过他们的行为而不是骗人的'社会主义'的语言来判断中国领导人，他们使用的这样的语言是企图合法化其反革命的措施。我们赞成中国工人和农民对毁弃1949年革命取得的成果而促进最掠夺性的资本主义因素的反革命表现出来的的愤怒。
There is also broad agreement with Vincent Kolo on the programme that should be adopted by Marxists in relation to China. We call for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be run under workers’ control and management, and for SOEs to be integrated in a plan of production under the direction of a workers’ government and managed by elected, democratic planning bodies. Large privately-owned firms should be nationalised – or re-nationalised – and also run democratically by workers as part of a planned economy. As internationalists, we also raise the issue of international collaboration between Chinese workers and workers in other countries with the aim of developing economic planning on an international level.
在与中国有关的方面马克思主义者应采用的纲要上。我们和文森特也有着广泛的一致的地方。我们呼吁国有企业（SOEs）在工人的控制和管理下经营，以及将国有企业纳入在工人政府的指导下的计划生产并由选举出来的民主的计划经济机构来管理。大型民营企业应当国有化-或重新国有化-并作为计划经济的一部分由工人民主地运行。作为国际主义者，我们还提出带着在国际水平上发展经济计划的目的，中国工人和其他国家工人之间的国际合作的问题。
We agree that (as Vincent says), “A political – ‘anti-bureaucratic’ – revolution is no longer enough to raise the working class to power”. But we do not accept his assertion that, “Nor is it correct to say a new revolution will combine tasks of the political and social revolution…” There are indisputably important sections of industry and banking remaining under state ownership and control, and a revolutionary overturn would entail placing them under workers’ control and management. A proletarian revolution would, of course, involve the overthrow of the present state and the expropriation of the Chinese and foreign capitalists. But the tasks facing the coming Chinese revolution, because of the remnants of Maoism-Stalinism, are in some ways more complex than in the advanced capitalist countries, and our revolutionary programme must reflect this reality.
我们认为， （如文森特所说） ， “政治上的-'反官僚' -革命不足以再使工人阶级获取权力”。但我们不接受他如下的说法， “说一场新的革命将结合政治和社会革命的任务是不正确地... ”无可争辩在中国，工业和银行业的重要部分仍处于国家所有和控制下，而且一个革命性的颠覆将需要对其进行工人的控制和管理。无产阶级革命，当然包括推翻目前的国家和中国和外国的资本家的剥削。但由于残余的毛泽东斯大林主义，在某些方面，将来的中国革命面临的任务要比先进的资本主义国家复杂得多，我们的革命纲要必须反映这一现实。
2008年11月12日星期三
展望（中国国家性质）
展望
Perspectives
“THE STATE SECTOR today”, writes Vincent, “is a lever for developing the capitalist economy”, providing a framework of basic industries and infrastructure. This is evidently true. The regime is carrying out, under contemporary international conditions, the barbarous tasks of ‘primitive accumulation’, historically required as the basis for capitalist growth. There is a brutal process of forced urbanisation, as the poor peasantry are being driven from the land and are forced to seek low-paid work under atrocious conditions in the sweatshops and construction sites of the big cities. In the long run, if this development continues in an uninterrupted way, it would produce a ‘fully’ capitalist society. But this depends on perspectives.
文森特写道：“今天的国有部门是一个发展资本主义经济的杠杆” ，为基础工业和基础设施提供了一个框架。这显然是正确的。该政权在当代国际条件下正在执行'原始积累'的野蛮任务，资本主义增长历史性基础性的需要。有一个强迫城市化的残酷的过程，贫穷的农民正在被赶出土地，被迫在血汗工厂和大城市的建筑工地的恶劣的工作条件下寻求低工资的工作。从长远来看，如果这种发展以一个不间断的方式继续下去，这将产生一个'完全'的资本主义社会。但是，这有待观察。
If there were to be a long period of rapid growth in the world capitalist economy (continuing, for instance, the record 5% per annum growth of 2002-07), accompanied by 10% a year growth in the Chinese economy, then China could, theoretically, move steadily towards a ‘fully’ capitalist economy. At a certain point, on that basis, a strengthened Chinese bourgeoisie would come into conflict with the ex-Stalinist Bonapartist state and attempt to take direct control of a Chinese capitalist society (though the bourgeoisie would be increasingly challenged by a strengthened working class). Given the current implosion of the global capitalist finance system and the beginnings of a world recession, that does not seem the most likely perspective.
如果世界资本主义经济有一个漫长的快速增长的时期（例如，2002-07年连续的以创记录的5 ％的年增长率增长），伴随着中国经济以每年10 ％增长率增长，那么中国理论上可能稳步迈向'完全的'资本主义经济。在某个时刻，在此基础上，巩固了的中国资产阶级将与前斯大林主义波拿巴国家发生冲突并试图直接控制中国的资本主义社会（虽然资产阶级将越来越受到强大了的工人阶级的挑战） 。鉴于目前全球资本主义金融体系的爆裂，并开始了世界经济衰退，这似乎不是最有可能的前景。
If there is a prolonged world economic crisis, on the other hand, which would inevitably result in a serious downturn in the Chinese economy, the regime could be forced to intervene in the economy to prevent economic and social collapse, and head-off a revolutionary challenge from the Chinese workers and peasants. The Chinese leaders have already taken note of the abrupt swing of the US government from free-market fundamentalism to state intervention and the nationalisation of failed financial institutions. Faced with the prospect of failed industries collapsing, it is likely that the Chinese state will intervene and take them over. Given the history of the Chinese state and the existing extent of state ownership, this is likely to be on a bigger scale than in the major capitalist states.
另一方面，如果世界经济危机长期化，这将不可避免地造成中国经济的严重衰退，该政权可能会被迫干预经济，防止经济和社会崩溃，并制止来自中国的工人和农民的一种革命性的挑战。中国领导人已经注意到美国政府突然由自由市场原教旨主义回转到对经营不善的金融机构进行国家干预和国有化。面对经营失败的产业崩溃的前景，中国国家很可能将进行干预并接管它们。鉴于中国国家的历史和国家所有制的现有程度，这可能以比主要资本主义国家更大的规模进行。
The Chinese regime (as with Bismarck, the tsarist autocracy, and other Bonapartist regimes in the past) faces the problem that, in ‘breeding’ a new capitalist class in China, it is also breeding a new working class. Already there is a high level of social protest and strikes, often brutally repressed by the regime. In coming years the Chinese workers will increasingly form independent trade unions and their own political parties. The advanced layer of workers will in the course of struggles prepare to overthrow the regime and sweep away the capitalists, Chinese and foreign.
在中国政权（和俾斯麦、沙皇独裁政府以及过去的其他波拿巴政权一样）面临的问题是在中国“培育”一个新的资产阶级的同时它也培育了一个新的工人阶级。已经有一个高水平的社会抗议和罢工，这些往往被该政权残酷镇压。在未来几年的中国工人将越来越多地形成独立工会和自己的政党。工人的先进的层将在斗争过程中准备推翻该政权和扫除中国和外国的资本家。
We cannot predict the timescale of such events. But we should not take it for granted that China will automatically become a ‘fully’ capitalist society. In the coming years, events and the influence of Marxist ideas will give rise to a revolutionary movement aiming to overthrow the regime, sweep away capitalism, and re-establish nationalised property relations and planned production – this time under the democratic control of the working class and linked to an international perspective for a world socialist economy.
我们无法预测这类事件的时间表。但是，我们不应想当然地认为中国将自动成为一个'完全'的资本主义社会。在今后几年内，发生的事件和马克思主义思想的影响力将产生革命性的行动旨在推翻该政权和扫除资本主义以便重新确立国有财产关系和计划生产-这次是在工人阶级的民主控制下并与世界社会主义经济的国际前景连接起来。
Perspectives
“THE STATE SECTOR today”, writes Vincent, “is a lever for developing the capitalist economy”, providing a framework of basic industries and infrastructure. This is evidently true. The regime is carrying out, under contemporary international conditions, the barbarous tasks of ‘primitive accumulation’, historically required as the basis for capitalist growth. There is a brutal process of forced urbanisation, as the poor peasantry are being driven from the land and are forced to seek low-paid work under atrocious conditions in the sweatshops and construction sites of the big cities. In the long run, if this development continues in an uninterrupted way, it would produce a ‘fully’ capitalist society. But this depends on perspectives.
文森特写道：“今天的国有部门是一个发展资本主义经济的杠杆” ，为基础工业和基础设施提供了一个框架。这显然是正确的。该政权在当代国际条件下正在执行'原始积累'的野蛮任务，资本主义增长历史性基础性的需要。有一个强迫城市化的残酷的过程，贫穷的农民正在被赶出土地，被迫在血汗工厂和大城市的建筑工地的恶劣的工作条件下寻求低工资的工作。从长远来看，如果这种发展以一个不间断的方式继续下去，这将产生一个'完全'的资本主义社会。但是，这有待观察。
If there were to be a long period of rapid growth in the world capitalist economy (continuing, for instance, the record 5% per annum growth of 2002-07), accompanied by 10% a year growth in the Chinese economy, then China could, theoretically, move steadily towards a ‘fully’ capitalist economy. At a certain point, on that basis, a strengthened Chinese bourgeoisie would come into conflict with the ex-Stalinist Bonapartist state and attempt to take direct control of a Chinese capitalist society (though the bourgeoisie would be increasingly challenged by a strengthened working class). Given the current implosion of the global capitalist finance system and the beginnings of a world recession, that does not seem the most likely perspective.
如果世界资本主义经济有一个漫长的快速增长的时期（例如，2002-07年连续的以创记录的5 ％的年增长率增长），伴随着中国经济以每年10 ％增长率增长，那么中国理论上可能稳步迈向'完全的'资本主义经济。在某个时刻，在此基础上，巩固了的中国资产阶级将与前斯大林主义波拿巴国家发生冲突并试图直接控制中国的资本主义社会（虽然资产阶级将越来越受到强大了的工人阶级的挑战） 。鉴于目前全球资本主义金融体系的爆裂，并开始了世界经济衰退，这似乎不是最有可能的前景。
If there is a prolonged world economic crisis, on the other hand, which would inevitably result in a serious downturn in the Chinese economy, the regime could be forced to intervene in the economy to prevent economic and social collapse, and head-off a revolutionary challenge from the Chinese workers and peasants. The Chinese leaders have already taken note of the abrupt swing of the US government from free-market fundamentalism to state intervention and the nationalisation of failed financial institutions. Faced with the prospect of failed industries collapsing, it is likely that the Chinese state will intervene and take them over. Given the history of the Chinese state and the existing extent of state ownership, this is likely to be on a bigger scale than in the major capitalist states.
另一方面，如果世界经济危机长期化，这将不可避免地造成中国经济的严重衰退，该政权可能会被迫干预经济，防止经济和社会崩溃，并制止来自中国的工人和农民的一种革命性的挑战。中国领导人已经注意到美国政府突然由自由市场原教旨主义回转到对经营不善的金融机构进行国家干预和国有化。面对经营失败的产业崩溃的前景，中国国家很可能将进行干预并接管它们。鉴于中国国家的历史和国家所有制的现有程度，这可能以比主要资本主义国家更大的规模进行。
The Chinese regime (as with Bismarck, the tsarist autocracy, and other Bonapartist regimes in the past) faces the problem that, in ‘breeding’ a new capitalist class in China, it is also breeding a new working class. Already there is a high level of social protest and strikes, often brutally repressed by the regime. In coming years the Chinese workers will increasingly form independent trade unions and their own political parties. The advanced layer of workers will in the course of struggles prepare to overthrow the regime and sweep away the capitalists, Chinese and foreign.
在中国政权（和俾斯麦、沙皇独裁政府以及过去的其他波拿巴政权一样）面临的问题是在中国“培育”一个新的资产阶级的同时它也培育了一个新的工人阶级。已经有一个高水平的社会抗议和罢工，这些往往被该政权残酷镇压。在未来几年的中国工人将越来越多地形成独立工会和自己的政党。工人的先进的层将在斗争过程中准备推翻该政权和扫除中国和外国的资本家。
We cannot predict the timescale of such events. But we should not take it for granted that China will automatically become a ‘fully’ capitalist society. In the coming years, events and the influence of Marxist ideas will give rise to a revolutionary movement aiming to overthrow the regime, sweep away capitalism, and re-establish nationalised property relations and planned production – this time under the democratic control of the working class and linked to an international perspective for a world socialist economy.
我们无法预测这类事件的时间表。但是，我们不应想当然地认为中国将自动成为一个'完全'的资本主义社会。在今后几年内，发生的事件和马克思主义思想的影响力将产生革命性的行动旨在推翻该政权和扫除资本主义以便重新确立国有财产关系和计划生产-这次是在工人阶级的民主控制下并与世界社会主义经济的国际前景连接起来。
2008年11月11日星期二
继续-中国国家的性质（这些是草译，还待整理）
Method
方法
IN OUR VIEW, the possibility of swings by the Chinese regime between promoting accelerated capitalist development and increased state intervention to stabilise the economy is inherent in the contradictory, hybrid character of the Chinese state. This is why our method of analysis is important. In 1936, Leon Trotsky analysed the character of the Soviet Union in The Revolution Betrayed (chapter 9: Social Relations in the Soviet Union). The situation was obviously different from China today. But from the point of view of Marxist method, Trotsky’s analysis of the Soviet Union of that period as a transitional or intermediate social formation is very relevant to our approach to contemporary China.
在我们看来，中国政权可能在加速推进资本主义发展和增加国家干预以稳定经济之间的摇摆具有内在固有的矛盾，既中国国家的混合的性质。这就是为什么我们的分析方法是很重要的。 1936年，托洛茨基在《革命的背叛》（第9章：苏联的社会关系）中分析苏联的性质。这种情况显然不同于今日的中国。但是，从马克思主义的方法的角度来看，，托洛茨基对那个期间苏联的分析，把苏联看作一个过渡或中间的社会形态，相应地，这个方法也是我们对当代中国的分析方法。
Finished social categories, such as capitalism and socialism, wrote Trotsky, had to be abandoned in favour of “a more complete definition”, necessarily more “complicated and ponderous”. Trotsky summarised his analysis of the Soviet Union in nine points, summarising key features of the Soviet state and society, and posing several alternative perspectives for the fate of the Soviet state.
托洛茨基写道，不得不放弃完美的社会范畴，如资本主义和社会主义，这样有利于“更完整的解说” ，必然更加“复杂和沉重” 。托洛茨基在对苏联的分析中总结出了9点，总结了苏联国家和社会的主要特点并提到了作为苏联命运的几种可能性。
“Doctrinaires will doubtless not be satisfied with this hypothetical definition. They would like categorical formulae: yes-yes, and no-no. Sociological problems would certainly be simpler, if social phenomena had always a finished character. There is nothing more dangerous, however, than to throw out of reality, for the sake of logical completeness, elements which today violate your scheme and tomorrow may wholly overturn it. In our analysis, we have above all avoided doing violence to dynamic social formations which have had no precedent and have no analogies. The scientific task, as well as the political, is not to give a finished definition to an unfinished process, but to follow all its stages, separate its progressive from its reactionary tendencies, expose their mutual relations, foresee possible variants of development, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
“ 教条主义者无疑对这一假设的定义不会感到满意。他们喜欢绝对的公式：是就是是，非就是非。如果社会现象总是具有最终的性质，那么社会学的问题肯定会更简单。没有什么比脱离现实更危险的了，为了合乎逻辑的完整性，今天和您的计划不一致的东西可能明天完全相反。在我们的分析中，我们首先要避免对没有先例和没有相似物的动态的社会形态做出武断分析的作法。科学的任务，以及政治不能对一个未完成的过程给出完成的定义，而是循着其所有的阶段，把它的进步之处和它的反动倾向分离开，揭示其相互关系并预见到各种可能的演变以及在深谋远虑中找到行动根据。 “
In a notebook written in the 1930s, Trotsky made a further general comment that is extremely relevant to any discussion of the character of the Chinese state today: “Some objects [phenomena] are confined easily within boundaries according to logical classification, others present [us with] difficulties: they can be put here or there, but within a stricter relationship – nowhere. While provoking the indignation of systematisers, such transitional forms are exceptionally interesting to dialecticians, for they smash the limited boundaries of classification, revealing the real connections and consecutiveness of a living process”. (Trotsky’s Notebooks 1933-1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism, edited by Philip Pomper, NY Columbia University Press, 1986)
1930年代写的一本笔记本中，托洛茨基作出了进一步的一般性评论，该评论与对今天中国性质的任何讨论非常有关的： “按照逻辑分类，有些对象[现象]边界清晰易于界定，其他却给我们带来困难：他们可以这样也可以那样，但处在一个严格的关系中-到处都无。虽然激起系统主义者的愤慨，这种过渡形式对辨证家来说是非常有趣的，他们打破分类的边界限制，揭示了活生生的过程的真实的连接和连续性 “ 。 （1933年至1935年托洛茨基的笔记：关于列宁的著作，辩证法和进化论，Philip Pomper编辑 ，美国纽约哥伦比亚大学出版社， 1986年）
We believe that the transformation in China is also a process without precedent and that we have to ‘follow all stages’. Our analysis may appear more ‘complicated and ponderous’ than the simple assertion that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. However, it is necessary, in our view, to take account of the contradictory features of the transition and “foresee possible variants of developments, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
我们相信中国的变化也是没有先例的过程，我们必须追踪所有阶段。我们的分析可能会显得比简单地断言中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家更为'复杂和笨重'。然而，它是必要的，我们认为，考虑到过渡的矛盾的特点和“预见到演变的多种可能性并在深谋远虑中找到行动的根据。”
The role of the Bonapartist state
LINKED TO THE question of method is the issue of the role of the state, in particular the autonomous role that can be played – under certain conditions, for a certain period of time – by a Bonapartist state consisting of a powerful apparatus and army, together with a powerful ruling party, in the case of China. Vincent, in our view, does not take sufficient account of the role of the ex-Stalinist, Bonapartist state in steering the transition in China.
波拿巴国家的作用
与方法的问题联系在一起的是国家作用的问题，特别是由强大的国家机器和军队以及一个强大的执政党组成的波拿巴国家-在特定条件下，在一定的时间内-可发挥的自发的作用。在我们看来，就中国而言，文森特没有充分考虑到中国前斯大林主义者波拿巴国家在指导国家过渡上所发挥的作用。
“The class character of any social organism, regime, or party”, writes Vincent, “is determined by the class interests it serves – its social base”. As a general proposition, this is correct. But it is not sufficient for analysing the situation in China. The Chinese regime has abandoned defence of nationalised property and the planned economy, historically progressive relations of production, and is promoting the development of capitalist relations. But the situation in China is conditioned by the past development of the Maoist-Stalinist system after 1949. While defending the planned economy, the state was relatively independent, not subject to democratic checks by the working class. Now the regime has turned to a pro-capitalist, counter-revolutionary course. This undoubtedly serves the interests of an emerging Chinese capitalist class and international capital. But it would be too simplistic, at this stage, to say that the regime is simply the repressive agent or servant of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The Chinese state, a product of Maoism-Stalinism, has a large degree of autonomy in fostering and steering the development of capitalism while striving to preserve its own power.
文森特写道“任何社会有机体，政权，或政党的阶级性质是由它所服务的阶级利益决定的” 。一般来说，这是正确的。但它在分析中国的情况上是不够的。中国政权已放弃捍卫具有历史进步性的生产关系的国有财产和计划经济而促进发展资本主义的关系。但中国的情况是以过去1949年之后毛泽东斯大林主义制度的发展的为条件的。虽然当时的国家捍卫计划经济，但国家是相对独立的，不受制于由工人阶级监督的民主的。现在，这一制度已转向有利于资本主义的，反革命的路线。这无疑有利于新兴的中国资产阶级和国际资本。但是，如果在这一阶段说该政权完全是镇压的代理人或中国资产阶级的仆人就过于简单化了。中国这个国家是毛泽东斯大林主义的产物，在促进和指导资本主义发展的同时努力维护自己的权力上有很大程度的自发性。
There are analogies for this development in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, where they show that, under certain circumstances, a state power balancing between social classes (a ‘Bonapartist’ state) can play an autonomous role in sponsoring the development of capitalist industry and fostering the development of a capitalist class. In Germany during the 1870s, for instance, Otto von Bismarck – based on the Prussian monarchist state, the army elite and the Junker landlords – promoted the development of capitalist forces as the necessary basis for German imperialism’s increased military and economic power.
卡尔•马克思和恩格斯的著作对这种演变有类似的分析，他们在那里表明，在特定情况下，平衡社会各阶层的国家权力（波拿巴国家）可以发挥作用以帮助资本主义工业的发展和促进资产阶级的发展。德国在19世纪70年代，例如，奥托•冯•俾斯麦-基于普鲁士君主国家，军队精英和容克地主-促进了资本主义力量的发展并使该发展成为德国帝国主义增加其军事和经济力量的必要基础。
Another example is the Russian tsarist state during the second half of the 19th century. Based on archaic feudal landlordism, some tsarist leaders recognised that to survive as a military power they had to develop industry (especially railways and armaments). After the Crimean war (1853-56), Engels wrote, the Russian government “set about breeding a Russian capitalist class”. (The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism, 1890, Marx-Engels Collected Works vol 27) The tsarist state remained a powerful force in Russian society until the crisis of the first world war and its overthrow by the October revolution in 1917. Like Bismarck, the tsarist state in breeding a capitalist class also bred a small, but powerful, working class.
另一个例子是19世纪下半叶的沙俄国家。基于陈旧的封建地主所有制 ，一些沙皇领导人认识到，为了作为军事大国而存在，他们必须发展工业（特别是铁路和军备） 。恩格斯写道，克里米亚战争（ 1853至1856年）后 ，俄罗斯政府着手“培育俄罗斯资产阶级” 。 （沙俄的对外政策， 1890年，马克思恩格斯全集第27卷）沙皇国家在俄罗斯社会保留着强大的力量直到第一次世界大战的危机而在1917年十月革命下被推翻。和俾斯麦一样，培育资本家阶级的沙皇国家也孕育了规模不大但强有力的工人阶级。
In China, the former Maoist-Stalinist state has used its massive power to ‘breed’ a Chinese capitalist class. The regime has adapted the state (the party, the army and the apparatus) to the transition to capitalism. But the state retains considerable power, while the new capitalist forces are, at this stage, an emergent social class in the process of formation.
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的权力'培育了'中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家（党，军队和国家机器）适应向资本主义的过渡。但是，国家保留了相当大的权力，而在这一阶段新的资本主义势力作为一个新兴的社会阶层处在形成过程中。
The burgeoning capitalist elements are very diverse, ranging from small family businesses to the owners of giant corporations. At this stage, they lack social cohesion and, as yet, have not developed any independent political representation. Many of the capitalists are ex-bureaucrats or state-sector bosses, and retain close links with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the apparatus. They are mostly quite content to allow the state to create the conditions for the growth of capitalist business, and provide ‘social stability’, that is, to protect them from resistance and mass protest by workers and peasants. At this stage, there is no threat to the regime’s absolute political power from the emergent capitalist class.
新兴的资本主义的要素是非常多样的，从小型家族企业到大公司的业主。在这个阶段，他们缺乏社会凝聚力，迄今为止，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。许多资本家是前官员或国有部门的老板，并与中国共产党（中共）和国家机器保持着密切联系。他们大多相当地满意于用国家的力量来为资本主义企业的生长创造条件并提供'社会稳定'的环境 ，也就是保护他们免受工人和农民的大规模的抗议活动的影响。在这个阶段，没有来自这个新兴资产阶级的对该政权的绝对的政治权力的威胁。
方法
IN OUR VIEW, the possibility of swings by the Chinese regime between promoting accelerated capitalist development and increased state intervention to stabilise the economy is inherent in the contradictory, hybrid character of the Chinese state. This is why our method of analysis is important. In 1936, Leon Trotsky analysed the character of the Soviet Union in The Revolution Betrayed (chapter 9: Social Relations in the Soviet Union). The situation was obviously different from China today. But from the point of view of Marxist method, Trotsky’s analysis of the Soviet Union of that period as a transitional or intermediate social formation is very relevant to our approach to contemporary China.
在我们看来，中国政权可能在加速推进资本主义发展和增加国家干预以稳定经济之间的摇摆具有内在固有的矛盾，既中国国家的混合的性质。这就是为什么我们的分析方法是很重要的。 1936年，托洛茨基在《革命的背叛》（第9章：苏联的社会关系）中分析苏联的性质。这种情况显然不同于今日的中国。但是，从马克思主义的方法的角度来看，，托洛茨基对那个期间苏联的分析，把苏联看作一个过渡或中间的社会形态，相应地，这个方法也是我们对当代中国的分析方法。
Finished social categories, such as capitalism and socialism, wrote Trotsky, had to be abandoned in favour of “a more complete definition”, necessarily more “complicated and ponderous”. Trotsky summarised his analysis of the Soviet Union in nine points, summarising key features of the Soviet state and society, and posing several alternative perspectives for the fate of the Soviet state.
托洛茨基写道，不得不放弃完美的社会范畴，如资本主义和社会主义，这样有利于“更完整的解说” ，必然更加“复杂和沉重” 。托洛茨基在对苏联的分析中总结出了9点，总结了苏联国家和社会的主要特点并提到了作为苏联命运的几种可能性。
“Doctrinaires will doubtless not be satisfied with this hypothetical definition. They would like categorical formulae: yes-yes, and no-no. Sociological problems would certainly be simpler, if social phenomena had always a finished character. There is nothing more dangerous, however, than to throw out of reality, for the sake of logical completeness, elements which today violate your scheme and tomorrow may wholly overturn it. In our analysis, we have above all avoided doing violence to dynamic social formations which have had no precedent and have no analogies. The scientific task, as well as the political, is not to give a finished definition to an unfinished process, but to follow all its stages, separate its progressive from its reactionary tendencies, expose their mutual relations, foresee possible variants of development, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
“ 教条主义者无疑对这一假设的定义不会感到满意。他们喜欢绝对的公式：是就是是，非就是非。如果社会现象总是具有最终的性质，那么社会学的问题肯定会更简单。没有什么比脱离现实更危险的了，为了合乎逻辑的完整性，今天和您的计划不一致的东西可能明天完全相反。在我们的分析中，我们首先要避免对没有先例和没有相似物的动态的社会形态做出武断分析的作法。科学的任务，以及政治不能对一个未完成的过程给出完成的定义，而是循着其所有的阶段，把它的进步之处和它的反动倾向分离开，揭示其相互关系并预见到各种可能的演变以及在深谋远虑中找到行动根据。 “
In a notebook written in the 1930s, Trotsky made a further general comment that is extremely relevant to any discussion of the character of the Chinese state today: “Some objects [phenomena] are confined easily within boundaries according to logical classification, others present [us with] difficulties: they can be put here or there, but within a stricter relationship – nowhere. While provoking the indignation of systematisers, such transitional forms are exceptionally interesting to dialecticians, for they smash the limited boundaries of classification, revealing the real connections and consecutiveness of a living process”. (Trotsky’s Notebooks 1933-1935: Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism, edited by Philip Pomper, NY Columbia University Press, 1986)
1930年代写的一本笔记本中，托洛茨基作出了进一步的一般性评论，该评论与对今天中国性质的任何讨论非常有关的： “按照逻辑分类，有些对象[现象]边界清晰易于界定，其他却给我们带来困难：他们可以这样也可以那样，但处在一个严格的关系中-到处都无。虽然激起系统主义者的愤慨，这种过渡形式对辨证家来说是非常有趣的，他们打破分类的边界限制，揭示了活生生的过程的真实的连接和连续性 “ 。 （1933年至1935年托洛茨基的笔记：关于列宁的著作，辩证法和进化论，Philip Pomper编辑 ，美国纽约哥伦比亚大学出版社， 1986年）
We believe that the transformation in China is also a process without precedent and that we have to ‘follow all stages’. Our analysis may appear more ‘complicated and ponderous’ than the simple assertion that China is now a ‘fully’ capitalist state. However, it is necessary, in our view, to take account of the contradictory features of the transition and “foresee possible variants of developments, and find in this foresight a basis for action”.
我们相信中国的变化也是没有先例的过程，我们必须追踪所有阶段。我们的分析可能会显得比简单地断言中国现在是一个'完全'的资本主义国家更为'复杂和笨重'。然而，它是必要的，我们认为，考虑到过渡的矛盾的特点和“预见到演变的多种可能性并在深谋远虑中找到行动的根据。”
The role of the Bonapartist state
LINKED TO THE question of method is the issue of the role of the state, in particular the autonomous role that can be played – under certain conditions, for a certain period of time – by a Bonapartist state consisting of a powerful apparatus and army, together with a powerful ruling party, in the case of China. Vincent, in our view, does not take sufficient account of the role of the ex-Stalinist, Bonapartist state in steering the transition in China.
波拿巴国家的作用
与方法的问题联系在一起的是国家作用的问题，特别是由强大的国家机器和军队以及一个强大的执政党组成的波拿巴国家-在特定条件下，在一定的时间内-可发挥的自发的作用。在我们看来，就中国而言，文森特没有充分考虑到中国前斯大林主义者波拿巴国家在指导国家过渡上所发挥的作用。
“The class character of any social organism, regime, or party”, writes Vincent, “is determined by the class interests it serves – its social base”. As a general proposition, this is correct. But it is not sufficient for analysing the situation in China. The Chinese regime has abandoned defence of nationalised property and the planned economy, historically progressive relations of production, and is promoting the development of capitalist relations. But the situation in China is conditioned by the past development of the Maoist-Stalinist system after 1949. While defending the planned economy, the state was relatively independent, not subject to democratic checks by the working class. Now the regime has turned to a pro-capitalist, counter-revolutionary course. This undoubtedly serves the interests of an emerging Chinese capitalist class and international capital. But it would be too simplistic, at this stage, to say that the regime is simply the repressive agent or servant of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The Chinese state, a product of Maoism-Stalinism, has a large degree of autonomy in fostering and steering the development of capitalism while striving to preserve its own power.
文森特写道“任何社会有机体，政权，或政党的阶级性质是由它所服务的阶级利益决定的” 。一般来说，这是正确的。但它在分析中国的情况上是不够的。中国政权已放弃捍卫具有历史进步性的生产关系的国有财产和计划经济而促进发展资本主义的关系。但中国的情况是以过去1949年之后毛泽东斯大林主义制度的发展的为条件的。虽然当时的国家捍卫计划经济，但国家是相对独立的，不受制于由工人阶级监督的民主的。现在，这一制度已转向有利于资本主义的，反革命的路线。这无疑有利于新兴的中国资产阶级和国际资本。但是，如果在这一阶段说该政权完全是镇压的代理人或中国资产阶级的仆人就过于简单化了。中国这个国家是毛泽东斯大林主义的产物，在促进和指导资本主义发展的同时努力维护自己的权力上有很大程度的自发性。
There are analogies for this development in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, where they show that, under certain circumstances, a state power balancing between social classes (a ‘Bonapartist’ state) can play an autonomous role in sponsoring the development of capitalist industry and fostering the development of a capitalist class. In Germany during the 1870s, for instance, Otto von Bismarck – based on the Prussian monarchist state, the army elite and the Junker landlords – promoted the development of capitalist forces as the necessary basis for German imperialism’s increased military and economic power.
卡尔•马克思和恩格斯的著作对这种演变有类似的分析，他们在那里表明，在特定情况下，平衡社会各阶层的国家权力（波拿巴国家）可以发挥作用以帮助资本主义工业的发展和促进资产阶级的发展。德国在19世纪70年代，例如，奥托•冯•俾斯麦-基于普鲁士君主国家，军队精英和容克地主-促进了资本主义力量的发展并使该发展成为德国帝国主义增加其军事和经济力量的必要基础。
Another example is the Russian tsarist state during the second half of the 19th century. Based on archaic feudal landlordism, some tsarist leaders recognised that to survive as a military power they had to develop industry (especially railways and armaments). After the Crimean war (1853-56), Engels wrote, the Russian government “set about breeding a Russian capitalist class”. (The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism, 1890, Marx-Engels Collected Works vol 27) The tsarist state remained a powerful force in Russian society until the crisis of the first world war and its overthrow by the October revolution in 1917. Like Bismarck, the tsarist state in breeding a capitalist class also bred a small, but powerful, working class.
另一个例子是19世纪下半叶的沙俄国家。基于陈旧的封建地主所有制 ，一些沙皇领导人认识到，为了作为军事大国而存在，他们必须发展工业（特别是铁路和军备） 。恩格斯写道，克里米亚战争（ 1853至1856年）后 ，俄罗斯政府着手“培育俄罗斯资产阶级” 。 （沙俄的对外政策， 1890年，马克思恩格斯全集第27卷）沙皇国家在俄罗斯社会保留着强大的力量直到第一次世界大战的危机而在1917年十月革命下被推翻。和俾斯麦一样，培育资本家阶级的沙皇国家也孕育了规模不大但强有力的工人阶级。
In China, the former Maoist-Stalinist state has used its massive power to ‘breed’ a Chinese capitalist class. The regime has adapted the state (the party, the army and the apparatus) to the transition to capitalism. But the state retains considerable power, while the new capitalist forces are, at this stage, an emergent social class in the process of formation.
在中国，前毛泽东斯大林主义国家利用其强大的权力'培育了'中国资产阶级。该政权已使国家（党，军队和国家机器）适应向资本主义的过渡。但是，国家保留了相当大的权力，而在这一阶段新的资本主义势力作为一个新兴的社会阶层处在形成过程中。
The burgeoning capitalist elements are very diverse, ranging from small family businesses to the owners of giant corporations. At this stage, they lack social cohesion and, as yet, have not developed any independent political representation. Many of the capitalists are ex-bureaucrats or state-sector bosses, and retain close links with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the apparatus. They are mostly quite content to allow the state to create the conditions for the growth of capitalist business, and provide ‘social stability’, that is, to protect them from resistance and mass protest by workers and peasants. At this stage, there is no threat to the regime’s absolute political power from the emergent capitalist class.
新兴的资本主义的要素是非常多样的，从小型家族企业到大公司的业主。在这个阶段，他们缺乏社会凝聚力，迄今为止，还没有发展出任何独立的政治代表。许多资本家是前官员或国有部门的老板，并与中国共产党（中共）和国家机器保持着密切联系。他们大多相当地满意于用国家的力量来为资本主义企业的生长创造条件并提供'社会稳定'的环境 ，也就是保护他们免受工人和农民的大规模的抗议活动的影响。在这个阶段，没有来自这个新兴资产阶级的对该政权的绝对的政治权力的威胁。
2008年11月6日星期四
新译文章《中国的国家性质》的部分（待全部译玩后校对整理）
The character of the Chinese state
Socialism Today’s China debate continues with a reply by LYNN WALSH to’s article, China’s Capitalist Counter-Revolution (Socialism Today No.114). In that article, Vincent argues that, to all intents and purposes, China is now a fully-fledged capitalist economy. Is it that clear cut?
中国的国家性质
当今社会主义关于中国性质的争论通过林恩•沃尔什（LYNN WALSH）对文森特•卡洛（Vincent Kolo）的文章《中国的资本主义反革命（114号当今社会主义）》的答辩继续着。在那篇文章中，文森特认为，从所有意图和目的看，中国现在是一个完全成熟的资本主义经济。这确定无疑吗？
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA are of crucial importance to socialists everywhere. The Chinese economy is now a major component of the global economy. With its increased economic and strategic weight, China is now a key player in relations between the major world powers. And political developments in China – the fate of the regime and struggles of the massive Chinese working class and poor peasantry – are of enormous significance internationally. At the same time, there has, not surprisingly, been a debate about the complex transition from a Maoist-Stalinist planned economy and the current character of the Chinese state.
对各处的社会主义者而言，中国的演变是至关重要的。中国经济现在是全球经济的一个重要组成部分。随着它的经济和战略性力量的增长，中国现在在世界主要大国关系之间扮演着一个关键的角色。中国的政治演变-政权的命运和中国工人阶级和贫困农民的大规模斗争-在国际上具有重大意义。与此同时，对于从毛泽东斯大林主义的计划经济到具有当前的特色的中国的复杂转变的争论也并不奇怪了。
In his article (www.socialismtoday.org/114/china), Vincent argued, in essence, that China is now a fully capitalist state. “The top echelons of the Chinese state… are now fully integrated into the global capitalist system”. In our view – the view of the leadership of the CWI – Vincent’s characterization is too categorical. The direction of travel of the Chinese state is clear enough, from the former Maoist-Stalinist planned economy, based on nationalised property, towards a capitalist economy. But, however powerful the locomotive, the train has not yet arrived at its destination. It is premature to declare: “Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”.
在他的文章（ www.socialismtoday.org/114/china ）中 ，文森特说，在本质上，中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。 “中国现在的高层已完全融入全球的资本主义制度中” 。在我们看来-工人国际委员会（CWI）的领导们的观点-文森特的描述是过于绝对。中国国家的走向是很清晰的，由基于国有所有制上的前毛派斯大林主义计划经济体制转向资本主义经济。但是，无论火车头有多么强大，火车还没有到达目的地。宣布：“中国特色的资本主义已经复辟” 是有些太早了 。
Although there are powerful and rapidly growing capitalist forces in China, the Chinese state is still a hybrid, combining remaining state-owned industries with ‘state capitalist’ enterprises (state-owned companies run on a more or less market basis) and with new elements of private capitalism (ranging from millions of individual businesses to giant Chinese and foreign corporations). The transition is not, in our view, complete and may not develop in a straight line. There can be significant twists and turns in the situation. It cannot be ruled out that, in the coming period of world economic crisis, the state will once again take over privately-owned corporations and some previously privatised companies threatened with collapse.
虽然在中国有强大的和迅速发展的资本主义势力，中国这个国家仍然是一个混合物，混合着具有“国家资本主义”企业（在或多或少的市场的基础上运行的国有企业）性质的剩余的国有工业和私人资本主义（从数以百万计的私营企业到大型的中国和外国公司）性质的新成分。在我们看来，转型还没有完成，也不会直线地发展演变。可能会出现曲折的局势。不能排除，在世界经济危机的今后一段时期里，国家将再次接管私人拥有的公司和一些濒临崩溃的曾经私有化的公司。
We believe that this debate is important and we welcome Vincent Kolo’s contribution. But, it may be asked, if both Vincent and ourselves agree that there is no longer a state-planned economy and that China is heading in a capitalist direction, is there a real difference? We believe there are important issues involved in this debate.
我们认为这场辩论是重要的，我们欢迎文森特投稿。但是，可能会问文森特和我们自己双方是否会同意在中国不可能重新出现国家计划经济，中国正在走向资本主义，这里有一个真正的区别吗？我们认为在本次辩论中有一些重要的问题。
First, there is the issue of method. Marxists should strive to analyse social phenomena (in this case, the changing Chinese state) in a rounded-out, scientific manner, not attempting to fit new developments into old stereotypes.
首先是方法的问题。马克思主义者应该努力以科学方式全面地分析社会现象（在这里是，中国国家的改变）而不是试图把新的发展状况纳入陈旧观念中。
A second issue, related to method, is the autonomous role that can be played under certain conditions by a powerful Bonapartist state (particularly an ex-Maoist-Stalinist state) in directing a social transformation from above.
第二个问题，与方法有关，是在一个强有力的波拿巴国家（特别是前毛派斯大林主义国家）的特定条件下在自上而下地领导社会变革中发挥作用的独立的角色的问题。
Third, there are issues of perspectives. It would be a mistake, in our view, to base ourselves on a single perspective that China will develop on purely capitalist lines, uninterrupted by turns in the direction of the regime. The advanced layers of the Chinese workers, in our view, have to be politically prepared for several different perspectives. In particular, they need to be prepared for the possibility that, faced with a deep economic crisis and a mass upsurge which threatens its survival, the regime will revert to much greater intervention in the economy, including taking over failing companies, in an attempt to defuse a potentially revolutionary situation.
第三，是一些展望的问题。在我们看来，立足于单一的角度认为中国将确立纯粹的资本主义路线而不会被其政权的转向而干扰将是错误的。在我们看来，中国工人的先进阶层，在政治上必须为几种不同的发展可能性做好准备。他们特别需要为如下可能性做好准备，面临着一个深刻的经济危机和威胁该政权生存的大规模斗争的升级，该政权将转向更大的对经济的干预，包括接管经营失败的公司来化解潜在的革命形势。
Socialism Today’s China debate continues with a reply by LYNN WALSH to’s article, China’s Capitalist Counter-Revolution (Socialism Today No.114). In that article, Vincent argues that, to all intents and purposes, China is now a fully-fledged capitalist economy. Is it that clear cut?
中国的国家性质
当今社会主义关于中国性质的争论通过林恩•沃尔什（LYNN WALSH）对文森特•卡洛（Vincent Kolo）的文章《中国的资本主义反革命（114号当今社会主义）》的答辩继续着。在那篇文章中，文森特认为，从所有意图和目的看，中国现在是一个完全成熟的资本主义经济。这确定无疑吗？
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA are of crucial importance to socialists everywhere. The Chinese economy is now a major component of the global economy. With its increased economic and strategic weight, China is now a key player in relations between the major world powers. And political developments in China – the fate of the regime and struggles of the massive Chinese working class and poor peasantry – are of enormous significance internationally. At the same time, there has, not surprisingly, been a debate about the complex transition from a Maoist-Stalinist planned economy and the current character of the Chinese state.
对各处的社会主义者而言，中国的演变是至关重要的。中国经济现在是全球经济的一个重要组成部分。随着它的经济和战略性力量的增长，中国现在在世界主要大国关系之间扮演着一个关键的角色。中国的政治演变-政权的命运和中国工人阶级和贫困农民的大规模斗争-在国际上具有重大意义。与此同时，对于从毛泽东斯大林主义的计划经济到具有当前的特色的中国的复杂转变的争论也并不奇怪了。
In his article (www.socialismtoday.org/114/china), Vincent argued, in essence, that China is now a fully capitalist state. “The top echelons of the Chinese state… are now fully integrated into the global capitalist system”. In our view – the view of the leadership of the CWI – Vincent’s characterization is too categorical. The direction of travel of the Chinese state is clear enough, from the former Maoist-Stalinist planned economy, based on nationalised property, towards a capitalist economy. But, however powerful the locomotive, the train has not yet arrived at its destination. It is premature to declare: “Capitalism, of a peculiar Chinese type, has been restored”.
在他的文章（ www.socialismtoday.org/114/china ）中 ，文森特说，在本质上，中国现在是一个完全的资本主义国家。 “中国现在的高层已完全融入全球的资本主义制度中” 。在我们看来-工人国际委员会（CWI）的领导们的观点-文森特的描述是过于绝对。中国国家的走向是很清晰的，由基于国有所有制上的前毛派斯大林主义计划经济体制转向资本主义经济。但是，无论火车头有多么强大，火车还没有到达目的地。宣布：“中国特色的资本主义已经复辟” 是有些太早了 。
Although there are powerful and rapidly growing capitalist forces in China, the Chinese state is still a hybrid, combining remaining state-owned industries with ‘state capitalist’ enterprises (state-owned companies run on a more or less market basis) and with new elements of private capitalism (ranging from millions of individual businesses to giant Chinese and foreign corporations). The transition is not, in our view, complete and may not develop in a straight line. There can be significant twists and turns in the situation. It cannot be ruled out that, in the coming period of world economic crisis, the state will once again take over privately-owned corporations and some previously privatised companies threatened with collapse.
虽然在中国有强大的和迅速发展的资本主义势力，中国这个国家仍然是一个混合物，混合着具有“国家资本主义”企业（在或多或少的市场的基础上运行的国有企业）性质的剩余的国有工业和私人资本主义（从数以百万计的私营企业到大型的中国和外国公司）性质的新成分。在我们看来，转型还没有完成，也不会直线地发展演变。可能会出现曲折的局势。不能排除，在世界经济危机的今后一段时期里，国家将再次接管私人拥有的公司和一些濒临崩溃的曾经私有化的公司。
We believe that this debate is important and we welcome Vincent Kolo’s contribution. But, it may be asked, if both Vincent and ourselves agree that there is no longer a state-planned economy and that China is heading in a capitalist direction, is there a real difference? We believe there are important issues involved in this debate.
我们认为这场辩论是重要的，我们欢迎文森特投稿。但是，可能会问文森特和我们自己双方是否会同意在中国不可能重新出现国家计划经济，中国正在走向资本主义，这里有一个真正的区别吗？我们认为在本次辩论中有一些重要的问题。
First, there is the issue of method. Marxists should strive to analyse social phenomena (in this case, the changing Chinese state) in a rounded-out, scientific manner, not attempting to fit new developments into old stereotypes.
首先是方法的问题。马克思主义者应该努力以科学方式全面地分析社会现象（在这里是，中国国家的改变）而不是试图把新的发展状况纳入陈旧观念中。
A second issue, related to method, is the autonomous role that can be played under certain conditions by a powerful Bonapartist state (particularly an ex-Maoist-Stalinist state) in directing a social transformation from above.
第二个问题，与方法有关，是在一个强有力的波拿巴国家（特别是前毛派斯大林主义国家）的特定条件下在自上而下地领导社会变革中发挥作用的独立的角色的问题。
Third, there are issues of perspectives. It would be a mistake, in our view, to base ourselves on a single perspective that China will develop on purely capitalist lines, uninterrupted by turns in the direction of the regime. The advanced layers of the Chinese workers, in our view, have to be politically prepared for several different perspectives. In particular, they need to be prepared for the possibility that, faced with a deep economic crisis and a mass upsurge which threatens its survival, the regime will revert to much greater intervention in the economy, including taking over failing companies, in an attempt to defuse a potentially revolutionary situation.
第三，是一些展望的问题。在我们看来，立足于单一的角度认为中国将确立纯粹的资本主义路线而不会被其政权的转向而干扰将是错误的。在我们看来，中国工人的先进阶层，在政治上必须为几种不同的发展可能性做好准备。他们特别需要为如下可能性做好准备，面临着一个深刻的经济危机和威胁该政权生存的大规模斗争的升级，该政权将转向更大的对经济的干预，包括接管经营失败的公司来化解潜在的革命形势。
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