国家的角色（中国国家性质）

国家的角色
VINCENT GIVES NO real analysis of the process of transition since Deng Xiaoping launched his pro-market reforms in 1978. In particular, the comments on the role of the state are inadequate. This means, in turn, that Vincent draws a simplistic picture of the unfolding counter-revolutionary processes.

文森特并没有真正的分析过自1978年邓小平发起他的支持市场的改革以来的过渡的进程。特别是，对国家的角色的评论是不适当的。反过来，这意味着文森特对正在展开的反革命进程给出了一个过分简单化的图片。
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The role of the state is a key factor in determining the character of the transitional regime. Vincent presents it simply as a ‘repressive apparatus’ that has shifted from the planned economy to capitalism. With the abandonment of central planning, the working class is no longer the “ruling economic class”. The Chinese state “has thrown in its lot with capitalism”. A section of the Maoist bureaucracy has converted itself through the “reform” process into “a property owning class”. “The victory of bourgeois counter-revolution, albeit in a peculiar ‘Confucian’ form, is today brutally clear”.
国家的角色在确定过渡性政权的性质上是一个关键因素。文森特仅仅把中国政权看作为已从计划经济转向资本主义的一个'镇压机器。随着放弃中央计划经济，工人阶级不再是“经济的统治阶级” 。中国国家在资本主义下“已经抛弃很多” 。毛主义官僚阶层已经通过“改革”进程转变为“有产阶级” 。 “虽然以特殊的'儒家'的形式，今天资产阶级反革命的胜利是极其清晰的”
There is truth in all of this, but Vincent’s analysis does not take sufficient account of the decisive role of the powerful Bonapartist state created by the Maoist-Stalinist regime. Far more than a repressive apparatus, the bureaucratic state has fostered the development of capitalist forces, with the aim of creating a new social base for its continued rule. It has used all the resources of the CCP and the state apparatus to direct the process of change from above and to retain, together with its monopoly of political power, a key role in the running of the economy. Its economic power is undoubtedly diminished compared with the situation under the centrally planned economy. But the state retains a far greater role in the economy than in capitalist countries like Japan and South Korea.
所有这一切中都包含有事实，但是文森特的分析没有充分考虑到毛派斯大林主义政权创建的强大的波拿巴国家的决定性的作用。远远不只是镇压仪机器，官僚国家促进了资本主义势力的发展，其目的是为其继续统治创建一个新的社会基础。它使用共产党和国家机器的所有资源从上面来指导变化的进程并连同其垄断的政治权力保留对经济运行发挥关键的作用。与中央计划经济的情况下相比，它的经济力量无疑是减小的。但是，中国国家比在资本主义国家如日本和韩国在经济中保留了一个更为重要的角色。
It is not a question of the Chinese state, the CCP and the state apparatus itself, being “the repository of the socially progressive features created by the 1949 revolution”. The state has clearly abandoned the relatively progressive planned economy. Nevertheless, to understand the processes taking place in China, we have to take account of the role played by the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state in the transition. The autonomous power of the state, neither controlled by the working class nor by the emergent capitalist class, together with significant elements of state industry and banking, determines the mixed or hybrid character of the transitional society that exists in China today.
这不是一个中国国家的问题，中共和国家机器本身是“1949年的革命创造的社会进步的核心力量” 。国家已明确放弃了比较进步的计划经济。然而，为了了解在中国发生的过程，我们必须考虑前毛泽东斯大林主义国家在过渡中所发挥的作用。既没有被工人阶级控制也没有被新兴的资产阶级所控制的国家自发的权力，连同国有工业和国有银行这些重要组成部分，确定了在今日中国存在着社会过渡的混合或杂交的性质。
Leaving aside for a moment the question of what stage has been reached, the counter-revolutionary process in China is not simply a transfer from one ruling class (the working class) to another (the bourgeoisie). In the aftermath of the second world war, the magnificent revolutionary mass movement of the Chinese peasants and workers swept away landlordism, capitalism and their imperialist patrons. The transformation of 1949, however, was directed from above by the Maoist leadership of the peasant Red Army and the bureaucratised (Stalinised) Communist Party. Under the planned economy, which was run on Stalinist lines, there were (as Vincent points out) important social gains for the workers and peasants that have now been largely wiped out.
暂时撇开已经达到什么阶段的问题，中国的反革命进程不仅是由一个统治阶级（工人阶级）转移到另一个统治阶级（资产阶级） 。第二次世界大战之后，中国农民和工人的宏伟的革命群众运动扫除了封建主义 、资本主义和它们的帝国主义支持者。但是，1949年的转变是直接由农民红军和官僚化的（ 斯大林化 ）共产党的毛主义领导者从上面领导达成的。在运行在斯大林路线上的计划经济下，（如文森特指出的）工人和农民获得了现在已经基本上被取消的重要的社会福利。
The working class and peasantry, however, were excluded from any democratic participation in the running of the state or the economy. They were denied any independent, democratic trade unions or political organisations. The centrally planned economy was historically progressive compared to capitalism and was therefore in the interests of the working class. In this sense, the working class could be described as the ‘ruling economic class’. But, politically, the working class never became the ruling class. That would have required the working class to overthrow the bureaucracy and establish workers’ democracy – a political revolution. China (like the Soviet Union under Stalin) was ruled by a bureaucratic caste through a monstrous apparatus consisting of the CCP and the state machine itself. Unchecked by workers’ democracy, the state became a monstrous behemoth wielding enormous power over every area of society.

可是，工人阶级和农民，被排除在任何民主参与国家或经济的运行。他们被拒绝拥有任何独立的，民主的工会或政治组织。与资本主义相比，中央计划经济是具有历史进步性的，因此也是符合工人阶级利益的。在这个意义上说，工人阶级可以说是'经济的统治阶级。但是，在政治上，工人阶级从来没有成为统治阶级。这需要工人阶级推翻官僚作风，并建立工人民主——政治革命。官僚阶级通过由中共和国家机器本身组成的巨大的工具统治着中国（如斯大林治下的前苏联）。没有工人民主的监督，国家成为一个可怕的庞然大物在社会的各个领域掌控着巨大的力量。
For nearly three decades the bureaucratic Maoist elite defended the planned economy as the basis of its power and privileges. In the 1970s, however, the planned economy (as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) began to flounder under the weight of bureaucratic mismanagement. Deng Xiaoping introduced ‘reforms’, elements of the market economy (inevitably stimulating the emergence of capitalist relations), initially with the aim of stimulating growth and shoring up the planned economy. However, after the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the other Stalinist states following the fall of the Berlin wall, Deng and other leaders concluded that the planned economy was no longer viable and they could preserve their power only through a transition to a market economy. In reality, this inevitably meant moving towards a capitalist economy. Of course, the regime tried to disguise this by presenting the new course as ‘market socialism’.
近30年里，毛主义官僚精英捍卫着作为其权力和特权基础的计划经济。然而，在1970年代，在官僚管理不善的重压下，计划经济（如苏联和东欧）开始困难重重。邓小平提出“改革”， 引进市场经济要素（不可避免地刺激产生资本主义的关系）的最初目的是为了刺激增长和支撑计划经济。然而，在随着柏林墙的倒塌苏联和其他斯大林主义国家迅速瓦解后，邓小平和其他领导人得出结论计划经济体制已不再可行，他们只有通过向市场经济过渡来维护他们的权力。在现实中，这不可避免地意味着走向资本主义经济。当然，该政权试图通过提出叫“市场社会主义”的新的理论来掩盖这一点。
Paramount for the CCP leaders was the need to retain the power of their regime. The regime was profoundly shaken by the mass protest movement that culminated in the bloody Tiananmen Square events. From that and the events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Chinese leaders concluded that they could not tolerate any political liberalisation: there would be no democratic reforms accompanying the moves towards the market.
对中共领导人来说极为重要的是需要保持他们的政权。该政权被最终导致血腥的天安门事件的大规模的抗议活动深深震撼了。从这一事件以及苏联和东欧的事件发生后，中国领导人得出结论认为，他们无法容忍任何政治自由化：走向市场过程中就不会相应地进行民主改革。

At the same time, the Chinese regime concluded that it should at all costs avoid the kind of ‘big bang’ economic transition that had taken place in the Soviet Union. Sweeping privatisation of the state industries had not only provoked an economic disaster but had (as was intended by US advocates of the ‘big bang’) shattered the bureaucratic, Stalinist state apparatus and the Communist Party. There would be no Chinese Yeltsin.
与此同时，中国政权得出结论，它应该不惜一切代价避免苏联经济转型中发生的'休克疗法'。国有企业彻底的私有化不仅挑起了一场经济灾难，而且（正是由美国倡导的'休克疗法' 希望看到的）打破了斯大林主义国家机器和共产党官僚政治。就不会有中国的叶利钦。
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Chinese regime proceeded incrementally towards the capitalist market. It promoted market forces in the countryside and opened the door to foreign trans-national corporations in the economic development zones. Private enterprises were allowed to develop in urban areas alongside the state-owned enterprises. The regime, fearing a surge of social and political unrest, has moved cautiously and incrementally towards the privatisation or ‘corporatisation’ of SOEs. It has undoubtedly opened the door to the ruthless, super-exploitation of workers. At the same time, it has been cautious about the freeing of prices and the cutting or abolition of subsidies for fuel and food.

与苏联相反，中国的政权实施小步走向资本主义市场。它在农村推进了市场力量并在经济开发区向外国跨国公司敞开了大门。与城市地区，在国有企业外允许民营企业的发展。该政权担心社会和政治动乱的爆发，一直在谨慎和逐步实现国有企业的私有化或'公司化'。毫无疑问，敞开了对工人超级的无情剥削的大门。与此同时，在放开价格和削减或取消燃料和食品的补贴上一直持谨慎态度。
So far, as a result of this incremental approach – and given the absence of an organised mass opposition to the regime – the Chinese leadership has preserved the regime and the state bureaucracy largely intact. Clearly, it is no longer in complete command of a centrally planned economy. But it retains powerful levers for steering the direction of economic change. Vincent says that “the state’s economic power has been seriously degraded”. But it retains far more power than in economies where capitalism has been consolidated as the dominant socio-economic system. Moreover, the regime has attempted to adapt the ex-Maoist-Stalinist state machine and the CCP (with over 70 million members) to the tasks of directing a market-dominated economy.
到目前为止，作为这种渐进的方式的结果-由于缺乏针对该政权的一个有组织的群众反对派-中国领导层保持了政权并且国家官僚机构基本上完好无损。显然，它不再是中央计划经济全权领导。但它继续控制着指导经济改革方向的强大的杠杆。文森特说： “国家的经济力量已严重退化。 ”但它保留了远远高于那些资本主义已巩固为社会经济制度的主导的经济体的更多的权力。此外，该政权一直试图使前毛泽东斯大林主义国家机器和中共（超过70万会员）适应引导经济走上市场为主导的任务。
In his recent book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (2008), David Shambaugh writes: “… the CCP has atrophied over time and its Leninist [Maoist-Stalinist] instruments of control are not as sharp as in the past, but its tools of rule are far from blunt – and they are being re-strengthened. The party remains a nationwide organisation of considerable authority and power. It is the only political game in town. Through its monopoly on personnel management (through the nomenklatura and bianzhi [selective appointment] systems), the party effectively controls not only the government at all levels but also a wide variety of professional institutions, corporations and enterprises, universities and research institutions, and service organisations. It also controls the military and all coercive institutions (People’s Armed Police, People’s Militia, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Public Security). It also controls much of the media and flow of information to and within society. The party certainly does not intend to relinquish these instruments of control – quite to the contrary, it has been doing much to strengthen them. It also brooks no opposition, and it quickly suppresses any sign of organised political activity”.
在他最近的书，《中国共产党：萎缩和适应（ 2008年）》 ，David Shambaugh写道： “ ... 随着时间的推移中共已萎缩及其列宁主义[毛泽东斯大林主义] 控制工具并不象过去一样具有锋芒，但其统治的工具远远没有钝化-他们正在重新加强。党仍然是一个具有相当权威和权力的全国性的组织。这是城里的唯一的政治游戏。通过其对人事管理的垄断（通过nomenklatura[党管干部]和bianzhi [选择性任命]的制度） ，党不仅有效地控制了各级政府而且控制了各种各样的专业机构、公司企业、大学和研究机构，以及服务组织。它还控制着军队和所有强制性机构（人民武装警察部队，民兵，国家安全部和公安部） 。另外，它还控制大部分的媒体和社会中的信息流转。党当然不打算放弃这些控制工具-恰恰相反，它一直在加强它们。它也不容反对派，并迅速抑制任何组织政治活动的迹象。”